Barbara Brown v. Scott Burton ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 12 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BARBARA E. BROWN, No. 17-55698
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:15-cv-00294-CJC-E
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SCOTT BURTON, Deputy Sheriff, in his
individual capacity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 10, 2018**
Before: TROTT, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges
Barbara E. Brown appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Fourth Amendment violations for
improper detention and arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo, Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011),
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Brown’s Fourth
Amendment claim for improper detention and arrest because Brown failed to raise
a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants (1) had a reasonable
suspicion to detain Brown while investigating a 911 call for a domestic
disturbance, and (2) had probable cause to arrest her pursuant to California Penal
Code § 148(a)(1). See Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir.
2011) (“An officer has probable cause to make a warrantless arrest when the facts
and circumstances within his knowledge are sufficient for a reasonably prudent
person to believe that the suspect has committed a crime.”); United States v. Palos-
Marquez, 591 F.3d 1272, 1274 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An investigatory stop does not
violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported
by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.” (citations and quotations
omitted)); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing
parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that
version of the facts for the purposes of ruling on a motion for summary
judgment.”). The audio recordings of the officers’ interaction with and handling of
the plaintiff demonstrate that her claims against them are spurious. We agree with
the district court that the recordings “refute by blatant contradiction” most of
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Brown’s assertions. The officers’ treatment of her as captured on the recordings
was professional, respectful, and courteous.
The district court properly dismissed Brown’s claims against unnamed John
Doe defendants because Brown failed to make any factual allegations as to these
claims. See Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th
Cir. 2008) (dismissal is proper when plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to
support a claim).
We reject Brown’s meritless contentions that the district court was biased
against her, improperly transferred her case to the district court in Los Angeles,
and improperly denied her request for appointment of counsel.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised in the
opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See
Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); see also United States v.
Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the
district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).
Brown’s motion for appointment of counsel (Docket Entry No. 15) is
denied.
AFFIRMED.
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