Ron Sarfaty v. City of Los Angeles ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 3 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RON SARFATY; GARY SCHERER, No. 17-56468
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No.
2:17-cv-03594-SVW-KS
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES; DOES, 1-10, MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 8, 2019
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and CARDONE, ** District
Judge.
Ron Sarfaty and Gary Scherer (“Plaintiffs”) sued the City of Los Angeles
(the “City”) for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
the Rehabilitation Act, and similar provisions of California law. The district court
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
granted the City’s motion to dismiss the complaint, and this appeal followed. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse and remand.
1. The district court first concluded that the City’s class action settlement
in Willits v. City of Los Angeles released Plaintiffs’ injunctive claims. In reaching
this conclusion, the court did not consider the extrinsic evidence that Plaintiffs
tendered to support their interpretation of the Willits release language. As a matter
of California law, this was error. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas
Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645 (Cal. 1968); see also Trident Ctr. v.
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 565 (9th Cir. 1988) (“This case therefore
presents the question whether parties in California can ever draft a contract that is
proof to parol evidence. Somewhat surprisingly, the answer is no.”). The court
should have “review[ed] the proffered material regarding the parties’ intent to see
if the language is ‘reasonably susceptible’ of the interpretation urged by” Plaintiffs.
Appleton v. Waessil, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676, 677 (Ct. App. 1994). If so, “the extrinsic
evidence is then admitted to aid in the second step, which involves actually
interpreting the contract.” Id. at 678.
If, on remand, the district court concludes that Plaintiffs’ claims here are
encompassed by the Willits release, it must then compare Plaintiffs’ claims to the
claims asserted by the class in Willits to determine whether the two sets of claims
share an “identical factual predicate.” See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA,
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Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 748 (9th Cir. 2006). The Willits release is binding as to
Plaintiffs here only if their claims “depend[] upon the same set of facts.” Williams
v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1134 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Because the district court did not consider Plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence as to
the scope of the Willits release, and because the court failed to conduct the
“identical factual predicate” test that our precedent requires, we reverse the grant
of the City’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ injunctive claims.1
2. Plaintiffs also argue that the district court improperly dismissed their
damages claims.
At the outset, we disagree with the City that Plaintiffs waived their damages
claims by failing to amend their complaint. See WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104
F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
The district court concluded that Plaintiffs’ complaint did not adequately
allege a damages claim. “To succeed on a civil rights claim in this context, the
plaintiffs must show intentional discrimination.” T.B. ex rel. Brenneise v. San
Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 806 F.3d 451, 469 (9th Cir. 2015). Deliberate
indifference satisfies this standard, Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124,
1
Plaintiffs move for judicial notice of seven documents related to the Willits class
action settlement. We GRANT the motion as to Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4. Exhibits 5,
6, and 7 are already part of the record on appeal, and we DENY the motion as
unnecessary with respect to those exhibits.
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1138 (9th Cir. 2001), and can be established by “show[ing] [that] the defendant
had notice of [Plaintiffs’] need for an accommodation and failed to act,” A.G. v.
Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69, 815 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir. 2016)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court dismissed
Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice, and Plaintiffs stood on their complaint on
this issue and chose not to amend.
The district court did not reach the question of notice (by assuming arguendo
that Plaintiffs satisfied the notice prong), but found that Plaintiffs “pleaded no facts
that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the City acted with deliberate
indifference.” Like the district court, we do not reach the issue of notice.2 We
agree with the district court as to Plaintiff Scherer’s failure to plead sufficient facts
as to deliberate indifference,3 but disagree as to Plaintiff Sarfaty. The complaint
alleges that, despite the fact that the City was on notice of Sarfaty’s need for
accommodation, its ADA Coordinator affirmatively told Sarfaty that the City
would not act on his needs. Thus, as alleged, the City’s failure to act was not
2
A plaintiff “can establish notice by showing that she alerted the public entity to
her need for accommodation; or that the need for accommodation was obvious, or
required by statute or regulation.” A.G., 815 F.3d at 1207 (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted). However, our cases make clear that the plaintiff must
“identify specific reasonable and necessary accommodations that the defendant
failed to provide.” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139.
3
The district court found: “[W]ith regard to Plaintiff Scherer, the complaint alleges
only that ‘[t]he City has not issued any substantive response to Scherer’s complaint
or request for accessible parking.’”
4
“negligent, lazy, or careless,” it was intentional. Oden v. N. Marianas Coll., 440
F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2006). Notwithstanding our agreement with the district
court that Plaintiff Scherer failed to adequately allege deliberate indifference; in
light of our other rulings, we remand with direction to allow leave to amend to
both plaintiffs, including as to notice and deliberate indifference.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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