George Lopez Ramirez v. City of Glendale ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 10 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GEORGE LOPEZ RAMIREZ, No. 21-55036
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:19-cv-04126-DDP-AFM
v.
CITY OF GLENDALE, a municipal MEMORANDUM*
corporation; AARON ZEIGLER, Police
Officer; ISABEL RIVAS, Corrections
Officer; CARL POVILAITIS, Chief of
Police; DOES, 1 through 20,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 8, 2022**
Pasadena, California
Before: IKUTA, LEE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff George Lopez Ramirez sued Defendants City of Glendale, Aaron
Zeigler, Isabel Rivas, Carl Povilaitis, and Does 1 through 20 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
alleging false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment and unlawful
imprisonment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Defendants on both claims. On appeal, Plaintiff
asserts that 1) the district court improperly resolved material factual disputes
regarding whether there was probable cause for his arrest, and 2) there is a material
factual dispute as to whether his post-arrest detention violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. United
States v. Phattey, 943 F.3d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 2019). In doing so, we “view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether
there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly
applied the relevant substantive law.” Id. (cleaned up). We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. Probable cause for arrest. The district court did not improperly resolve a
factual dispute in concluding that Defendant Zeigler had probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff for domestic battery. “Probable cause exists ‘when the facts and
circumstances within [an officer’s] knowledge are sufficient for a reasonably
prudent person to believe that the suspect has committed a crime.’” Reed v.
1
Plaintiff also alleged failure to train under Monell v. New York City Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), but he does not bring that claim on appeal.
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Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Rosenbaum v. Washoe
County, 663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011)). This is an “an objective standard[,]
and the officer’s subjective intention in exercising his discretion to arrest is
immaterial in judging whether his actions were reasonable for Fourth Amendment
purposes.” United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 740 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted).
In California, “any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the
person of another” is battery. Cal. Penal Code § 242. The Penal Code separately
punishes battery committed against a person “with whom the defendant currently
has . . . a dating or engagement relationship.” Id. § 243(e)(1). Here, Plaintiff does
not dispute that Medina reported to the police that a man was “pushing” her. He also
does not dispute that he told Defendant Zeigler that he was in a relationship with
Medina and that he had “grabbed” her arms. Therefore, under the totality of the
circumstances known to Defendant Zeigler at the time of the arrest, the undisputed
facts establish probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest for domestic battery.
Because there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for domestic battery, we
need not address whether there was also probable cause to arrest him for the
outstanding warrant. See United States v. Magallon-Lopez, 817 F.3d 671, 675 (9th
Cir. 2016) (“[I]f the facts support probable cause to arrest for one offense, the arrest
is lawful even if the officer invoked, as the basis for the arrest, a different offense as
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to which probable cause was lacking.”). Nor need we address whether the officers
are entitled to qualified immunity.
2. Post-arrest detention. The district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. Detention on
a mistaken warrant may violate due process if “the circumstances indicated to the
defendants that further investigation was warranted.” Garcia v. County of Riverside,
817 F.3d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). However, probable cause for
an arrest defeats any subsequent claim for unlawful imprisonment under § 1983. See
Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (“To prevail
on his § 1983 claim for false arrest and imprisonment, [plaintiff] would have to
demonstrate that there was no probable cause to arrest him.”). Because Defendant
Zeigler had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for domestic battery, his Fourteenth
Amendment claim fails as a matter of law. Although Plaintiff seems to assert that he
was detained only for the outstanding warrant, there is no genuine dispute that he
was arrested and detained for both the outstanding warrant and domestic battery.
AFFIRMED.
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