Carrie Klyse v. Carolyn W. Colvin , 556 F. App'x 615 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             FEB 24 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    CARRIE S. KLYSE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,              No. 12-15660
    D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05070-WHA
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    CAROLYN W. COLVIN,**
    Commissioner of Social Security Admin.
    Defendant-Appellee.
    On Appeal from the United States District
    Court for the Northern District of California
    William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 12, 2014 ***
    San Francisco, California
    Before: O’SCANNLAIN and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and ADELMAN,
    District Judge.****
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted as defendant-appellee in place of
    Michael J. Astrue pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c).
    ***
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ****
    The Honorable Lynn Adelman, United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.
    Plaintiff-Appellant Carrie Klyse appeals the district court’s order affirming the
    denial of her application for social security disability benefits. We review de novo the
    district court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner’s decision, Hill v. Astrue, 
    698 F.3d 1153
    , 1158 (9th Cir. 2012), and will uphold the Commissioner’s final decision
    if the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) applied the correct legal standards and
    supported his decision with substantial evidence, Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
    Admin., 
    682 F.3d 1157
    , 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).
    1.    Klyse contends that the ALJ should have found her mental impairments
    conclusively disabling. The ALJ thoroughly considered the mental impairment
    listings, and Klyse fails to demonstrate that she satisfies the criteria of any particular
    section. Merely pointing to a diagnosis or “GAF” score will not suffice. See Young
    v. Sullivan, 
    911 F.2d 180
    , 181, 183-85 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that mere diagnosis
    of a listed impairment is not sufficient to sustain a finding of disability); Revised
    Medical Criteria for Evaluating Mental Disorders and Traumatic Brain Injury, 
    65 Fed. Reg. 50,746
    , 50,764-65 (Aug. 21, 2000) (noting, in a response to public comment, that
    the GAF scale “does not have a direct correlation to the severity requirements in our
    mental disorders listings”).
    2.      Klyse argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating the credibility of the
    testimony. The ALJ provided specific, cogent reasons for not fully crediting Klyse’s
    2
    claims, see Berry v. Astrue, 
    622 F.3d 1228
    , 1234 (9th Cir. 2010), including the
    inconsistency between some of Klyse’s assertions and the medical record, her limited
    treatment, and her daily activities (e.g., caring for three foster children, housework,
    gardening, and swimming), see Chaudhry v. Astrue, 
    688 F.3d 661
    , 672 (9th Cir.
    2012). The ALJ considered the testimony that Klyse’s children helped around the
    house but nevertheless found that Klyse could perform a range of sedentary work.
    3.   Klyse’s remaining arguments – relating to her fibromyalgia diagnosis and
    the vocational expert’s testimony – are waived, Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
    
    439 F.3d 1001
    , 1007 (9th Cir. 2006), and none of the waiver exceptions applies to her
    case, see Greger v. Barnhart, 
    464 F.3d 968
    , 973 (9th Cir. 2006). Social Security
    Ruling (“SSR”) 12-2p, 
    2012 WL 3104869
     (July 25, 2012), merely provides guidance
    for evaluating fibromyalgia in disability claims, and Beltran v. Astrue, 
    700 F.3d 386
    (9th Cir. 2012), addressed whether the expert had identified a “significant number of
    jobs” the claimant could still perform. Neither changed the law pertinent to Klyse’s
    claims. See, e.g., Benecke v. Barnhart, 
    379 F.3d 587
    , 594 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding
    disability based on fibromyalgia); Thomas v. Barnhart, 
    278 F.3d 947
    , 960 (9th Cir.
    2002) (accepting the claimant’s state as the relevant “region”); SSR 00-4p, 
    2000 WL 1898704
     (Dec, 4, 2000), at *4 (requiring the ALJ to reconcile conflicts between the
    expert’s testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles).
    AFFIRMED.
    3