Dz Bank Ag Deutsche Zentral v. Louis Meyer ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    JUL 11 2017
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DZ BANK AG DEUTSCHE ZENTRAL-                     No.   15-35086
    GENOSSENSCHAFT BANK,
    FRANKFURT AM MAIN,                               D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00869-JLR
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    LOUIS PHILLIPUS MEYER; LYNN
    MEYER,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 19, 2017
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: HAWKINS, GOULD, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
    Appellant DZ Bank AG Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank (“DZ
    Bank”) appeals from a district court order affirming the bankruptcy court’s
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    judgment in favor of Appellees Louis and Lynn Meyer (“the Meyers”).1 We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we reverse.
    Prior to defaulting on a $1,728,834.65 promissory note held by DZ Bank
    and their personal guarantee of the note, the Meyers executed an elaborate series of
    transfers and sales to place their assets beyond the reach of their creditors.
    Notably, in October 2008, Louis Meyer caused his insurance company to transfer
    assets valued at $123,200 to Meyer Insurance (“MI”), a corporation in which he
    owned 100% of the shares. This transfer increased MI’s assets to $385,000, which
    was later transferred for no consideration to another corporation under Meyer’s
    control. That corporation, Insurance Choices 4 U (“IC4U”), agreed to pay the
    $385,000 back to Meyer, personally, over time. Eventually, the Meyers defaulted
    and filed for bankruptcy.
    In bankruptcy court, DZ Bank filed an adversary action against the Meyers
    alleging that the $385,000 transferred out of MI was a fraudulent transfer under the
    Washington Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“WUFTA”) and therefore
    non-dischargeable under 
    11 U.S.C. § 523
    . See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 
    136 S. Ct. 1581
     (2016). Section 523 exempts debts for money obtained by “actual
    1
    At oral argument, Appellees’ counsel represented to the court that the
    Meyers are no longer married. For the sake of convenience, however, we continue
    to refer to Appellees as “the Meyers.”
    2
    fraud,” see 
    11 U.S.C. § 523
    (a)(2)(A), while WUFTA makes any transfer made by a
    debtor “[w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor”
    an actual fraud, see 
    Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.041
    (a)(1). WUFTA defines a
    transfer as “every mode, direct or indirect” of disposing of an asset, 
    Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.011
    (12), which, in turn, is defined as the “property of the debtor,” 
    id.
    § 19.40.011(2)(i). The statute defines “property” as “anything that may be the
    subject of ownership.” Id. § 19.40.011(10).
    Although the bankruptcy court ruled in favor of DZ Bank on its fraudulent
    transfer claim, it ultimately limited the judgment to $123,200, which was the
    portion of the $385,000 that was traceable to DZ Bank’s security interest in the
    assets. The district court affirmed, albeit on a slightly different ground. The court
    reasoned that DZ Bank could only recover assets that were the “property of the
    debtor[s]”—i.e., legally titled in the Meyers’ name. Since the assets were legally
    titled in MI’s name, WUFTA did not apply. For WUFTA to apply, DZ Bank was
    required to obtain a ruling that MI was the alter ego of the Meyers, which it failed
    to do. On the facts of this case, we disagree with both courts.
    The Washington Supreme Court has explained that “the overriding purpose
    of the UFTA is to provide relief for creditors whose collection on a debt is
    frustrated by the actions of a debtor to place the putatively satisfying assets beyond
    3
    the reach of the creditor.” Thompson v. Hanson, 
    219 P.3d 659
    , 665, as amended
    (Mar. 26, 2010), republished as modified at 
    239 P.3d 537
     (Wash. 2009) (en banc);
    see also Husky Int’l, 
    136 S. Ct. at
    1586–88 (discussing the history of “actual
    fraud”). This “overriding purpose,” Hanson, 219 P.3d at 655, can be traced to “the
    beginning of English bankruptcy practice,” Husky Int’l, 
    136 S. Ct. at 1587
    . Since
    then, “courts and legislatures have used the term ‘fraud’ to describe a debtor’s
    transfer of assets that . . . impairs a creditor’s ability to collect the debt.” 
