Juan Velazquez v. James Logan ( 2018 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JAN 04 2018
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN VELAZQUEZ, No. 16-15485
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00941-SPL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JAMES LOGAN, in his individual
capacity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 15, 2017
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and W. FLETCHER and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Juan Velazquez (“Velazquez”) appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees James Logan (“Logan”), Tammy
Hardy (“Hardy”), Michelle McCloskey (“McCloskey”), and Maricopa County and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
denying Velazquez’s cross-motion for summary judgment on his state and federal
constitutional claims. We affirm on different grounds.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s
“application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine de novo.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709
F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2013). We review de novo a district court’s grant of
summary judgment and affirm only if, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Velazquez, the record evidences “no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Lew v. Kona Hosp.,
754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985).
1. We do not agree with the district court’s conclusion that Velazquez’s claims
were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman test is a two-
step inquiry: first, the plaintiff must engage in a de facto appeal of an “allegedly
erroneous decision by a state court,” and second, the de facto appeal must be
“‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court judicial decision.” Bell, 709 F.3d at
897. The district court erroneously conflated these two separate and distinct steps
in its Rooker-Feldman analysis.
Where, as here, the plaintiff challenges the defendants’ conduct and
interpretation of a court order as opposed to the order itself, there is no “forbidden
de facto appeal of a state court decision.” Id. at 897; see also Morrison v. City of
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New York, 591 F.3d 109, 113–15 (2d Cir. 2010) (declining to apply Rooker-
Feldman where case turned on “two competing interpretations” of an ambiguous
state court order). Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply and
does not bar review of Velazquez’s constitutional claims.
2. Defendants are nonetheless entitled to summary judgment because
Velazquez has failed to sufficiently demonstrate a violation of his constitutional
rights. “We may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground supported by
the record, even if not relied upon by the district court.” U.S. ex rel. Ali v. Daniel,
Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, 355 F.3d 1140, 1144 (9th Cir. 2004).
We first note that Defendants Hardy and McCloskey were subject to suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “While generally not applicable to private parties, a §
1983 action can lie against a private party when he is a willful participant in joint
action with the State or its agents.” Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Velazquez, the record demonstrates that McCloskey and Hardy
reported to Logan and agreed, per his instructions, to withhold the storage locker
key from Velazquez. These facts were sufficient to show that McCloskey and
Hardy were “willful participant[s] in joint action” with Logan, who was a state
official. Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989).
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Velazquez, however, has failed to show that Defendants’ actions violated his
federal constitutional rights. The Fourth Amendment guards against unreasonable
searches and seizures by the government. See United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d
1427, 1429–30 (9th Cir. 1990). Neither McCloskey or Hardy withheld the storage
key with “the intent[] to elicit a benefit for the government in either its
investigative or administrative capacities.” Id. at 1431. Accordingly, their actions
do not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment. In contrast, although
Logan acted with administrative intent, his actions were objectively reasonable.
Logan’s justifications for withholding the storage key and access code from
Velazquez pending court order “match[ed] the degree of intrusion.” San Jose
Charter of Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 971
(9th Cir. 2005).
Velazquez has similarly failed to show a violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights, either procedural or substantive. “[A]n
unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not
constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is
available.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). In this case, the state
superior court eventually ordered Logan to turn the storage key and access code
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over to Velazquez’s post-conviction counsel, thereby restoring Velazquez’s access
to the materials inside the locker. We conclude this was an adequate post-
deprivation remedy under the Fourteenth Amendment. As to his substantive due
process rights, Velazquez has failed to demonstrate that the deprivation in question
was “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.” FDIC v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 474
(9th Cir. 1991). Defendants’ actions do not amount to an abuse of power that
“shocks the conscience.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–49
(1998).
Because the record does not evidence a violation of Velazquez’s federal
constitutional rights, the district court properly granted Defendants summary
judgment. Given this disposition, we need not address the Defendants’ remaining
arguments.
AFFIRMED.
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