Dukeshane Palk v. C. M. Harrison ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 17 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S . CO U RT OF AP PE A LS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DUKESHANE TORRES PALK, No. 09-55977
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:04-cv-08571-MMM-
CT
v.
C. M. HARRISON, Warden, MEMORANDUM *
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 10, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: TROTT, WARDLAW, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
Duµeshane Palµ appeals the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. Palµ is currently incarcerated for crimes of domestic violence
against his ex-girlfriend, K.A. Palµ argues that the state court of appeal made
errors of fact and law in concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
by withholding K.A.'s past medical records. Palµ argues also that the trial court
erred by failing to define a 'dating relationship' for the jury, necessary for a
domestic violence sentencing enhancement. The California State Court of Appeal
considered Palµ's claims regarding K.A.'s medical records but not the jury
instructions. We affirm.
We review de novo the district court's decision to grant or deny a 28 U.S.C.
y 2254 habeas petition. Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 2004). We
review findings of fact made by the district court for clear error. See Riley v.
Payne, 352 F.3d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, a habeas petitioner whose claim was adjudicated on
the merits in state court is not entitled to relief in federal court unless it is
demonstrated that the state court's adjudication '(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.' 28 U.S.C. y 2254(d).
Before trial, Palµ's counsel requested that the court review K.A.'s medical
records for documents related to four specific areas. The state court of appeal
reviewed the documents and transcripts and found that the trial court did not
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improperly withhold requested impeachment documents. ER 494. The district
court identified a few documents that arguably fell under the purview of Palµ's
requested disclosure, but concluded that the state court of appeal's determination
was not unreasonable. ER 51. This factual finding by the district court was not
clearly erroneous, and Palµ does not dispute the state court of appeal's finding that
K.A.'s medical records contained no documents relevant to the four specifically
requested areas.
Instead, Palµ attempts to maneuver around the dearth of documents in the
specific areas he requested by arguing that the state court of appeal's conclusion
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by withholding K.A.'s past medical
records violated clearly established federal law in two ways: (1) he was unable to
present a complete defense, and (2) he was unable to impeach K.A., in violation of
the Confrontation Clause. Neither argument is availing.
Palµ was able to present a complete defense. K.A.'s past medical records
would have contributed minimal, if any, probative value to Palµ's criminal
proceedings, and Palµ had sufficient information to present his 'new' theory at
trial: that K.A. was beaten by another ex-boyfriend and she inculpated Palµ as a
cover. The exclusion of evidence of third-party culpability, absent substantial
evidence tending to directly connect that person with the actual commission of the
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offense, or tangential evidence of something that may have happened at a different
time and place, does not constitute a due process violation. Walters v.
McCormicµ, 122 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1997).
The withholding of K.A.'s medical records did not violate the Confrontation
Clause. Palµ overstates the evidence contained in K.A.'s past medical records;
nothing in them shows a bias on the part of K.A., and Palµ was not prohibited from
engaging in appropriate cross-examination.
The trial court's error in failing to define 'domestic violence' for the jury
was harmless. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). K.A. testified
that she and Palµ dated for almost a year. ER 109-10. K.A.'s grandmother
testified that K.A. and Palµ were dating. ER 189-90. K.A. told a responding
police officer that Palµ was her boyfriend. ER 206. During opening statements,
Palµ's counsel described one of the incidents between K.A. and Palµ as being
precipitated by Palµ's telling K.A. that he '[did not] want to be with her anymore.'
ER 106. Palµ did not contest that he had been dating or engaged in a dating
relationship with K.A. at any point during trial.
AFFIRMED.
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FILED
Palµ v. Harrison, 09-55977 DEC 17 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
IKUTA, Circuit Judge, concurring: U.S . CO U RT OF AP PE A LS
I concur in the result. Because Palµ's claims fail under de novo review, they
necessarily fail under AEDPA's more deferential standard. See Berghuis v.
Thompµins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010).