In Re: Latasha Mitchell v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. ( 2023 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    APR 4 2023
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    In re: LATASHA DENELL MITCHELL,                     No.   21-60050
    Debtor,                              BAP No. 21-1010
    ------------------------------
    MEMORANDUM*
    LATASHA RICHARDSON, AKA
    LaTasha Denell Mitchell,
    Appellant,
    v.
    SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING,
    INC.,
    Appellee.
    Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
    Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
    Lafferty III, Brand, and Taylor, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
    Submitted March 28, 2023**
    San Francisco, California
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Before: GOULD and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,*** District Judge.
    Latasha Richardson appeals from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s (BAP)
    judgment (1) affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of a discharge injunction
    violation under 
    11 U.S.C. § 524
    (a)(2) and (2) holding that the violation of the
    automatic stay under 
    11 U.S.C. § 362
    (a) was harmless. We have jurisdiction under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 158
    (d), and we affirm in part and reverse in part.
    The BAP did not err in holding that, although Select Portfolio Servicing,
    Inc. (SPS) technically violated the automatic stay, the violation did not give rise to
    any emotional distress damages, because Richardson’s claims of emotional distress
    were based on non-significant harms that are not compensable as actual damages
    under 
    11 U.S.C. § 362
    (k). See In re Snowden, 
    769 F.3d 651
    , 655–57 (9th Cir.
    2014); In re McHenry, 
    179 B.R. 165
    , 168–69 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995).1 Richardson
    is, however, entitled to attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred in prosecuting the stay
    under § 362(k), including on appeal. See In re Schwartz-Tallard, 
    803 F.3d 1095
    ,
    1101 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). We therefore reverse as to the issue of attorneys’
    ***
    The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
    the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    1
    To the extent Richardson argues she is entitled to the $3,100 she paid to
    SPS during the automatic stay as actual damages for a violation of the stay, we
    reject this argument because that payment allowed her to stay in her home and
    avoid foreclosure.
    2
    fees and remand to the BAP with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy court
    for a determination of the amount of attorneys’ fees Richardson reasonably
    incurred in litigating her claim that SPS violated the automatic stay at the
    bankruptcy court and at the BAP. See Easley v. Collection Serv. of Nev., 
    910 F.3d 1286
    , 1293 (9th Cir. 2018).
    The bankruptcy court’s finding that SPS did not try to collect a personal debt
    from Richardson after discharge is not clearly erroneous. See In re Mellem, 
    625 B.R. 172
    , 182–83 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2021). Because a secured lien survives a
    discharge in bankruptcy up to the value of the collateral, see 
    11 U.S.C. § 506
    (a)(1),
    SPS was entitled to enforce its lien even though Richardson did not reaffirm her
    debt to SPS, which would have reaffirmed her personal liability.
    The record supports the BAP’s conclusion that SPS did not make any effort
    to collect from Richardson personally; rather, SPS’s communications with
    Richardson related to how she could avoid foreclosure by making mortgage
    payments, or to the loan modification agreement between Richardson and SPS.
    Such communications did not violate the discharge injunction. See In re Garske,
    
    287 B.R. 537
    , 545 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002); see also 
    11 U.S.C. § 524
    (j).
    3
    Therefore, the BAP did not err in holding that SPS did not violate the discharge
    injunction.2
    AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.3
    2
    Because Richardson does not explain how she was treated differently than
    other debtors, we reject her claim that her Fourteenth Amendment rights were
    violated. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 
    429 U.S. 252
    ,
    265 (1977).
    3
    We deny as moot Richardson’s Motion for Judicial Notice, Dkt. 40, and
    Richardson’s Motion to Strike SPS’s Response, Dkt. 46. Each party will bear its
    own costs on this appeal.
    4