United States v. Oscar Ledezma-Ortiz ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 30 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-10343
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
4:15-cr-01118-FRZ
v.
OSCAR LEDEZMA-ORTIZ, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frank R. Zapata, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 17, 2018**
San Francisco, California
Before: BEA and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and MCLAUGHLIN,***
District Judge.
Oscar Ledezma-Ortiz appeals his conviction after jury trial of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
(b)(1)(C); and importation of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a),
960(a)(1), and 960(b)(3). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
The government gave notice pretrial of its intent to introduce inculpatory
statements Ledezma-Ortiz made when he was interviewed at the border. Ledezma-
Ortiz objected that his entire statement should be admitted under the rule of
completeness. At trial, the entire statement was played to the jury without
objection, and without limiting instructions. On appeal, Ledezma-Ortiz challenges
the district court’s failure, sua sponte, to instruct the jury on a variety of issues
having to do with his recorded interview, and challenges the sufficiency of two of
the jury instructions given by the district court.
Jury Instructions
1. Ledezma-Ortiz first contends that the district court erred by failing sua
sponte to instruct the jury based on Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Criminal Jury
Instructions § 4.3:
You have heard evidence that the defendant committed other acts not
charged here. You may consider this evidence only for its bearing, if
any, on the question of the defendant’s knowledge and for no other
purpose. You may not consider this evidence as evidence of guilt of
the crime for which the defendant is now on trial.
When admitting relevant evidence under F.R.E 404(b), the trial judge should
ordinarily instruct the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence is
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admitted. United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1314 (1978). However, “[i]t
is well-settled that where no limiting instruction is requested concerning evidence
of other criminal acts, the failure of the trial court to give such an instruction sua
sponte is not reversible error.” United States v. Multi-Management, 743 F.2d
1359, 1364 (9th Cir. 1984). As a result, Ledezma-Ortiz’s claim fails.
2. Ledezma-Ortiz next contends the district court erred in failing to provide
the jury with Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions 3.10, “Activities
Not Charged.” Ledezma-Ortiz’s failure to request the instruction when it was
omitted from the district court’s draft jury instructions means we review this claim
for plain error. United States v. Jayavarman, 871 F.3d 1050, 1061 (9th Cir. 2017).
The purpose of this jury instruction, as the comment explains, is to avoid
constructive amendment of the indictment where evidence of other uncharged
conduct could be interpreted by the jury as satisfying an element of the offense
charged. Here, given the evidence and arguments at trial, which were focused
entirely on the May 12 border crossing and subsequent detention, there is no
reasonable possibility that the jury relied on passing references to prior border
crossings when convicting Ledezma-Ortiz. See United States v. Freeman, 498
F.3d 893, 907 (9th Cir. 2007). There was no plain error in failing to give the
instruction.
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3. Ledezma-Ortiz next contends the trial court should have sua sponte
provided a limiting instruction advising the jury that the agent’s out-of-court
statements during the interview could be used only for non-hearsay purposes, and
not as evidence of guilt. Ledezma-Ortiz has waived this argument as to several of
the statements of which he now complains, including: statements about how drug
cartels work; that drug dealers in Mexico would not have provided a vehicle laden
with a large quantity of drugs to a driver they could not control; and the agent’s
statement to Ledezma-Ortiz that the vehicle contained a large quantity of drugs.
Defense counsel stated that after considering the issue, he was not requesting a
limiting instruction with regard to those statements, and that he did not believe that
a limiting instruction was in his client’s best interests. This exchange establishes a
waiver, precluding plain error review of the failure to give a limiting instruction
with respect to these statements. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-33
(1993).
Even if not waived, Ledezma-Ortiz cannot establish that admission of any of
the agent’s statements in the interview affected his substantial rights because
defense counsel re-elicited from the agent the bulk of the statements he now
complains of, in a non-hearsay format, during cross-examination. And as to the
two categories of statements that were not re-elicited, they did not affect Ledezma-
Ortiz’s substantial rights. First, the agent suggested that one of Ledezma-Ortiz’s
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text messages “could be a code” in which the “groceries” referred to the drugs in
the car. But none of the agent’s statements during the interview affirmatively
asserted that he knew this was a coded message; instead, they were questions to
Ledezma-Ortiz, who disclaimed knowledge. The agent’s questions about code
were not hearsay at all, and the failure sua sponte to limit their use to prove the
truth of the matter asserted could not have affected Ledezma-Ortiz’s substantial
rights. Second, Ledezma-Ortiz contends that the agent’s statements that he had
crossed the border with drugs on other occasions required a limiting instruction.
Even if the statement could be read to suggest that the agent actually knew, rather
than that he was merely asserting a belief as an interrogation tactic in order to elicit
a response, the evidence would nevertheless be inconsequential. The focus of the
trial was on Ledezma-Ortiz’s transport of drugs across the border on May 12,
2015, and the agent’s assertion that he believed, or knew, that Ledezma-Ortiz had
carried drugs over during prior crossings was inconsequential in the context of the
case as a whole.
4. Ledezma-Ortiz next contends the trial court plainly erred when it omitted
language about evidence admitted for a limited use from the “What Is Not
Evidence” jury instruction at the end of the trial. He claims that the court’s
instruction to the jury about the distinction between the investigating agent’s
testimony as a lay witness and an expert witness constituted a “limiting
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instruction.” This was not error. Before admitting the agent’s expert testimony,
the district court properly instructed the jury about the distinction between
testimony of a percipient witness and expert opinion testimony. Contrary to
Ledezma-Ortiz’s argument, the record reflects that the district court did not limit
the purpose for which the jury could consider the expert testimony. Because the
testimony was not admitted for a limited purpose, the district court did not err
when it decided not to instruct the jurors about their obligation to abide by any
limitation with respect to this evidence. And even if the expert instruction was
construed as limiting, there is no showing that the absence of the “What is Not
Evidence” instruction prejudiced Ledezma-Ortiz, or would have undermined the
district court’s earlier instruction.
5. Ledezma-Ortiz next contends that the district court erred in failing to
instruct the jury with his proffered “blind mule” instruction. There was no error.
Because the jury was adequately instructed that it could not convict without proof
that Ledezma-Ortiz acted “knowingly,” was instructed in detail on the meaning of
“knowingly,” and was alerted by the court’s “blind mule” instruction that the
defense theory was that Ledezma-Ortiz did not act knowingly, the jury was
adequately instructed concerning the theory of defense. United States v. Romero-
Avila, 210 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2000) (“It is true that the judge did not use
[defendant’s] precise words in giving these instructions. But ‘[a] defendant is not
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entitled to any particular form of instruction’”). Consequently, Ledezma-Ortiz’s
claim fails.
6. Ledezma-Ortiz argues that the cumulative impact of trial court errors
requires reversal. We reject this contention.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Ledezma-Ortiz claims that defense counsel was ineffective at trial and
sentencing, depriving him of the right to a fair trial. “[A]s a general rule, we do not
review challenges to the effectiveness of defense counsel on direct appeal.” United
States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds
by United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
This is because “a [c]hallenge [to effectiveness of counsel] by way of a habeas
proceeding is preferable as it permits defendant to develop a record as to what
counsel did, why it was done, and what, if any, prejudice resulted.” Id. at 1156
(quoting United States v. Laughlin, 933 F.2d 786, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1991). Ledezma-
Ortiz’s ineffective assistance claims require further development of the record. We
therefore dismiss Ledezma-Ortiz’s ineffective assistance claims, without prejudice
to his raising them in a properly filed motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. United States
v. McGowan, 668 F.3d 601, 606 (9th Cir. 2012).
AFFIRMED.
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