Wallace Brown, Iii v. Department of Public Safety, S , 446 F. App'x 70 ( 2011 )

FILED
JUL 29 2011
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WALLACE R. BROWN, III, No. 09-17234
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:08-cv-00470-JMS-
LEK
v.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, MEMORANDUM
STATE OF HAWAII,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 15, 2011*
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: ALARCÓN, WARDLAW, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Wallace R. Brown, III appeals from the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of the State of Hawaii, Department of Public Safety
*This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
(the “Department”) on Brown’s claims of racial discrimination and retaliation
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-1 et seq). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
Brown filed formal charges of Title VII violations with the EEOC asserting
racial discrimination based on the use of the term “Operation Mandingo” by a
subordinate on March 28, 2007, and a retaliation claim based upon his removal
from a temporary assigned position on May 8, 2008.
I
Brown failed to demonstrate that, in connection to the “Operation
Mandingo” incident, he suffered an adverse employment action. See Davis v.
Team Electric Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008) (To establish a prima facie
case of disparate treatment, Brown must show that (1) he belongs to a protected
class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he was subjected to an adverse
employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected
class were treated more favorably). Although “adverse employment action” is
broadly defined, Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 847
(9th Cir. 2004), Brown did not present evidence that he suffered an adverse action
with respect to the events surrounding the “Operation Mandingo” report. See Little
v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 2002) (a reduction in
2
base monthly pay is an adverse employment action); University of Hawai'i Prof'l
Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1999) (receiving pay a
couple of days late constitutes substantial impairment); Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809
F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (job transfers and undeserved performance ratings
can be adverse employment decisions). Brown received favorable evaluations
throughout his employment and was temporarily assigned to a higher position at an
increase in salary after the “Operation Mandingo” incident.
II
A
Brown failed to file a formal EEOC charge as to his claim that certain
members of the Department did not investigate his complaints of insubordination
and rule violations by Department employees on 52 separate occasions between
November 2002 and May 2007. These incidents were not similar to his claim that
the “Operation Mandingo” report created a hostile working environment based on
a single act of actual racial discrimination.
“Incidents of discrimination not included in an EEOC charge may not be
considered by a federal court unless the new claims are ‘like or reasonably related
to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge.’” Green v. Los Angeles Cnty.
Superintendent of Sch., 883 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Brown v.
3
Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Trust, 732 F.2d 726, 729 (9th Cir.
1984)).
In response to the motion for summary judgment, Brown presented only his
conclusions and speculation that the failure to investigate his claims was based on
his race. See McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1121 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“Under Title VII, an individual suffers disparate treatment when he or she is
singled out and treated less favorably than others similarly situated on account of
race.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In opposing summary
judgment, Brown “‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.’” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Brown failed to present evidence in opposition to the
Department’s motion for summary judgment that the Department’s alleged failure
to investigate the 52 incidents of insubordination and rule violations was due to
racially discriminatory treatment. He, therefore, failed to demonstrate that the
incidents were “like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC
charge.” B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002)
(internal quotations and citation omitted). Brown’s counsel should have filed a
third formal charge with the EEOC based on his claim that his superiors’ failure to
4
investigate 52 acts of insubordination and rule violations complaints created a
hostile working environment.
B
Brown also failed to demonstrate that the Department’s failure to investigate
created a severe or pervasive alteration of the condition of his employment. See
Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003) (“To determine
whether conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to violate Title VII, we look
at ‘all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance.”) (quoting Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270-71
(2001)). Brown presented no evidence that the Department’s alleged failure to
investigate the 52 other incidents was due to racial discrimination. Further, Brown
continued to receive favorable evaluations and was temporarily assigned to a
higher position at an increase in salary while these events allegedly occurred.
Accordingly, Brown has not demonstrated that the Department’s alleged failure to
investigate his other claims constituted severe or pervasive racial discrimination.
C
Furthermore, his attorney failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in
5
order to obtain a right to sue letter with respect to the 52 incidents which the
Department allegedly failed to investigate. “Title VII claimants generally establish
federal court jurisdiction by first exhausting their EEOC administrative remedies.”
Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990). The purpose of these
procedures is to “afford[] the agency an opportunity to investigate the charge.”
B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1099. See also Brown, 732 F.2d at 729 (“Title VII places
primary responsibility for disposing of employment discrimination complaints with
the EEOC in order to encourage informal conciliation of employment
discrimination claims and foster voluntary compliance with Title VII.”). The court
is “required to construe appellants’ EEOC charges with utmost liberality since they
are made by those unschooled in the technicalities of formal pleading.” Lyons v.
England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, “[i]n civil rights cases, where the plaintiff is pro se, we have an
obligation to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the plaintiff the benefit
of any doubt.” King v. Atiyeh , 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987).
