John Fields v. Renee Baker ( 2023 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAR 30 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN VERNON FIELDS, No. 20-17342
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.
3:16-cv-00298-MMD-CLB
v. District of Nevada,
Reno
RENEE BAKER, Warden; ATTORNEY
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF ORDER
NEVADA,
Respondents-Appellees.
Before: NGUYEN and KOH, Circuit Judges, and BOUGH,* District Judge.
The memorandum disposition filed on December 13, 2022 is hereby
amended by the memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this order. With
the memorandum disposition so amended, the panel has voted to deny the petition
for panel rehearing. Judge Nguyen and Judge Koh have voted to deny the petition
for rehearing en banc, and Judge Bough has so recommended.
The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc and no
judge of the court has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc.
Fed. R. App. P. 35.
The petition for panel rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc, Dkt. 46,
*
The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.
are DENIED. No further petitions for rehearing will be accepted.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 30 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN VERNON FIELDS, No. 20-17342
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.
3:16-cv-00298-MMD-CLB
v.
AMENDED
RENEE BAKER, Warden; ATTORNEY MEMORANDUM*
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF
NEVADA,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 9, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: NGUYEN and KOH, Circuit Judges, and BOUGH,*** District Judge.
John Fields (“Fields”) appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.
a writ of habeas corpus. Fields was convicted of first-degree murder with use of a
deadly weapon and conspiracy in Nevada state court. On direct appeal to the
Nevada Supreme Court, Fields challenged the admission of bad act evidence
during his trial. Here, he argues that his direct appeal counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel (“IAC”) because his counsel submitted the trial record but
failed to submit trial exhibits and a recording related to the bad act evidence. The
Nevada Supreme Court on post-conviction review held that Fields failed to show
prejudice. We affirm the district court’s denial of Fields’s petition.
Assuming without deciding that Fields’s appellate counsel’s performance
was deficient, Fields has failed to show that he was prejudiced. See Creech v.
Richardson, 59 F.4th 372, 384 (9th Cir. 2023) (acknowledging that a panel need
not reach the performance prong if an IAC claim may be disposed of on prejudice).
1. Fields argues that the Nevada Supreme Court’s post-conviction
decision is not entitled to deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). He argues that the Nevada Supreme Court applied a
higher prejudice standard than required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668(1984), and that the Nevada Supreme Court unreasonably determined that Fields
and his wife, Linda Fields (“Linda”), were not similarly situated.
First, the Nevada Supreme Court’s post-conviction decision is not contrary
to clearly established law. The court stated the correct standard: “[P]etitioner must
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demonstrate . . . that the omitted issue would have had a reasonable probability of
success on appeal.” It also cited a Nevada case that adopted the Strickland
standard. The court further stated that “Fields does not explain how the outcome
of his claim would have been different” and “Fields fails to demonstrate that the
result of his appeal would have been different.” Although Fields argues that these
statements are evidence that the court applied a higher standard, the statements are
at worst ambiguous. This ambiguity is not enough to overcome AEDPA deference
because “it is possible to read the state court’s decision in a way that comports with
clearly established federal law.” Mann v. Ryan, 828 F.3d 1143, 1157 (9th Cir.
2016) (en banc).
Second, the Nevada Supreme Court’s determination that Fields and Linda
were not similarly situated is not objectively unreasonable. See Andrews v. Davis,
944 F.3d 1092, 1107 (9th Cir. 2019). Fields argues that his and Linda’s trials used
very similar witnesses and evidence, and Linda raised the same challenge to the
bad act evidence in her direct appeal and was successful. However, the Nevada
Supreme Court’s conclusion is supported by the record. The court correctly stated
that Fields was charged with conspiracy and Linda was not. Furthermore, the
prosecution at Fields’s trial presented different theories of the case than the
prosecution at Linda’s trial. At Linda’s trial, the prosecution argued that Linda
killed the victim for money or because he molested Linda’s grandson, and the bad
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act evidence was inconsistent with the latter theory. At Fields’s trial, the
prosecution focused on Fields’s financial motive, a theory with which the bad act
evidence was consistent.
2. Fields has failed to prove the prejudice prong of Strickland under the
highly deferential standard of AEDPA. See Creech, 59 F.4th at 385. “A state
court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so
long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s
decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).
Fairminded jurists could disagree about whether the inclusion of the trial
exhibits and recording would have changed the outcome of Fields’s direct appeal.
Fields argues that reviewing the trial exhibits and hearing the recording would
have led the Nevada Supreme Court to conclude that the bad act evidence was
more prejudicial than probative. However, Fields’s direct appeal counsel
submitted transcripts of the trial, which included the trial court’s summary of the
recording and a witness’s summary and discussion of the missing trial exhibits.
The Nevada Supreme Court acknowledged that this was sufficient for it to review
Fields’s claim. The court also acknowledged that any risk of unfair prejudice from
the bad act evidence was mitigated by the trial court’s limiting instruction and the
fact that the prosecution made minimal use of the bad act evidence.
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In addition, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that “there was sufficient
proof, independent of the [bad act] evidence, to convict Fields.” For example,
Fields’s brother-in-law overheard Fields ask Linda, “What if they found out we
dumped the body?” Fields’s brother-in-law also testified that Linda’s daughter
told him that the Fieldses were arguing with the victim about money on the night
before the victim disappeared. Another witness testified that the Fieldses
suggested running the victim over and pushing him into the river. A third witness
testified that Fields did not intend to tell the police that his truck’s haul capacity
was consistent with the police theory of the murder. Finally, a handwriting expert
testified that it was “probable” that Fields wrote the victim’s will. Fields’s defense
at trial was that he was unaware of Linda’s murder scheme. A reasonable jurist
could have found this evidence sufficient to undercut Fields’s defense without
relying on the bad act evidence.
Fairminded jurists could disagree about whether the trial exhibits and
recording would have led the Nevada Supreme Court to reverse Fields’s conviction
based on a finding that the probative value of the bad act evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Therefore, the court’s
post-conviction conclusion that Fields was not prejudiced by his attorney’s
performance precludes federal habeas relief. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102.
AFFIRMED.
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