Rafagad Ali v. William Barr ( 2020 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        DEC 4 2020
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RAFAGAD ALI,                                    No.    19-72273
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A215-814-646
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted October 5, 2020
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: PAEZ and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and PREGERSON,** District
    Judge.
    Petitioner Rafagad Ali, a native and citizen of Pakistan, petitions for review
    of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order dismissing his appeal of an
    immigration judge’s (IJ) decision denying his asylum, withholding of removal, and
    Convention Against Torture (CAT) claims and rejecting his due process claim.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Dean D. Pregerson, United States District Judge for
    the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a). We review for substantial
    evidence factual findings by the IJ. Ren v. Holder, 
    648 F.3d 1079
    , 1083 (9th Cir.
    2011) (citing Khan v. Holder, 
    584 F.3d 773
    , 776 (9th Cir. 2009)). The findings
    “are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude
    to the contrary.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B). We review de novo claims of due
    process violations in immigration proceedings. Lianhua Jiang v. Holder, 
    754 F.3d 733
    , 738 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Lopez-Urenda v. Ashcroft, 
    345 F.3d 788
    , 791 (9th
    Cir. 2003)). We grant the petition for review and remand for further proceedings.
    1.     The BIA erred by concluding that Ali could not demonstrate
    prejudice. To establish a due process violation, a petitioner must explain that (1)
    the proceeding was fundamentally unfair and (2) he was prejudiced such “that the
    outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.”
    Colmenar v. INS, 
    210 F.3d 967
    , 971 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (emphasis
    added). “Our review is limited to those grounds explicitly relied upon by the
    [BIA].” Budiono v. Lynch, 
    837 F.3d 1042
    , 1046 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Najmabadi
    v. Holder, 
    597 F.3d 983
    , 986-87 (9th Cir. 2010)). Because the BIA did not analyze
    whether Ali’s proceeding was fundamentally unfair, we review only its
    determination that Ali did not show prejudice. See 
    id.
    To show prejudice, a petitioner “need not explain exactly what evidence he
    would have presented in support of his application, and we may infer prejudice in
    2
    the absence of any specific allegation as to what evidence [petitioner] would have
    presented . . . had he been provided the opportunity to present that evidence.”
    Tawadrus v. Ashcroft, 
    364 F.3d 1099
    , 1105 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Cano-Merida
    v. INS, 
    311 F.3d 960
    , 965 (9th Cir. 2002)) (alteration and omission in original); see
    also Zolotukhin v. Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 1073
    , 1077 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We may infer
    prejudice even absent any allegations as to what the petitioner or his witnesses
    might have said if the IJ had not cut off or refused to permit their testimony.”);
    Colmenar, 
    210 F.3d at 972
     (“Although [petitioner] does not explain exactly what
    evidence he would have presented to support [his] assertions, we do not require
    such an explanation to find prejudice.”).
    Ali repeatedly told the IJ that he had a friend who could help him prepare
    documents for his case, and that he wanted to hire a lawyer. During his credible
    fear interview, Ali clearly explained his conversion to Shia Islam and the violent
    attacks he suffered as a result. Yet after the IJ denied Ali’s motions to continue
    and change venue, and informed Ali that his merits hearing would be held that day,
    Ali became less and less responsive, failing to answer even basic questions posed
    by the IJ. Ali also stated that he was not well after the IJ failed to understand parts
    of his testimony. Had Ali been provided additional time to retain counsel, collect
    documents, and prepare his claims, he may have been able to demonstrate that his
    fear of persecution was well-founded. See Colmenar, 
    210 F.3d at 972
    .
    3
    2.     The BIA’s reliance on Zetino v. Holder, 
    622 F.3d 1007
     (9th Cir.
    2010), is misplaced. In Zetino, we considered a petitioner’s claim that the BIA
    violated due process by denying his motion to accept a late brief. 
    Id. at 1012
    .
    Despite the petitioner’s “failure to properly file an appellate brief, the BIA
    considered the merits of his application because he had sufficiently articulated his
    challenges to the IJ’s decision in his Notice of Appeal.” 
    Id. at 1011
    . We held that
    even if a due process violation existed, the petitioner could not “show prejudice
    because the BIA considered all of the facts presented and applied them to the law.”
    
    Id. at 1014
    . Because Ali contends he was deprived of an opportunity to present
    additional evidence in support of his claims, the BIA did not consider all the facts
    Ali seeks to present. See Zolotukhin, 
    417 F.3d at 1077
    .1
    Petition for review GRANTED and REMANDED.
    1
    In light of this disposition, we need not address the two other issues raised by Ali,
    namely whether (1) the IJ erred in her adverse credibility determination and (2) the
    BIA erred in its affirmance of the IJ’s denial of CAT relief. Ali may raise these
    issues in any future petition for rehearing, if necessary.
    4