Here, Brown is not pro se. The June 30, 2008 letter was drafted by Brown’s
counsel, who is not “unschooled in the technicalities of formal pleading.” Lyons,
307 F.3d at 1104. While the letter could, through liberal construction, be read to
give notice to the EEOC to investigate these incidents, Brown’s counsel did not
6
request that they be included in the scope of an investigation. Instead, she
requested that a right to sue letter be issued immediately so that Brown could
pursue his legal claims in court. Accordingly, the June 30, 2008 letter should not
be liberally construed to be an amendment to the formal EEOC charge for
discrimination. Brown failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to all but
his discrimination claims related to the use of the term “Operation Mandingo” on
March 28, 2007.
III
Brown has failed to demonstrate that his removal from his temporary
assignment to a higher-ranking administrator position was retaliation for the filing
of his discrimination charge with the EEOC. He was given the temporary
assignment with an increase in pay five months after he filed his discrimination
charge with the EEOC. Brown was removed from the temporary position after the
Hawaii Government Employees Association notified the Department that Brown’s
assignment violated the collective bargaining agreement. He was removed from
the temporary position so that the warden could consider Brown and other
qualified candidates to fill the position. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc.,
281 F.3d 1054, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2002) (“To establish causation [between
involvement in protected activity and an adverse employment action, a plaintiff]
7
must show . . . that engaging in the protected activity was one of the reasons for
[his removal] and that but for such activity [he] would not have been [removed].”).
Additionally, Brown has not demonstrated that the Department’s “presumptively
valid reasons for his [removal] were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory
decision.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973).
AFFIRMED.
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FILED
Brown v. Department of Public Safety, No. 09-17234 JUL 29 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge, dissenting: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Nearly five months before the EEOC notified Brown of his right to sue in
federal court, Brown’s counsel sent the Hawaii Civil Rights Commission a letter
detailing fifty-two incidents where the Department of Public Safety failed to
investigate complaints filed by Brown, while adequately investigating complaints
filed by non-African American supervisors. Even though it is uncontested that the
EEOC received a copy of this letter, the majority concludes that Brown did not
exhaust his administrative remedies and that his counsel should have filed a third
formal charge based on these additional incidents. Because the majority’s holding
is contrary to the purpose of Title VII’s exhaustion requirement and our duty to
construe Title VII charges liberally, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority itself notes, the purpose of Title VII’s administrative
exhaustion requirement is to “afford[] the agency an opportunity to investigate the
charge.” B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002).
Despite the Supreme Court’s warning that “technicalities are particularly
inappropriate in a statutory scheme [such as Title VII] in which laymen, unassisted
by trained lawyers, initiate the process,” Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527
(1972), the majority concludes that Brown has failed to exhaust his administrative
1
remedies with respect to the fifty-two additional incidents of discrimination, even
though Brown’s attorney notified the EEOC about the fifty-two incidents in a
timely supplemental letter.
I.
This letter constituted a de facto request to amend Brown’s formal EEOC
charge, even if the letter did not explicitly request an amendment to the formal
charge. The applicable federal regulation permits amendment of EEOC charges:
A charge may be amended to cure technical defects or omissions,
including failure to verify the charge, or to clarify and amplify
allegations made therein. Such amendment and amendments alleging
additional acts which constitute unlawful employment practices
related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge
will relate back to the date the charge was first received.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (emphasis added).
Brown’s formal EEOC charge, which he filed pro se, alleged that Brown
was subjected to “racial harassment” on March 28, 2007, and that the actions of
Sgt. Melvin Kia’aina in using the term Operation Mandingo “created a hostile and
offensive working atmosphere.” The charge also explicitly alleged that the
Warden failed to take appropriate corrective action in response to Brown’s
complaint arising from the “Operation Mandingo” incident:
Warden Frank told me to write Sgt. Kia’aina a letter amounting to a
Letter of Reprimand . . . I believe that no corrective action was taken,
2
as there was no prompt and thorough investigation of my complaint. .
. . I also believe that my employer’s inaction has not deterred future
racial harassment against me.
Our case law is clear that “[w]e are required to construe appellants’ EEOC charges
‘with utmost liberality since they are made by those unschooled in the
technicalities of formal pleading.’” Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th
Cir. 2002) (citing B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100). Given our duty to construe EEOC
charges liberally, Brown’s formal charge sufficiently alleged the existence of a
hostile work environment based on the Warden’s failure to take appropriate
corrective action in response to Brown’s complaint. Once Brown retained legal
representation, his counsel sent the letter reporting fifty-two more incidents
supporting Brown’s hostile environment claim in order to “clarify and amplify,” 29
C.F.R. § 1601.12, the allegations made in Brown’s pro se charge.
To be sure, counsel’s letter should have explicitly requested amendment of
Brown’s formal charge to include these additional incidents. The majority
erroneously concludes that this technicality precludes Brown from showing that he
has exhausted his administrative remedies.1 However, the regulation does not set
1
The majority concludes that Brown’s counsel should have filed a third
formal charge of discrimination with the EEOC based on these additional
incidents. The majority fails to recognize that Brown could not file a third formal
charge because the last incident mentioned in the letter occurred more than 300
days before the letter’s date. These incidents, however, are timely when
3
forth a particular procedure that must be followed to amend a charge, and the clear
purpose of the letter was to amend Brown’s charge to include the “long history of
complaints that were ignored while non-African American supervisor’s complaints
were investigated.” Given that the purpose of the administrative exhaustion
requirement is to ensure that the EEOC has the opportunity to investigate potential
claims, this letter demonstrates that Brown exhausted his administrative remedies.
