Peter Palmer v. County of Yavapai , 471 F. App'x 781 ( 2012 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 15 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PETER MICHAEL PALMER, No. 10-17690
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-08049-JWS
v.
MEMORANDUM *
COUNTY OF YAVAPAI, a political
subdivision of the State of Arizona; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John W. Sedwick, District Judge, Presiding **
Submitted March 6, 2012 ***
Before: B. FLETCHER, REINHARDT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Peter Michael Palmer appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable John W. Sedgwick, United States District Judge for
the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations by public officials in
Arizona. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of
discretion the denial of leave to amend, Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011), and the denial of a motion for
disqualification, Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703, 714
(9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the
complaint on the grounds of futility and for failure to comply with the local rules.
See Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1043 (upholding denial of leave to amend where
motion was “procedurally improper and substantively unsupported,” and noting
that plaintiffs had failed to comply with local rules).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Palmer’s motion for
disqualification because all of the incidents complained about in Palmer’s motion
“occurred in the course of judicial proceedings, and neither (1) relied upon
knowledge acquired outside such proceedings nor (2) displayed deep-seated and
unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 556 (1994).
Although Palmer’s notice of appeal indicated that he was also appealing the
denial of his motion for reconsideration and the entry of summary judgment,
2 10-17690
Palmer did not brief these issues on appeal and they are accordingly deemed
waived. See Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Kempthorne, 520 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th
Cir. 2008).
AFFIRMED.
3 10-17690