Doc's Dream, LLC v. Dolores Press, Inc. ( 2017 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FEB 23 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DOC’S DREAM, LLC, No. 15-56096
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:15-cv-02857-R-PLA
v.
DOLORES PRESS, INC. and MELISSA MEMORANDUM*
SCOTT,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 9, 2017**
Pasadena, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, NGUYEN, Circuit Judge, and AMON,*** District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Doc’s Dream, LLC (“Appellant”) appeals the district court’s order
dismissing this declaratory action for failure to state a claim under Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). We have jurisdiction under
12 U.S.C. § 1291 and review de novo a dismissal without leave to amend. Dumas
v. Kipp, 90 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 1996). We review for abuse of discretion,
however, a district court’s denial of leave to amend. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG
Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). Because the parties are familiar
with the facts and the procedural history, we will not recount them here.
The district court correctly concluded that Appellant failed to adequately
plead its copyright abandonment claim under the requirements of Rule 8. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a). Appellant did not allege in its complaint that Dr. Eugene Scott
actually owned any copyrights to the audio and video recordings that he created to
promote his ministry. Because copyright ownership is a prerequisite for
abandonment, see Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th
Cir. 1960), Appellant’s complaint does not “state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, the district court should have given Appellant an opportunity to
amend its complaint. “[I]n a line of cases stretching back nearly [65] years, we
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have held that in dismissing for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), ‘a
district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading
was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the
allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). “Dismissal
without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear, upon de novo review, that the
complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298
F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, “[a]n outright refusal to grant leave to
amend without a justifying reason is . . . an abuse of discretion.” Manzarek v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008)).
Here, the district court offered no reason why Appellant could not simply
amend its complaint to allege that Dr. Scott once held the copyrights to his works.
Furthermore, it dismissed Appellant’s complaint on a ground that Defendants did
not raise and neither party briefed. See Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902,
907 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the “district court erred in denying . . .
leave to amend” where it “sua sponte dismissed the complaint on standing
grounds”). We therefore remand to the district court with instructions to grant
Appellant leave to amend.
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AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
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