David Rhodes v. Ricardo Chavez ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                               MAR 03 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DAVID THOMAS RHODES,                             No. 13-17368
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01971-DGC
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    RICARDO E. CHAVEZ, individually and
    in his official capacity as Warden of FCI
    Phoenix; et al.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 24, 2016**
    Before:        LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
    David Thomas Rhodes, a former federal prisoner, appeals pro se from the
    district court’s judgment dismissing his action brought under Bivens v. Six
    Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
     (1971),
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    alleging that he was incarcerated beyond the term of his sentence. We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a district court’s
    dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Paul, 
    547 F.3d 1055
    , 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We vacate and remand.
    The district court dismissed Rhodes’ action as barred by the applicable
    statute of limitations. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-542(1) (two-year statute of
    limitations for personal injury actions); W. Ctr. For Journalism v. Cederquist, 
    235 F.3d 1153
    , 1156 (9th Cir. 2000) (for Bivens claims, federal courts apply the forum
    state’s personal injury statute of limitations and federal law for determining
    accrual). However, as appellees concede, the dismissal was improper because
    Rhodes was pursuing habeas relief when he was released from custody, and thus
    his claim did not accrue before his release. See Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
    ,
    489-90 (1994) (“[A prisoner’s 42 U.S.C.] § 1983 cause of action for damages
    attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the
    conviction or sentence has been invalidated.”); Erlin v. United States, 
    364 F.3d 1127
    , 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that under Heck, a cause of action for
    miscalculation of a prisoner’s release date does not accrue until the prisoner has
    won a writ of habeas corpus); Martin v. Sias, 
    88 F.3d 774
    , 775 (9th Cir. 1996)
    (order) (“Heck applies to Bivens actions.”).
    2                                     13-17368
    Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal of Rhodes’ action to the extent that the
    district court concluded it was barred by the statute of limitations, and remand for
    further proceedings. We express no opinion on whether the district court had
    personal jurisdiction over defendants Johnson and Watts.
    Appellees shall bear the costs on appeal.
    VACATED and REMANDED.
    3                                    13-17368