Richard Brubaker v. City of Tucson ( 2021 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUL 26 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD BRUBAKER, No. 20-15547
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:10-cv-00649-DCB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF TUCSON, a municipal
corporation; JACK WOOLRIDGE;
MICHAEL JAMES PELTON,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
PIMA COUNTY BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 5, 2021
Portland, Oregon
Before: W. FLETCHER, BEA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Richard Brubaker appeals from the district court’s grant of judgment as a
matter of law in favor of Sergeant Jack Woolridge and Officer Michael Pelton
(collectively, “Defendants”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50.1 He also
appeals the district court’s grant of Defendants’ motion in limine, which limited
the evidence of damages introduced at trial. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
(1) Rule 50 ruling:
The district court granted Defendants’ Rule 50 motion with respect to both
Brubaker’s § 1983 and state-law trespass claims.
The court granted the motion with respect to the § 1983 claim on the ground
that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. In the view of the district
court, there was no evidence that either Defendant intentionally or recklessly
misled the judge who authorized the search of Brubaker’s home. We disagree.
Based on the evidence before it, the jury reasonably could have chosen to
disbelieve Defendants’ testimony that they did not intend to mislead the judge who
issued the telephonic warrant, or reasonably could have found that Defendants
1
The City of Tucson is also a Defendant as to Brubaker’s trespass claim, on
a respondeat superior theory. Brubaker’s arguments on appeal focus on the
individual defendants, however, so our discussion does as well—unless otherwise
noted, our references to “Defendants” refer only to Woolridge and Pelton.
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were reckless in their preparation of the warrant application. Indeed, the jury could
have inferred recklessness from evidence presented at trial, including: Officer
Pelton’s false statement in his telephonic affidavit implying that police had
received reports of drugs being sold at Brubaker’s address, the officers’ reliance on
a single source, coupled with their failure to uncover and disclose the source’s
criminal history of lying to police, and the officers’ failure to acquire meaningful
corroboration. We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of the Rule 50
motion as to the § 1983 claim.
The court held that it necessarily followed from its grant of Defendants’
Rule 50 motion with respect to Brubaker’s § 1983 claim that Defendants’ motion
with respect to Brubaker’s state-law trespass claim must also be granted. As noted
in the preceding paragraph, we reverse the grant of the Rule 50 motion with respect
to Brubaker’s § 1983 claim, so we likewise reverse on the trespass claim as to all
Defendants, including the City. Because the jury could have reasonably concluded
that Defendants procured the search warrant through judicial deception, it similarly
could have concluded that Defendants’ entry onto Brubaker’s property was an
unauthorized trespass.
(2) In limine evidentiary ruling:
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We have already reversed the district court’s grant of Defendants’ Rule 50
motion, so we are not required to reach the question of whether the court’s in
limine evidentiary ruling was improper. However, because this case may be
retried, we reach and decide the question as a matter of judicial efficiency.
We conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in granting
Defendants’ motion in limine limiting evidence of damages. See Branch Banking
and Tr. Co. v. D.M.S.I, LLC, 871 F.3d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 2017). Brubaker sought
to recover damages related to the seizure and forfeiture of his animals, to his
criminal prosecution for animal neglect, and to the condemnation of his home.
Brubaker argues that these damages are recoverable under his § 1983 claim and/or
under his trespass claim because Defendants proximately caused them by
unlawfully entering and searching his home.
In his § 1983 claim, Brubaker pleaded that his Fourth Amendment rights
were violated when Defendants searched his home, and invited others to do so,
pursuant to an allegedly unlawfully obtained warrant. The district court concluded
that Brubaker may claim damages caused by the search, including physical damage
to the premises, his emotional distress, his loss of use of the house during the
search, and nominal damages. We agree.
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The district court also concluded that under § 1983 Brubaker may not
recover damages for the subsequent seizures of his animals and home, or his
criminal prosecution. We again agree, because the Fourth Amendment prohibits
only “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Searches and seizures are “reasonable”
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when supported by probable cause. See
Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 192 (2013). Unlawfully obtained evidence
may provide probable cause for a search or seizure. Lingo v. City of Salem, 832
F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2016). Although such evidence may be suppressed in the
context of criminal proceedings, the same is not true in § 1983 actions. Id. at 958.
Section 1983 defendants may prove that their search or seizure was reasonable for
Fourth Amendment purposes—and therefore not cognizable under § 1983—by
introducing unlawfully obtained evidence substantiating probable cause. See id. at
955, 958-59. Brubaker never disputed that Defendants’ allegedly unlawful search
of his home provided probable cause for the subsequent seizures and his criminal
prosecution. He therefore cannot obtain damages for those actions under § 1983.
Under Arizona law, damages for Brubaker’s state-law trespass claim are
limited to “(a) the difference between the value of the land before the harm and the
value after the harm . . . , (b) the loss of use of the land, and (c) discomfort and
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annoyance to [the] occupant.” Dixon v. City of Phoenix, 845 P.2d 1107, 1116
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929 (Am. L.
Inst. 1979)). The evidence excluded by the district court was not relevant to these
damages.
Each party shall bear its own costs.
REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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