Vernon Thompson, Jr. v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAR 8 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    VERNON A. THOMPSON, JR. and                     No.    17-56769
    FLORIA M. GRIFFIN,
    D.C. No.
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,          2:16-cv-02628-PSG-AGR
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
    a/k/a ORTHO-MCNEIL-JANSSEN
    PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., and
    JOHNSON & JOHNSON, INC.
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Phillip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 5, 2019**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: FERNANDEZ and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and DONATO,*** District
    Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable James Donato, United States District Judge for the
    Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    Plaintiffs Vernon A. Thompson, Jr. and his mother, Floria M. Griffin,
    (together, “Thompson”) appeal from the district court’s order denying their motion
    for voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). The
    district court also granted summary judgment in favor of defendants Janssen
    Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Johnson & Johnson (together, “Janssen”), but Thompson
    does not appeal the summary judgment order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
    We have “long held that the decision to grant a voluntary dismissal under
    Rule 41(a)(2) is addressed to the sound discretion of the District Court, and its
    order will not be reversed unless the District Court has abused its discretion.”
    Hamilton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
    679 F.2d 143
    , 145 (9th Cir. 1982).
    When ruling on a motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, the district
    court “must determine whether the defendant will suffer some plain legal prejudice
    as a result of the dismissal.” Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 
    100 F.3d 94
    ,
    96 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Legal prejudice is “prejudice to some legal
    interest, some legal claim, [or] some legal argument.” 
    Id. at 97.
    A district court
    may consider whether the plaintiff has asked for a voluntary dismissal to avoid a
    likely adverse ruling. Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 
    852 F.2d 424
    , 429 (9th Cir. 1988).
    Here, the district court considered permissible factors in evaluating prejudice
    and denying the Rule 41(a)(2) motion. The district court found that granting the
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    motion might require Janssen to face litigation on this claim in state court although
    it had already engaged in substantial discovery and reached the summary judgment
    stage in federal court. The district court noted that Thompson had offered no
    expert disclosures or expert reports to support his product liability claims against
    Janssen, and filed the Rule 41(a)(2) motion only after becoming aware that Janssen
    would seek summary judgment. The district court also found that Thompson had
    not adequately explained why he delayed so long in requesting a voluntary
    dismissal to refile in a similar state court proceeding that he had known about for
    many months. Because the district court’s determinations were not based on an
    erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the facts, it did not
    abuse its discretion.
    AFFIRMED.
    3