Isalinda Perez-Jones v. Liberty Life Assurance Company , 647 F. App'x 758 ( 2016 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 05 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ISALINDA PEREZ–JONES, No. 14-55455
Plaintiff–Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-09518-JAK-
AJW
v.
LIBERTY LIFE ASSURANCE MEMORANDUM*
COMPANY OF BOSTON and GOLDEN
WEST FINANCIAL CORPORATION
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN,
Defendants–Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 8, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: FARRIS, CLIFTON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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Isalinda Perez–Jones brought this suit, under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), challenging Liberty Life Assurance
Company of Boston’s (“Liberty Life”) discontinuation of her long-term-disability
benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1). After a bench trial, the district court entered
judgment for Liberty Life and the long-term-disability plan, finding that
Perez–Jones knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to receive long-term-
disability benefits by signing a severance agreement and accepting a severance
package provided by her then-employer, which sponsored the long-term-disability
plan. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The district court erred in finding that the waiver provision in the
severance agreement covers Perez–Jones’s claim. The severance agreement waives
only claims Perez–Jones had “up until the day [she] sign[ed]” the severance
agreement, not future claims. Although Perez–Jones had previously received long-
term-disability benefits, she had returned to work and was no longer receiving such
benefits when she signed the severance agreement. She thus had no claim to further
long-term-disability benefits and no ERISA claim to waive. Cf. Wetzel v. Lou
Ehlers Cadillac Group Long Term Disability Ins. Program, 222 F.3d 643, 649 (9th
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[U]nder federal law, an ERISA cause of action accrues
either at the time benefits are actually denied, or when the insured has reason to
2
know that the claim has been denied.” (citation omitted)); Smart v. Gillette Co.
Long-Term Disability Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 181 (1st Cir. 1995) (“That agreement
could not have waived her right to participate in the Plan during the severance
period because she had no such right . . . . [O]ne can scarcely release claims that
one does not possess.”).
2. We nonetheless affirm the district court’s decision because Perez–Jones is
not a “participant” in the long-term-disability plan entitled to bring an ERISA
claim. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1), (e). “Participants” include only “employees in,
or reasonably expected to be in, currently covered employment, or former
employees who have . . . a reasonable expectation of returning to covered
employment or who have a colorable claim to vested benefits.” Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 117–18 (1989) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). There is no dispute that Perez–Jones no longer worked
for the long-term-disability plan’s sponsor at the time she sought long-term-
disability benefits because she had already signed a severance agreement and
terminated her employment. Her coverage under the long-term-disability plan
terminated with her employment; she was not a “Covered Person” under the terms
of the plan entitled to claim benefits. See, e.g., Leeson v. Transamerica Disability
3
Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 971–79 (9th Cir. 2012); Miller v. Rite Aid Corp., 504
F.3d 1102, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2007).
That Perez–Jones previously received long-term-disability benefits does not
make her a “participant” in the long-term-disability plan. Perez–Jones points to
provisions of the plan specifying that “insurance will be continued for an
Employee absent due to Disability during . . . the period during which premium is
being waived,” and premiums are waived “during any period for which benefits are
payable.” However, at the time Perez–Jones filed her long-term-disability claim,
she was neither absent from employment due to disability nor receiving long-term-
disability benefits; she had to return to work from disability status to receive a
severance package, her doctor had cleared her to return to work, and she did return
to work. Nor does the long-term-disability plan’s provision for “successive periods
of disability” give Perez–Jones a claim to vested benefits: That provision extends
only to “Covered Persons,” and she was no longer a “Covered Person” after she
terminated her employment.
Perez–Jones also is not a “participant” in the long-term-disability plan by
virtue of her misunderstanding of the plan’s terms, even if Liberty Life or her then-
employer misinformed her as to the effect of the severance agreement on her
ability to claim long-term-disability benefits. An ERISA plan is governed by its
4
written terms, and the long-term-disability plan does not cover those who have
terminated their employment with the plan’s sponsor. See Gabriel v. Alaska Elec.
Pension Fund, 773 F.3d 945, 951–61 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Kennedy v. Plan
Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 555 U.S. 285, 300 (2009).
AFFIRMED.
5
FILED
No. 14-55455, Perez-Jones v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. et al. APR 05 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
CLIFTON, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I agree that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed, for the
reasons stated by the district court, and concur in the judgment.