Jing Feng v. Merrick Garland ( 2023 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 30 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JING FENG; XIAOTAO SUN,                         No.   21-70666
    Petitioners,                    Agency Nos.      A205-186-749
    A205-186-750
    v.
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney                    MEMORANDUM*
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted March 9, 2023**
    Las Vegas, Nevada
    Before: GRABER, BENNETT, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.
    Petitioner Jing Feng is a native and citizen of China who seeks asylum,
    withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. She
    claims that the Chinese government forced her to have an abortion and have an
    IUD inserted in 2011 after she became pregnant with her second child in violation
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    of China’s then-active one-child policy.
    The immigration judge (“IJ”) denied relief, and the Board of Immigration
    Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed. Petitioner timely filed this petition.
    Over Petitioner’s objection, the IJ admitted the asylum officer’s notes from
    Petitioner’s initial asylum interview. Petitioner contested the accuracy of the notes
    and demanded the opportunity to cross-examine the officer. The IJ did not require
    the government to “make a good faith effort” to produce the asylum officer at the
    hearing. Alcaraz-Enriquez v. Garland, 
    19 F.4th 1224
    , 1231 (9th Cir. 2021)
    (citation omitted). In his written decision, the IJ made an adverse credibility
    determination and found the other evidence alone insufficient to support
    Petitioner’s claims. The IJ premised his adverse credibility finding on
    discrepancies between Petitioner’s testimony at the hearing and the asylum
    officer’s notes.
    Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in immigration
    proceedings, the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process does apply.
    Cinapian v. Holder, 
    567 F.3d 1067
    , 1074 (9th Cir. 2009). In the immigration
    context, the admission of evidence must be “fundamentally fair.” 
    Id.
     Specifically,
    an asylum officer’s notes must have “sufficient indicia of reliability” to be
    admitted into evidence. Singh v. Gonzales, 
    403 F.3d 1081
    , 1089 (9th Cir. 2005).
    And if a petitioner: (1) objects to the admission of the interviewing officer’s notes,
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    (2) contests a material portion of the notes’ contents, and (3) asks for the officer to
    be produced, the government must attempt to make the officer available for cross-
    examination. Alcaraz-Enriquez, 19 F.4th at 1231; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B). To
    prevail on a due process challenge, a petitioner also must show “substantial
    prejudice.” Rodriguez-Jimenez v. Garland, 
    20 F.4th 434
    , 440 (9th Cir. 2021)
    (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Alam v. Garland, 
    11 F.4th 1133
    ,
    1135–36 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc).
    Here, the officer’s notes were properly admitted into evidence because they
    were reliable. See Espinoza v. I.N.S., 
    45 F.3d 308
    , 310 (9th Cir. 1995); Singh, 
    403 F.3d at
    1085–90. But even so, Petitioner should have had the opportunity to cross-
    examine the interviewing officer at the hearing because she contested the accuracy
    of the notes, asked to cross-examine the asylum officer, and objected to the
    admission of the report in the absence of that opportunity. See Alcaraz-Enriquez,
    19 F.4th at 1231.
    The government’s failure to make a good faith effort to make the officer
    available for cross-examination was prejudicial because “the outcome of the
    proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.” Cinapian, 
    567 F.3d at 1074
     (quoting Colmenar v. I.N.S., 
    210 F.3d 967
    , 971 (9th Cir. 2000)); Alcaraz-
    Enriquez, 19 F.4th at 1232 (ruling that the petitioner’s due process rights were
    violated when the BIA did not require the government to make a good-faith effort
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    to produce an adverse witness because the IJ could have found the petitioner’s
    story more credible if the witness had been cross-examined). We therefore grant
    the petition.
    Because we grant the petition on this ground, we decline to decide whether
    the IJ erred in making an adverse credibility finding. See I.N.S. v. Bagamasbad,
    
    429 U.S. 24
    , 25 (1976).
    Petition GRANTED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent
    with this disposition.
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