Alaska Laborers Health & Security, Retirement, Training & Legal Services Trust Funds v. Alaska Trailblazing, Inc. , 534 F. App'x 613 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              JUL 24 2013
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ALASKA LABORERS HEALTH AND                       No. 11-35845
    SECURITY, RETIREMENT, TRAINING
    AND LEGAL SERVICES TRUST                         DC No. 3:11 cv-0049 RRB
    FUNDS,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             MEMORANDUM*
    v.
    ALASKA TRAILBLAZING, INC.,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Alaska
    Ralph R. Beistline, Chief District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 22, 2013
    Anchorage, Alaska
    Before:       TASHIMA, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiff-Appellant Alaska Laborers Health and Security, Retirement,
    Training and Legal Services Funds (“Laborers”), appeals from the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee Alaska Trailblazing, Inc.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    (“Trailblazing”), on the ground of res judicata. Because the facts and procedural
    history are familiar to the parties, we do not recite them here, except as necessary
    to explain our disposition. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We
    review de novo both the district court’s determination that res judicata applies and
    its order granting summary judgment on that ground. See Clark v. Bear Stearns &
    Co., 
    966 F.2d 1318
    , 1320 (9th Cir. 1992). We affirm the district court’s grant of
    summary judgment.
    It is undisputed that the prior action was between the same parties and
    concluded in a final judgment on the merits. We analyze whether or not a
    subsequent claim is based on the same “cause of action” by considering, among
    other factors, “whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of
    facts.” Constantini v. Trans World Airlines, 
    681 F.2d 1199
    , 1201-02 (9th Cir.
    1982). To avoid “repetitive litigation,” we consider whether claims brought in a
    subsequent suit would have combined with those of the prior suit to form a
    “convenient trial unit.” Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. Karr, 
    994 F.2d 1426
    ,
    1430 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Karr, we held that
    claims for late payment and underpayment are based on a “single right” to “proper
    monthly contribution.” 
    Id.
     Karr’s holding therefore compels the conclusion that
    Laborers’ second action was based on the “same cause of action” as the first action,
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    and is precluded by res judicata. See 
    id. at 1429
    .
    Accordingly, Laborers’ arguments to the contrary are without merit. First,
    the “on demand” issue is immaterial because Laborers had audited Trailblazing
    well before the district court entered judgment in the original action. See 
    id. at 1428
    . Laborers’ effort to distinguish Karr thus fails. Second, there is no reason to
    apply the concealment exception in this case because Laborers learned of the
    under-payments in plenty of time to recover them in the first action. Finally,
    Laborers is unable to avail itself of the alternative holding of Cabrera v. City of
    Huntington Park, 
    159 F.3d 374
    , 382 n.12 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that res judicata
    will not bar suits brought to protect “new rights acquired pending the action”).
    Laborers’ second action was not based on a “new right,” but rather, was based on
    the same right to “proper monthly contribution” as the first. See Karr, 
    994 F.2d at 1430
    . Further, there is no danger of impracticability or unfairness here because
    Laborers learned about the under-payments in time to amend their claim in the first
    action as a matter of course pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A). See 
    id.
    Accordingly, Karr controls, not Cabrera, and the second action is precluded.
    Laborers’ claims asserted in this action are virtually identical to those
    asserted in their prior action, such that they “could have been asserted” in that
    litigation without difficulty. Karr, 
    994 F.2d at 1429
    . Laborers knew about
    -3-
    Trailblazing’s under-payment months before judgment was entered in the first
    action and could easily have amended its first complaint to include those claims.
    Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Trailblazing
    on the ground of res judicata.
    AFFIRMED.
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