Clement Ayer v. Charles Ryan , 682 F. App'x 594 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 16 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CLEMENT MAKUNG AYER, AKA                        No. 16-15976
    Clement Ayer, AKA Clement M. Ayer,
    D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00482-DJH-
    Plaintiff-Appellant,           MHB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    CHARLES L. RYAN, Director at Arizona
    State Prison Complex,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 8, 2017**
    Before:       LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    Arizona state prisoner Clement Makung Ayer appeals pro se from the
    district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
    defendant violated his Eighth Amendment rights by not providing elbow surgery or
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    a diabetic diet. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
    Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 
    670 F.3d 957
    , 970 (9th Cir.
    2011). We affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Ryan
    because Ayer failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
    defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Ayer’s health. See
    Toguchi v. Chung, 
    391 F.3d 1051
    , 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (a prison official acts
    with deliberate indifference only if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
    the prisoner’s health); Jones v. Williams, 
    297 F.3d 930
    , 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (under
    § 1983, there must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights
    deprivation).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ayer’s motion
    to amend judgment and motion for relief from judgment because Ayer failed to
    establish any grounds for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or.
    v. ACandS, Inc., 
    5 F.3d 1255
    , 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of
    review and grounds for relief from judgment under Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure 59(e) and 60(b)).
    Ayer’s appeal of the denial of his motion for preliminary injunction is moot.
    See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 
    954 F.2d 1441
    , 1450 (9th Cir. 1992)
    (when underlying claims have been decided, the reversal of a denial of preliminary
    2                                      16-15976
    relief would have no practical consequences, and the issue is therefore moot).
    We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    We do not consider issues which are not supported by argument. See
    Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 
    7 F.3d 139
    , 144 (9th Cir. 1993).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                   16-15976