Michael Alves v. Hewlett-Packard Comprehensive ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAR 10 2022
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    MICHAEL ALVES,                                   No.   21-55476
    Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No.
    2:16-cv-09136-RGK-JEM
    v.
    HEWLETT-PACKARD                                  MEMORANDUM*
    COMPREHENSIVE WELFARE
    BENEFITS PLAN; HEWLETT-
    PACKARD ENTERPRISE COMPANY,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 7, 2022**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: IKUTA, LEE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
    Michael Alves appeals the district court’s ruling that Sedgwick Claims
    Management Services, Inc. (“Sedgwick”), the ERISA plan administrator of the
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Hewlett-Packard Comprehensive Welfare Benefits Plan (the “Plan”), did not abuse
    its discretion in denying Alves’s long-term disability benefits.1 We review the
    district court’s decision de novo. See Gabriel v. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 
    773 F.3d 945
    , 953 (9th Cir. 2014).
    Sedgwick did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Alves was not
    “Totally Disabled” as defined in the Plan because Alves’s medical record did not
    show that he was “unable to perform the material and essential duties of his Own
    Occupation” or “unable to perform any occupation for which he is or may become
    qualified” over the relevant time periods. Sedgwick reasonably construed the
    Plan’s language and provided a detailed explanation for its determination. See
    Williby v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 
    867 F.3d 1129
    , 1138 (9th Cir. 2017). Moreover,
    Sedgwick’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, including multiple
    persuasive medical opinions from Drs. Taj Jiva, Rizwan Karatela, Heidi Connolly,
    Stephen Broomes, Brian Strizik, and Frank Polanco, concluding that Alves was not
    functionally impaired in a manner that would prevent him from performing his
    sedentary occupation. See Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Ret. Plan,
    
    410 F.3d 1173
    , 1179 (9th Cir. 2005). We reject Alves’s argument that Sedgwick’s
    1
    It is undisputed that the Plan grants the administrator discretionary
    authority.
    2
    decision is undercut by Dr. Stephen Broomes’s conclusion that Alves was limited
    to sitting continuously for 30 minutes per hour, or by Dr. Maryam Balouch’s
    conclusion that Alves needed to elevate his legs. Neither of these diagnoses would
    preclude Alves from performing sedentary work.
    Nor did Sedgwick abuse its discretion by failing to consider the disability
    determination issued by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). Sedgwick
    reasonably explained that the Plan applied a different definition of disability than
    did the SSA. Specifically, the SSA was directed by its Medical-Vocational
    Guidelines to find Alves disabled, regardless of whether Alves had the residual
    functional capacity to perform “the full range of sedentary work.” Therefore,
    Sedgwick did not abuse its discretion by reaching a different conclusion than that
    reached by the SSA. Alves also argues that Sedgwick abused its discretion by
    failing to compare and contrast the medical evidence it relied on with that relied on
    by the SSA. However, Sedgwick was not required to perform such an analysis,
    given that it relied on other medical evidence in the record, evaluated the SSA’s
    contrary conclusion, and gave a reasonable explanation for not adopting it. See
    Montour v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 
    588 F.3d 623
    , 635 (9th Cir. 2009).
    Alves’s other challenges to Sedgwick’s conclusion also fail. Contrary to
    Alves’s assertions, Sedgwick considered and discussed Alves’s leg edema and
    3
    stress conditions in its denial letter. Nor did Sedgwick err in hiring specialists to
    focus on their areas of specialty in reviewing Alves’s condition, especially since
    one of Sedgwick’s reviewing doctors thoroughly evaluated Alves’s medical record
    from a cumulative, “whole-body” perspective and concluded Alves was not
    disabled.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-55476

Filed Date: 3/10/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/10/2022