Genesis Chi v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAR 9 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    GENESIS NDEH CHI,                               No.    20-73663
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A213-187-432
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted March 7, 2022**
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: GRABER and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and REISS,*** District Judge.
    Petitioner Genesis Ndeh Chi, a native and citizen of Cameroon, petitions for
    review of the decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Christina Reiss, United States District Judge for the
    District of Vermont, sitting by designation.
    immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum, withholding of
    removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , and we deny the petition.
    “Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision while adding some of its
    own reasoning, we review both decisions.” Lopez-Cardona v. Holder, 
    662 F.3d 1110
    , 1111 (9th Cir. 2011). We review legal questions de novo and the BIA’s
    factual findings for substantial evidence. See Aden v. Wilkinson, 
    989 F.3d 1073
    ,
    1079 (9th Cir. 2021).
    1. With regard to asylum and withholding of removal, substantial evidence
    supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioner did not establish that he faced past
    persecution or had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his
    membership in a particular political group. Petitioner testified he believed that
    police officers sought to question and persecute him because he had attended two
    political protests and because secessionists frequented his beer parlor. He
    concedes, however, that he was able to live in other parts of Cameroon without
    incident and that he was not arrested, detained, or physically harmed. The BIA
    evaluated Petitioner’s testimony regarding his limited personal interactions with
    police officers, harm to his sister about which he heard from a third party, and the
    burning of his beer parlor by an unknown arsonist after he left Cameroon
    “cumulatively” and permissibly found it insufficient. See Sharma v. Garland, 9
    
    2 F.4th 1052
    , 1063 (9th Cir. 2021) (listing factors such as “physical violence and
    resulting serious injuries, frequency of harm, specific threats combined with
    confrontation, length and quality of detention, harm to family and close friends,
    economic deprivation, and general societal turmoil”). Although the BIA concluded
    that Petitioner testified credibly to his subjective fears of persecution, “the harm
    about which he testified does not rise to the level of persecution[,]” and “he has not
    shown a nexus between such harm and a protected characteristic.” Petitioner fails
    to establish that the evidence compels a different conclusion. See Garcia-Milian v.
    Holder, 
    755 F.3d 1026
    , 1031 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In order to reverse the BIA, we
    must determine ‘that the evidence not only supports [a contrary] conclusion, but
    compels it[.]’” (emphasis and first alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
    With regard to withholding of removal, substantial evidence supports the
    BIA’s finding that Petitioner failed to establish that it was more likely than not that
    he would be persecuted on account of a protected ground if he returned to
    Cameroon. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 
    846 F.3d 351
    , 360 (9th Cir. 2017)
    (holding that petitioners who apply for withholding of removal must establish that
    a statutorily protected ground was “a reason” for their persecution).
    2. Finally, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s findings that Petitioner’s
    fear of torture if he returned to Cameroon is generalized and speculative and does
    not demonstrate that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured by or
    3
    with the consent or acquiescence of the government. See Aden v. Holder, 
    589 F.3d 1040
    , 1047 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Zheng v. Holder, 
    644 F.3d 829
    , 835-36 (9th
    Cir. 2011) (finding the possibility of torture too speculative). As the BIA pointed
    out, Petitioner’s friend, eight-year-old son, and the mother of his son continue to
    live in Cameroon, apparently without incident. See Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 
    542 F.3d 738
    , 743 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen similarly situated members of the
    petitioner’s family live without incident in the danger zone, such family evidence
    and the inferences drawn from it does substantially support the agency
    decision[.]”) (internal quotation marks, modifications, and citation omitted),
    abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 
    707 F.3d 1081
     (9th Cir.
    2013) (en banc).
    The BIA thus permissibly denied Petitioner’s CAT claim.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-73663

Filed Date: 3/9/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/9/2022