Mitchell Miller v. Bank of America, N.A. ( 2018 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 13 2018
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MITCHELL MILLER,                                No.    17-56720
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:16-cv-07528-AB-GJS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., as successor
    in interest to America’s Wholesale Lender
    its successor and or assigns; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Andre Birotte, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted April 11, 2018**
    Before:      SILVERMAN, PAEZ, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    Mitchell Miller appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his
    action alleging federal and state law foreclosure-related claims. We have
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Miller’s Truth in Lending Act
    (“TILA”), fraud, and Unfair Competition Law claims as time-barred. See 15
    U.S.C. § 1635(f) (three-year period to exercise right of rescission under TILA);
    Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(d) (three-year statute of limitations for fraud claim
    under California law); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208 (four-year statute of
    limitations for unfair business practices claim under California law). Because
    these claims are time-barred, we do not consider Miller’s arguments concerning
    the merits of these claims.
    The district court properly dismissed Miller’s claim under 26 U.S.C.
    § 860G(d)(1) for an alleged violation of the pooling and servicing agreement
    because Miller failed to allege facts sufficient to show he had standing to bring the
    claim. See In re Turner, 
    859 F.3d 1145
    , 1149 (9th Cir. 2017) (borrowers are not
    third-party beneficiaries of pooling and service agreements); Saterbak v.
    JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
    199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790
    , 795-96 (Ct. App. 2016)
    (borrower lacks standing to bring a preforeclosure action for wrongful foreclosure
    based on an alleged defect in the assignment).
    2                                   17-56720
    The district court properly dismissed Miller’s cancellation of instruments
    claim because Miller failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the loan
    documents were void or voidable. See Thompson v. Ioane, 
    218 Cal. Rptr. 3d 501
    ,
    512 (Ct. App. 2017) (setting forth elements of cancellation of instruments claim
    under California law).
    The district court properly dismissed Miller’s Fair Debt Collection Practices
    Act claim because Miller failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible
    claim. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.; see also 
    Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341
    (although pro
    se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual
    allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).
    Because we affirm the dismissal of Miller’s substantive claims, the district
    court properly dismissed Miller’s accounting claim under California law. See
    Janis v. Cal. State Lottery Comm’n, 
    80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549
    , 554 (Ct. App. 1998)
    (right to accounting is derivative in that it must be based on other claims).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Miller’s motion to
    reconsider because Miller failed to establish any basis for reconsideration. See
    Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 
    5 F.3d 1255
    , 1262-63 (9th
    Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).
    3                                     17-56720
    Contrary to Miller’s contentions, the district court did not grant a request by
    defendants for judicial notice.
    We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal, or matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening
    brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    4                                    17-56720