    Id.
    With WUFTA’s purpose in mind, we look to what other courts have
    concluded when faced with a similar question under the UFTA. Thompson v.
    Hanson, 
    174 P.3d 120
    , 126 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (“Because an explicit purpose
    of the UFTA is uniformity among the States that have adopted it, the interpretation
    of other courts also provides guidance.”), aff’d, 
    239 P.3d 537
     (Wash. 2009) (en
    banc); see also 
    Wash. Rev. Code § 19.40.903
     (“[WUFTA] shall be applied and
    construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law . . . among
    states enacting it.”). In Wiand v. Lee, for example, the defendants argued that
    “transfers of funds from the receivership entities could not have been transfers of
    ‘assets’ because assets under FUFTA[, Florida’s statute identical to WUFTA,]
    must be [the] ‘property of a debtor,’ and the funds . . . transferred were property of
    the corporations.” 
    753 F.3d 1194
    , 1203 (11th Cir. 2014). The Eleventh Circuit
    4
    rejected that argument, explaining that the FUFTA did not require the debtors,
    themselves, to have legal title to the assets transferred. Florida law required only
    that the assets “could have been applicable to the payment of the debt due.” 
    Id.
    A Minnesota court interpreting Minnesota’s identical version of WUFTA in
    Reilly v. Antonello rejected a corporate officer’s argument that it was the
    corporation, not the officer, that legally diluted the corporation’s shares and
    thereby reduced his ownership from 100% to 2%. 
    852 N.W.2d 694
    , 701 (Minn.
    App. Ct. 2014). The court refused to “ignore[] the reality that [the officer] was
    exclusively responsible for the actions of the corporation and that he fraudulently
    transferred assets to the detriment of his creditors.” 
    Id.
     The court reasoned that
    “[t]o allow a sole director, officer, and shareholder to mask his fraudulent actions
    behind the facade of a closely held corporation would defy the plain meaning and
    intent of the Minnesota Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.” 
    Id.
    In In re Nickeson, a South Dakota bankruptcy court interpreting that state’s
    version of UFTA, which is identical to WUFTA, held similarly. Bankr. No.
    13-10137, Adversary No. 14-1004, 
    2014 WL 6686524
    , at *11 (Bankr. D.S.D. Nov.
    25, 2014). A sole shareholder and director of a farming corporation caused the
    corporation to dilute its shares, reducing the shareholder’s ownership from 100%
    to 20%. 
    Id.
     Refusing to “reward . . . [the] pervasive disregard for corporate
    5
    formalities,” the court rejected the shareholder’s argument that it was the
    corporation that diluted its own shares. 
    Id.
    If MI had retained the $385,000 in assets, DZ Bank would have been able to
    enforce any judgment against the Meyers, prior to their filing for bankruptcy
    protection, by executing against Louis Meyer’s 100% ownership interest in MI to
    satisfy $385,000 of its claim. 
    Wash. Rev. Code § 6.17.090
     (“All property, real and
    personal, of the judgment debtor that is not exempted by law is liable to
    execution.”). When Meyer indirectly transferred all of MI’s assets to another
    corporation, he, as in Wiand, Antonello, and Nickeson, depleted the value of his
    assets to the detriment of his creditors. His shares in MI became worthless as a
    result of his actions as MI’s sole owner and shareholder, while, even after filing for
    bankruptcy, he continued to receive payments from IC4U. Like other courts, we
    find this is sufficient to constitute “actual fraud” for the purposes of WUFTA and §
    523(a)(2)(A). The amount of the non-dischargeable debt resulting from Meyer’s
    fraudulent transfer is $385,000, which DZ Bank is entitled to recover.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-35086

Filed Date: 7/11/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021