Boyd v. Contra Costa Community College District , 384 F. App'x 681 ( 2010 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 21 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AKAN BOYD, No. 09-15311
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:08-CV-04129-JSW
v.
MEMORANDUM *
CONTRA COSTA COMMUNITY
COLLEGE DISTRICT and CAROLYN
HODGE,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 25, 2010 **
Before: CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Akan Boyd appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his
action alleging federal discrimination claims and state tort claims related to the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
defendants’ failure to hire him as an African Studies instructor. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Oki Semiconductor Co.
v. Wells Fargo Bank, 298 F.3d 768, 772 (9th Cir. 2002), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Boyd’s Title VII claim because he
failed to file a timely administrative complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e)(1) and 2000e-
5(f)(1), and did not allege grounds for equitable tolling, see Josephs v. Pac. Bell,
443 F.3d 1050, 1061 (9th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff must bring a timely EEOC
complaint as pre-requisite to federal suit or satisfy grounds set forth for equitable
tolling). The district court also properly dismissed Boyd’s state law tort claims
because defendants were entitled to immunity. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 815(a)
(public entities are immune from tort liability unless specifically provided by
statute); id. § 820 (public employees are not liable for injuries resulting from
discretionary acts or omissions).
Boyd also appeals from the district court’s order denying recusal and
reconsideration, both of which we review for abuse of discretion. See Pesnell v.
Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008); MacDonald v. Grace Church
Seattle, 457 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006). The district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Boyd’s motion for disqualification because he failed to
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establish any bias or prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (requiring recusal for personal
bias, prejudice, conflict of interest, and other narrow circumstances); see also
Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that bias or
prejudice warranting recusal must stem from an extrajudicial source and not from
conduct or rulings during proceedings). The district court also did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to reconsider its disqualification ruling because Boyd merely
repeated his previous arguments and did not allege any grounds warranting
reconsideration. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60.
Boyd’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive, and we do not consider
issues he tries to raise for the first time on appeal. See Foti v. City of Menlo Park,
146 F.3d 629, 238 (9th Cir. 1998).
AFFIRMED.
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