Joshua Nakagawa v. County of Maui , 686 F. App'x 388 ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 31 2017
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JOSHUA NAKAGAWA, No. 14-15683
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. Nos.
1:11-cv-00130-DKW-BMK
and 1:12-cv-00569-JMS-RLP
ANTHONY LUM-JOHN,
MEMORANDUM *
Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF MAUI; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
JOSHUA NAKAGAWA, No. 14-15709
Plaintiff, D.C. Nos.
1:11-cv-00130-DKW-BMK
and 1:12-cv-00569-DKW-BMK
ANTHONY LUM-JOHN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF MAUI; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Derrick Kahala Watson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 23, 2017
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: KOZINSKI, HAWKINS, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Joshua Nakagawa and Anthony Lum-John appeal the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for defendants. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
and affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history
of this case, we repeat only those facts necessary to resolve the issues raised on
appeal.
A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs only “when the officer by means of
physical force or show of authority terminates or restrains [the plaintiff’s] freedom
of movement through means intentionally applied," but not when an unintentional
act merely has the effect of restraining the plaintiff. Nelson v. City of Davis, 685
F.3d 867, 875-76 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the district court, appellants admitted as “undisputed” that 1) “Officer Losvar
began shooting at the driver”; 2) “Officer Hattori made a split second decision to
shoot at the driver”; and 3) Sergeant Kapahulehua “fired at the driver’s head.”
Because appellants admitted that the defendant officers intentionally directed their
force towards the driver (and not towards the appellants, any passenger in the
vehicle, or the vehicle in general), the district court concluded properly as a matter
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of law that no Fourth Amendment seizure occurred. Because no Fourth
Amendment seizure occurred, appellants’ Fourth Amendment claims fail as a
matter of law.
For appellants’ Fourteenth Amendment claims to succeed they must show
that defendant officers’ conduct “shocks the conscience.” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610
F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010). When a police officer makes “a snap judgment
because of an escalating situation, his conduct may only be found to shock the
conscience if he acts with a purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate law
enforcement objectives." Id. Using force to “bully” or “get even” with a suspect is
not a legitimate law enforcement objective. Id. Appellants below admitted as
“undisputed” that Losvar and Hattori fired their weapons because they believed
their fellow officer was in grave danger. As such, appellants have admitted that
these officers fired in order to protect their fellow officer from grave harm and not
to “bully” or “get even.” Because it is undisputed that Kapahulehua began to fire
only after the truck sped towards Losvar and Matsuura, no reasonable jury could
conclude that Kapahulehua fired his weapon to “bully” or “get even” given his
response to the clear danger faced by his colleagues. See id. at 551. For these
reasons, appellants’ Fourteenth Amendment claims also fail as a matter of law.
Because the defendant officers did not violate any clearly established
constitutional right, the district court found properly that they were entitled to
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qualified immunity. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
Appellants’ briefs fail to include citations to the record for key factual
assertions, thereby violating Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8)(A) and
Ninth Circuit Rule 28-2.8. Ninth Circuit Rule 28-1(a) provides that “[b]riefs not
complying with FRAP and these rules may be stricken by the Court.” This court
has on other occasions dismissed an appeal when an appellant received notice of
his failure to cite the factual record through an appellee’s answering brief but failed
to rectify his oversight by filing supplementary materials or a reply brief with
record citations. See Han v. Stanford Univ., 210 F.3d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 2000).
Appellants failed to do so here. Given the many factual assertions at issue in this
appeal, the “failure to refer to the record works a hardship not only on this court,
but also on the opposing litigants.” Mitchel v. Gen. Elec. Co., 689 F.2d 877, 879
(9th Cir. 1982). Thus, appellants’ failure to follow the appellate rules respecting
citations to the record provides an alternative basis to dismiss these appeals.
AFFIRMED.
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