United States v. Agustin Vazquez-Alcala , 407 F. App'x 172 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              DEC 27 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 09-50563
    Plaintiff - Appellee,              D.C. No. 3:08-cr-03799-JLS-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    AGUSTIN VAZQUEZ-ALCALA,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted December 10, 2010
    Pasadena, California
    Before: TROTT, WARDLAW, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
    Agustin Vazquez-Alcala appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty
    plea to illegal reentry after removal, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a), asserting Apprendi error,
    Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 490 (2000), because the date of his removal
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    was neither proven by the government nor admitted by him. We agree and,
    accordingly, vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
    The indictment charged Vazquez under 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1326
    (a) and (b) and
    alleged that he was “removed from the United States subsequent to December 19,
    1996.” However, during the plea colloquy, the date of removal was not admitted
    by Vazquez; nor was it necessary for the magistrate judge to elicit the date of
    removal as it is not an essential element of a violation of § 1326(a).
    Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 227 (1998) (concluding that
    facts listed in § 1326(b) are sentencing factors and not elements of a separate
    offense); United States v. Cazares, 
    121 F.3d 1241
    , 1248 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he
    effect of a guilty plea [is limited] to an admission of the facts essential to the
    validity of the conviction.”). Despite the omission from the plea colloquy of any
    mention of a removal date, the magistrate judge found in its Findings and
    Recommendation that Vazquez was “removed from the United States after
    December 19, 1996.” Although there was no evidentiary basis for this finding,
    Vazquez did not object at the time.
    The district court accepted the plea of guilty, which lacked a factual
    predicate for a sentencing enhancement under § 1326(b), United States v.
    Zepeda-Martinez, 
    470 F.3d 909
    , 913 (9th Cir. 2006), and was defective under Rule
    2
    11, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G), (b)(3); United States v. Minore, 
    292 F.3d 1109
    , 1115–17 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 
    426 U.S. 637
    (1976)).
    The presentence report recommended that Vazquez’s offense level be
    enhanced for removal after a conviction for a drug trafficking offense. Vazquez
    objected on the ground that the government had failed to prove, and he did not
    admit, that he was removed after December 19, 1996, following his conviction for
    a drug trafficking offense. Because the temporal relation between a removal and a
    prior conviction is a fact that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial or
    admitted by the defendant, United States v. Covian-Sandoval, 
    462 F.3d 1090
    , 1098
    (9th Cir. 2006), the district court committed Apprendi error when it enhanced
    Vazquez’s sentence under § 1326(b).
    Although the government possessed Vazquez’s warrant of removal, and
    could readily have introduced it to meet its burden of proof, it failed to do so.1
    Thus, the Apprendi error was not harmless because the court lacked
    “overwhelming and uncontroverted” evidence demonstrating the date of removal.
    United States v. Salazar-Lopez, 
    506 F.3d 748
    , 755 (9th Cir. 2007); Zepeda-
    1
    We deny the government’s belated effort to introduce the warrant of removal on appeal
    via its “motion to supplement the record and take judicial notice.”
    3
    Martinez, 
    470 F.3d at 913
    . Therefore, we must vacate the sentence and remand to
    the district court for resentencing.
    The district court did not err by failing to rule on Vazquez’s objections to the
    presentence report because “[o]nly specific factual objections trigger Rule
    32(i)(3)(B).” United States v. Stoterau, 
    524 F.3d 988
    , 1011 (9th Cir. 2008).
    We remand for resentencing on an open record. United States v. Matthews,
    
    278 F.3d 880
    , 885–87 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
    VACATED and REMANDED.
    4