Julio Castro-Perez v. William Barr ( 2020 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 9 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JULIO CASTRO-PEREZ, No. 19-73268
Petitioner, Agency No. A094-075-853
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 7, 2020**
Seattle, Washington
Before: MILLER and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and BASTIAN,*** District Judge.
Julio Castro-Perez, a Guatemalan citizen and member of the Quiche tribe,
seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing his
appeal of an Immigration Judge (IJ) decision denying Castro-Perez’s claims for
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Stanley Allen Bastian, Chief United States District
Judge for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).1
We review factual findings for substantial evidence and may grant relief only if the
record compels a contrary conclusion. Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007
(9th Cir. 2017). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the denial of withholding of removal. To
obtain relief, Castro-Perez “must show a clear probability of future persecution,”
Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted), by
showing it is “more likely than not” that he will experience persecution because of
his race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2).
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Castro-Perez has
not shown an individualized risk of persecution. See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d
1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009). Castro-Perez does not argue he suffered past
persecution. In addition, nothing in the record compels the conclusion that Castro-
Perez will be singled out for persecution because he is Quiche. The BIA could also
reasonably conclude that the murder of Castro-Perez’s father-in-law did not
demonstrate a likelihood that Castro-Perez would experience persecution, especially
when Castro-Perez admitted this murder did not concern him.
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Castro-Perez does not challenge the IJ’s and BIA’s determination that his asylum
application was untimely. We thus do not consider that claim.
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Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s further conclusion that Castro-Perez
has not demonstrated a “systematic pattern or practice of persecution against the
group to which he belongs in his home country.” Id. at 1060 (quotations omitted).
The “mere economic disadvantage” that the Quiche experience does not compel the
conclusion that Guatemala engages in the systematic persecution of that group. See
Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Wakkary, 558
F.3d at 1060–62 (discussing standard for establishing a pattern or practice of
persecution). Persecution is instead an “extreme concept” and “does not include
every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d
1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted); see also Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d
1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 2018). The record does not compel the conclusion that
Guatemala’s treatment of the Quiche people rises to that level. Nor does the record
evidence of past violence against indigenous people in Guatemala compel the
conclusion that there exists a current pattern practice of persecution against the
Quiche.
2. Substantial evidence supports the denial of CAT relief. To obtain such
relief, Castro-Perez must prove that government officials or private actors with
government consent or acquiescence would “more likely than not” torture him after
he returns to Guatemala. Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir.
2014) (quotations omitted). Castro-Perez argues he will experience torture because
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the Quiche people encounter discrimination, have suffered past violence, and are
subject to “extreme poverty.” The BIA could reasonably conclude that these
circumstances do not meet the CAT standard for torture. See Nuru v. Gonzales, 404
F.3d 1207, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that torture “is more severe than
persecution”).
3. The IJ did not abuse its discretion by refusing to consider Castro-Perez’s
late-filed evidence. See Owino v. Holder, 771 F.3d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 2014)
(standard of review). The agency may deny an untimely request to submit evidence
if it considers “(1) the nature of the evidence excluded as a result of the denial of the
continuance, (2) the reasonableness of the immigrant’s conduct, (3) the
inconvenience to the court, and (4) the number of continuances previously granted.”
Id. (quotations omitted).
The record shows that the IJ sufficiently and reasonably considered the
relevant factors. Among other things, the IJ reasonably refused to consider the
evidence because Castro-Perez was given approximately two years to gather it and
did not submit it by the deadline. Nor was the excluded evidence—which consisted
of around thirty pages of materials that largely summarized materials already in the
record—“critical” to Castro-Perez’s claims. Id. at 533; see also Ahmed v. Holder,
569 F.3d 1009, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 2009).
PETITION DENIED.
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