United States v. Jesus Covarruvias-Villareal ( 2023 )


Menu:
  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 7 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    21-50310
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. Nos.
    3:21-cr-00031-WQH-1
    v.                                             3:21-cr-00031-WQH
    JESUS COVARRUVIAS-VILLAREAL,
    MEMORANDUM*
    Defendant-Appellant.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    21-50311
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. Nos.
    3:21-cr-01706-WQH-1
    v.                                             3:21-cr-01706-WQH
    JESUS COVARRUVIAS-VILLAREAL,
    AKA Jesus Cobarruvias-Villareal,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted March 16, 2023
    Pasadena, California
    Before: PAEZ, CHRISTEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Jesus Covarruvias-Villareal appeals his 12-month sentence for illegal reentry
    under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
     and his 10-month sentence for violation of the terms of his
    supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We affirm.
    1. Breach of Plea Agreement. In July 2021, Covarruvias-Villareal entered
    into a plea agreement for his illegal reentry charge. The government agreed to
    recommend that Covarruvias-Villareal receive a “COVID variance” at
    sentencing—a two-level downward variance under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) “due to the
    nature of th[e] case and as part of the Temporary Plea Offer program.” The plea
    agreement also contained a breach waiver provision, under which Covarruvias-
    Villareal agreed to waive “any claim that the Government has not complied with
    this agreement” if he failed to raise it “before the sentencing hearing is complete.”
    At sentencing, the court expressed skepticism about whether Covarruvias-
    Villareal deserved to receive the COVID variance. In response, the government’s
    counsel made several comments about Covarruvias-Villareal’s criminal history.1
    Covarruvias-Villareal argues on appeal that the government’s comments amounted
    to a breach of the plea agreement’s promise that the government would
    recommend the variance. The government responds that Covarruvias-Villareal
    1
    The government stated that it “st[oo]d by . . . the COVID variance,” but noted
    that the variance was “very generous in light of the defendant’s criminal history.”
    The government proceeded to discuss the nature of Covarruvias-Villareal’s prior
    criminal offenses, including that several of the offenses “don’t score” as points for
    calculating his criminal history category.
    2
    waived any breach of the plea agreement by failing to object at sentencing, and that
    in any event, counsel’s comments did not amount to breach.
    Because Covarruvias-Villareal’s counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s
    statements at sentencing, his claim of breach is subject to plain error review. See
    United States v. Whitney, 
    673 F.3d 965
    , 970 (9th Cir. 2012). One factor we must
    consider under plain error review is whether the error affected the defendant’s
    substantial rights. 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). An error affects a defendant’s substantial
    rights if there is a reasonable probability that it affected the outcome. United
    States v. Gonzalez-Aguilar, 
    718 F.3d 1185
    , 1189 (9th Cir. 2013); see also United
    States v. Farias-Contreras, 
    60 F.4th 534
    , 545–46 (9th Cir. 2023).
    Here, even assuming that Covarruvias-Villareal’s claim is not waived and
    that the government’s comments breached the plea agreement, we conclude that
    the breach did not affect Covarruvias-Villareal’s substantial rights. There is strong
    evidence that the district court intended to reject the COVID variance from the
    outset of the sentencing hearing. Indeed, prior to the prosecutor’s remarks, the
    court stated that it was “not necessarily inclined to apply” the variance. The court
    explained that it had already taken COVID circumstances into account when it
    sentenced Covarruvias-Villareal in February 2021 for a separate § 1326 charge (for
    which he received time-served). The court expressed reluctance to give
    Covarruvias-Villareal the variance a second time, reasoning that he “kn[ew] better
    3
    than anybody that custody is more difficult during the pandemic.” And while the
    court referred to the prosecutor’s statements about criminal history later in the
    hearing, the court provided significantly more detail than the government,
    suggesting that it relied on the facts in the pre-sentence report rather than on the
    government’s brief statements. See Gonzalez-Aguilar, 
    718 F.3d at
    1187–89.
    Given the court’s stated rationale for declining to apply the variance, Covarruvias-
    Villareal cannot show he suffered prejudice from a breach of the plea agreement.
    2. Sentencing Errors. Covarruvias-Villareal argues that his cumulative 22-
    month sentence with a 3-year period of supervised release is unreasonable. In his
    plea agreement, Covarruvias-Villareal waived “all rights to appeal . . . [the]
    sentence,” subject to exceptions not applicable here. Assuming, without deciding,
    that the government breached the plea agreement and that Covarruvias-Villareal is
    therefore relieved of his appeal waiver, we conclude that the sentence is
    reasonable. Challenges to a criminal sentence are reviewed “under a deferential
    abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41 (2007). Such
    challenges are analyzed “in two steps: First, we consider whether the district court
    committed significant procedural error. Second, we consider the substantive
    reasonableness of the sentence.” United States v. Rosales-Gonzales, 
    801 F.3d 1177
    , 1179 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
    Covarruvias-Villareal argues that the court procedurally erred by failing to
    4
    apply a COVID variance for reasons inconsistent with the policy behind the
    variance. This argument is properly considered in the context of substantive
    unreasonableness because we do not procedurally review “whether the district
    court correctly applied [the relevant departure provision].” 
    Id. at 1180
     (alterations
    in original) (quoting United States v. Tankersley, 
    537 F.3d 1100
    , 1114 (9th
    Cir.2008)).
    Covarruvias-Villareal asserts that his sentence is substantively unreasonable
    because the court improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors, ignored the joint
    sentencing recommendation of the parties, and failed to consider the circumstances
    of the pandemic. These arguments are unpersuasive. The sentence imposed
    reasonably reflects the district court’s concern for deterrence in light of
    Covarruvias-Villareal’s recent, repeated reentries. It was not unreasonable for the
    court to weigh deterrent interests more heavily than pandemic-related concerns
    when Covarruvias-Villareal had received a COVID variance earlier that year to
    little deterrent effect. The court also was not required to select a sentence
    contemplated by the plea agreement. The district court weighed other § 3553(a)
    factors, including Covarruvias-Villareal’s family and economic motivations for
    entering the United States, but reasonably determined that a 22-month sentence
    was necessary.
    AFFIRMED.
    5