Kristine Armfield v. Kilolo Kijakazi ( 2023 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 31 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KRISTINE E. ARMFIELD, No. 22-35127
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:21-cv-05239-SKV
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Sarah Kate Vaughan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 29, 2023**
Seattle, Washington
Before: NGUYEN and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and GUTIERREZ,*** Chief
District Judge.
An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied Kristine Armfield’s application
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Philip S. Gutierrez, Chief United States District Judge
for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
for Social Security disability benefits. The district court affirmed the agency’s
decision. We have jurisdiction over Armfield’s appeal of that ruling under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and affirm.
1. Armfield argues that the ALJ improperly rejected various medical
opinions. We review the IJ’s evaluation of medical opinions for substantial
evidence. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2022). The “most
important factors” are “supportability” and “consistency.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920c(b)(2). If “the evidence can rationally be interpreted in more than one
way, the court must uphold the ALJ’s decision.” Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111,
1115–16 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
a. Dr. Ruddell’s 2018 opinion predated the claimed onset date and was not
materially different from the same psychologist’s 2019 opinion, so the ALJ properly
discussed them in a single analysis. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(1). Substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that the 2019 opinion was “inconsistent
with the treatment record,” which contains numerous subsequent “normal findings.”
b. Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s discounting of Nurse
Patterson’s opinion. Patterson’s own evaluation “indicates the claimant has no
mental health issues,” and other records show Armfield ambulating without
difficulty.
c. The ALJ also reasonably concluded that Dr. Harmon, a psychologist, was
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not qualified to give an opinion about Armfield’s physical condition. Harmon
recognized that a proper physical assessment would “depend on the information in
[Armfield’s] medical records and the judgment of the physicians on the [ ] review
panel.” See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(4).
d. Citing Dr. Gollogly’s statement that she would have “occasional”
workplace interruptions, Armfield argues that her residual functional capacity
should have assumed interruptions of one-third of a workday. But the ALJ is “the
final arbiter with respect to resolving ambiguities in the medical evidence,”
Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008), and Dr. Gollogly’s report
can reasonably be read to give “occasional” a more limited meaning.
e. The ALJ reasonably found Dr. Leinenbach’s opinion not persuasive
because it predated the alleged onset date and other medical opinions. See Carmickle
v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Medical
opinions that predate the alleged onset of disability are of limited relevance.”).
2. The ALJ offered “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for rejecting
Armfield’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at
1039 (cleaned up). A favorable response to conservative treatment “undermines [a
claimant’s] reports regarding the disabling nature of [her] pain.” Id. at 1040. The
record supports the ALJ’s finding that Armfield’s “pain symptoms and medical
impairments” were “managed conservatively with medication, physical therapy, and
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therapeutic injections,” and that reports throughout the record “often document no
acute distress and normal ambulating without difficulty.” Moreover, the record
conflicts with Armfield’s testimony about her use of electronic devices, cleaning
work, and socialization. See Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996,
1006 (9th Cir. 2015). The record is also inconsistent with Armfield’s testimony
about her depression because it shows management of her mental-health symptoms
with medication and therapy. The ALJ “did not wholly reject [Armfield’s]
allegations,” Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1163, but rather found contrary evidence clear
and convincing.
AFFIRMED.1
1
We decline to consider Armfield’s argument that portions of the Social
Security Administration’s 2017 rule revisions, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844 (Jan. 18, 2017),
violate the Administrative Procedure Act and Social Security Act, which was raised
for the first time in a reply brief. See Cedano-Viera v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 1062, 1066
n.5 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e decline to consider new issues raised for the first time in
a reply brief.”).
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