Paramjit Singh v. Loretta E. Lynch , 639 F. App'x 509 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAY 10 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    PARAMJIT SINGH,                                  No. 13-72124
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A098-537-234
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted May 5, 2016**
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: GRABER, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    Petitioner Paramjit Singh seeks review of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals’ ("BIA") denial of his motion to reopen. Reviewing for abuse of
    discretion, Go v. Holder, 
    744 F.3d 604
    , 609 (9th Cir. 2014), we dismiss in part and
    deny in part the petition.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    1. We lack jurisdiction over the BIA’s discretionary decision not to invoke
    its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings. 
    Id. at 609–10.
    Accordingly, we
    dismiss that part of Petitioner’s petition.
    2. Petitioner filed the motion to reopen well after the statutory deadline of
    90 days following the entry of the final order of removal. The BIA correctly held
    that none of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limit applies here. 8
    U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). The order of removal was not
    entered in absentia, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iii); the motion asserted the
    existence of neither changed country conditions nor a battered spouse, child, or
    parent, 
    id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)
    & (iv); and the government did not join the motion,
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii) & (iv).
    3. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply equitable
    tolling. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the medical
    evidence demonstrated, at most, mental incompetence in the preceding few
    years—well after the entry of the final order of removal. Accordingly, even
    assuming that mental incompetence could qualify as "error" for purposes of
    equitable tolling, Petitioner has not shown that he was "prevented from filing
    because of a deception, fraud, or error." Avagyan v. Holder, 
    646 F.3d 672
    , 679
    (9th Cir. 2011).
    2
    4. Because the motion to reopen was untimely, the BIA properly declined to
    reach the merits of Petitioner’s new application for humanitarian asylum. See
    Najmabadi v. Holder, 
    597 F.3d 983
    , 992 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that, because
    the motion to reopen was untimely, the BIA "was entitled to deny the motion
    solely on [that] ground[]").
    Petition DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-72124

Citation Numbers: 639 F. App'x 509

Judges: Graber, Berzon, Murguia

Filed Date: 5/10/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024