Juan Lorenzo-Leon v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 9 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN LORENZO-LEON, No. 20-73049
Petitioner, Agency No. A208-308-236
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 9, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: NGUYEN, MILLER, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Juan Lorenzo-Leon petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s
decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing legal questions de novo and the agency’s factual
findings for substantial evidence, see Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824,
831 (9th Cir. 2022), we deny the petition.
1. Lorenzo-Leon acknowledged to the agency that he filed his asylum
application after the one-year limit. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). The BIA
adopted the IJ’s conclusion that Lorenzo-Leon’s ignorance of asylum did not
constitute “changed . . . or extraordinary circumstances” that would excuse his
untimely filing. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). This conclusion was not erroneous, see
Antonio-Martinez v. INS, 317 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003), and Lorenzo-Leon
has forfeited any challenge to it by failing to address it in his brief. See Gonzalez-
Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 2018).
2. The agency did not err in denying Lorenzo-Leon’s application for
withholding of removal because he failed to articulate a cognizable “particular
social group.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). He argued to the agency that “he will
[be] targeted for kidnapping, robbery, extortion or even murder by criminals in
Guatemala” because “[i]ndividuals who have made progress in their lives, and are
successful, are targeted by organized criminals . . . because they are perceived as
wealthy.” But he provided insufficient evidence to support his claim that his
alleged wealthy appearance will make him a target for violent crimes upon his
return to Guatemala any more than the populace at large. See Ramirez-Munoz v.
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Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016); cf. Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007,
1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals
motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a
protected ground.”).
3. The agency did not err in denying Lorenzo-Leon’s application for CAT
relief because he failed to show that any torture would be committed “by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official . . . or other
person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). To the extent the
Guatemala country conditions report shows “a general ineffectiveness on the
government’s part to investigate and prevent crime,” that does “not suffice to show
acquiescence.” Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016).
PETITION DENIED.
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