Svetlana Tyshkevich v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 708 F. App'x 339 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 21 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SVETLANA TYSHKEVICH,                            No. 16-16592
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:15-cv-02010-JAM-AC
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee
    on behalf of Harbor View Mortgage Loan
    Pass-Through Trust Certificates Series 2006-
    12; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of California
    John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted December 18, 2017**
    Before:      WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    Svetlana Tyshkevich appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
    dismissing her action alleging federal and state law claims related to her mortgage
    loans. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    discretion a denial of leave to amend. Rich v. Schrader, 
    823 F.3d 1205
    , 1208 (9th
    Cir. 2016). We affirm.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend
    because amendment of Tyshkevich’s claims would have been futile. See
    AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 
    465 F.3d 946
    , 951 (9th Cir. 2006)
    (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend can be denied
    if amendment would be futile); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (providing a right of
    rescission within three years of the date of the consummation of a loan if the lender
    fails to make required disclosures to the borrower); Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home
    Loans, Inc., 
    135 S. Ct. 790
    , 792 (2015) (a borrower may exercise right of
    rescission by notifying the lender of borrower’s intent to rescind within three years
    after the transaction is consummated); Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 
    309 F.3d 1161
    , 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Section] 1635(f) is a statute of repose, depriving the
    courts of subject matter jurisdiction when a § 1635 claim is brought outside the
    three-year limitation period.”).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting judicial notice
    because the documents were matters of public record. See Lee v. City of Los
    Angeles, 
    250 F.3d 668
    , 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (court may take judicial notice of
    matters of public record).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    2                                     16-16592
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                       16-16592
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-16592

Citation Numbers: 708 F. App'x 339

Judges: Wallace, Silverman, Bybee

Filed Date: 12/21/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024