Accordingly, the district court should have considered these fifty-two additional
incidents when evaluating Brown’s hostile work environment claim.
II.
Further undermining the majority’s adherence to phantom technicalities to
deny Brown his day in court, Brown in fact exhausted his administrative remedies.
Even without considering his counsel’s supplemental letter, we have long held that
a plaintiff exhausts his administrative remedies with respect to all allegations that
are “‘like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC charge.’”
B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100 (citing Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of
Schs., 883 F.2d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir. 1989)). We have interpreted this as including
considered as part of Brown’s initial charge. See National RR Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002) (“Provided that an act contributing to the claim
occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment
may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability.”).
4
“all allegations of discrimination that either ‘fell within the scope of the EEOC’s
actual investigation or an EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected
to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’” Id. at 1100 (emphasis in original)
(quoting EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1994)). To
determine whether new allegations are covered by the initial charge, “it is
appropriate to consider such factors as the alleged basis of the discrimination, dates
of discriminatory acts specified within the charge, perpetrators of discrimination
named in the charge, and any locations at which discrimination is alleged to have
occurred.” Id.We must construe Brown’s pro se charge liberally, and, so construed, the
initial charge sets forth a hostile work environment race discrimination claim based
on the Department’s failure to respond to or investigate Brown’s complaint. An
“EEOC charge does not demand procedural exactness. It is sufficient that the
EEOC be apprised, in general terms, of the alleged discriminatory parties and the
alleged discriminatory acts.” Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir. 1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted). An EEOC investigation would reasonably be
expected to look into whether other specific incidents had contributed to the
allegedly hostile working environment. See, e.g. id. at 1457 (holding that while the
plaintiff’s EEOC charge referenced a specific adverse employment action, the
5
charge also made general allegations of “intimidation, harassment, . . . disparate
treatment,” and a “pattern and practice of retaliating,” and that “[w]hen
investigating harassment and retaliation against [him], the EEOC could reasonably
have looked into” other incidents).
Moreover, all of the relevant factors indicate that these fifty-two incidents
are like or reasonably related to the initial charge. Unlike prior cases in which a
plaintiff attempted to set forth completely new grounds for discrimination with his
new allegations, see Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
that an allegation of disability discrimination is not reasonably related to an EEOC
charge based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and/or age
discrimination), here, all of the allegations concern discrimination based on race.
Assuming that the acting Warden was responsible for investigating Brown’s
complaints,2 these additional allegations do identify the same individual, the
Warden, as the perpetrator of the discrimination. In addition, the alleged
discriminatory acts all occurred at the same place, the Correctional facility, and
they set forth a pattern of conduct beginning in 2002 and ending in May of 2007,
just two months after the discriminatory event specifically mentioned in the EEOC
2
The letter just refers to “Respondents” and does not indicate by name who
was responsible for investigating Brown’s complaints.
6
charge.3 It also bears noting that a plaintiff’s claims are considered to “be
reasonably related to allegations in the charge to the extent that those claims are
consistent with the plaintiff’s original theory of the case.” Lyons, 307 F.3d at 1105(internal quotation marks omitted). The Defendants themselves conceded in their
filings before the district court that the plaintiff’s EEOC charge was based on a
hostile work environment theory. Thus, even if Brown’s counsel had not sent the
supplemental letter, Brown has satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement
because the fifty-two additional incidents are like or reasonably related to the
initial charge.
III.
We have previously recognized that a overly technical application of the
administrative exhaustion requirement “would falsify the Civil Rights Act’s hopes
and ambitions of providing a process lay people can use effectively to resolve
discrimination complaints.” Sosa, 920 F.3d at 1458 (alteration omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Here, the majority precludes Brown from pursuing his
3
As recognized by the Supreme Court, hostile environment cases are based
on conduct that occurs “over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct
contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its
own.” National RR Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 115. Thus it is perfectly
appropriate that these additional instances of discrimination occurred during a five-
year period.
7
hostile work environment claim, even though his counsel’s letter informed the
EEOC of the fifty-two additional incidents, and these incidents are like or
reasonably related to his pro-se charge filed with the EEOC. The majority
erroneously concludes that Title VII can be read in a hyper-technical manner as
long as a Title VII plaintiff eventually acquires legal representation. This runs
contrary to Title VII’s broad remedial goal of removing “artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.” Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
I would reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Brown’s
hostile work environment claim, as the district court improperly failed to consider
these additional incidents when evaluating the merits of this claim. The only
reason that I do not request publication of the majority’s disposition is that its
unjust, overly technical, and legally erroneous rule should not be extended to any
other potential victims of Title VII discrimination.
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