Hardenbrook v. United Parcel Service, Inc. , 490 F. App'x 42 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            JUL 24 2012
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                    U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    DAREL HARDENBROOK, an individual,                Nos. 11-35309; 11-35353
    Plaintiff - Appellant/Cross-      D.C. No. 1:07-cv-00509-EJL-
    Appellee,                            CWD
    and
    MEMORANDUM *
    PAUL GOOCH, an individual
    Plaintiff,
    and
    ROBERT ORLOFF, an individual,
    Plaintiff/Contingent Cross-
    Appellee,
    v.
    UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., a
    Delaware corporation doing business in
    the State of Idaho,
    Defendant - Appellee/Cross-
    Appellant.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Idaho
    Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted May 7, 2012
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: GOULD, BYBEE, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
    Darel Hardenbrook, Paul Gooch, and Robert Orloff brought suit against
    United Parcel Service (“UPS”) alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the
    implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and wrongful termination in
    violation of public policy. The district court granted UPS’s motion for summary
    judgment on all of Orloff’s claims. Only Hardenbrook’s wrongful termination
    claim proceeded to trial, at which he won a judgment against UPS. After entry of
    the judgment, the district court denied Hardenbrook’s and UPS’s petitions for
    attorney’s fees, finding that there was no prevailing party. We have jurisdiction
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we reverse and remand.
    Pursuant to 
    Idaho Code § 12-120
    (3), the prevailing party in any civil action
    to recover on a commercial transaction “shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s
    fee to be set by the court.” 
    Idaho Code Ann. § 12-120
    (3) (emphasis added). The
    statute applies in actions brought pursuant to an employment contract and for
    2
    claims related to the employment relationship. See Jenkins v. Boise Cascade
    Corp., 
    108 P.3d 380
    , 391 (Idaho 2005).
    The Idaho Court of Appeals has articulated three factors that a trial court
    must consider when determining who is the prevailing party: (1) the final judgment
    or result, (2) whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties, and
    (3) the extent to which each party prevailed on each claim or issue. See Nguyen v.
    Bui, 
    191 P.3d 1107
    , 1112 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008); see also 
    id. at 1113
     (explaining
    that a trial judge should not split a “single ‘claim’ upon which the plaintiffs had
    prevailed into prevailing and nonprevailing ‘theories’”). Even if there are multiple
    claims, a trial judge is not required to apportion the attorney’s fees, but must only
    take that into consideration. 
    Id.
    The magistrate judge looked at the “overall action” and found that UPS
    would have been declared the prevailing party against Orloff, and Hardenbrook
    would have been the prevailing party against UPS; the court concluded that the two
    were basically a wash. Unlike the cases cited by UPS and the lower courts,
    however, this is not a case where there were multiple claims and counterclaims
    between the same parties. See Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating &
    Paving, Inc., 
    117 P.3d 130
    , 133 (Idaho 2005); Int’l Eng’g Co. v. Daum Indus., 
    630 P.2d 155
    , 158–59 (Idaho 1981). The magistrate judge found that Hardenbrook had
    3
    only one claim under alternate theories. UPS filed no counterclaims. Instead, this
    case involves one claim between Hardenbrook and UPS and a similar claim
    between Orloff and UPS. The magistrate judge explicitly found that “Hardenbrook
    basically prevailed on the principal complaint he and the other two Plaintiffs
    pursued against UPS,” and that UPS prevailed against Orloff. We agree. Thus,
    Hardenbrook is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees because he is the prevailing
    party in his case against UPS, and UPS is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees
    because it is the prevailing party in its case against Orloff. The district court
    abused its discretion by finding otherwise.
    The district court has discretion to determine a reasonable attorney’s fee to
    award to Hardenbrook, for his prevailing claim against UPS, and to UPS, for its
    prevailing claim against Orloff. See Schroeder v. Partin, 
    259 P.3d 617
    , 624 (Idaho
    2011). In this calculation, “the court [has] a duty to apportion to each of the parties
    only the attorney fees related to the claims upon which each party prevailed.” 
    Id.
    Thus, Hardenbrook is entitled to an award against UPS only for the time his
    attorneys spent on his prevailing claim. The calculation should take into
    consideration that during the early stages of the litigation, before the other parties
    were dismissed, there was overlapping representation between Hardenbrook,
    Orloff, and Gooch. The attorney time for the joint representation should be
    4
    reduced accordingly. Likewise, UPS is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees
    related only to defending against Orloff. Fees which may be attributed to
    defending on overlapping claims by Hardenbrook, Orloff, and Gooch should be
    apportioned and reduced accordingly. This case is remanded to the district court
    for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees in accordance with this decision.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-35309, 11-35353

Citation Numbers: 490 F. App'x 42

Judges: Gould, Bybee, Bea

Filed Date: 7/24/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024