Shabbir Fuad v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAR 11 2022
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    SHABBIR AHMED FUAD,                              No. 15-73201
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A206-911-272
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted March 9, 2022**
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: GRABER and BEA, Circuit Judges, and REISS,*** District Judge.
    Petitioner Shabbir Ahmed Fuad, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, seeks
    review of a final decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Christina Reiss, United States District Judge for the
    District of Vermont, sitting by designation.
    his appeal from an immigration judge’s denial of Petitioner’s application for
    asylum and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny
    the petition.
    1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Petitioner did not
    suffer past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Plancarte
    Sauceda v. Garland, 
    23 F.4th 824
    , 831 (9th Cir. 2022) (reviewing for substantial
    evidence the factual findings that underlie the BIA’s denial of asylum and CAT
    relief). Petitioner testified that a member of a rival political party beat him with a
    flashlight and, afterwards, that Petitioner received several threats. But the single
    beating did not result in any visible injury or medical treatment, and the threats
    were not fulfilled. Without more, therefore, Petitioner’s cumulative experience in
    Bangladesh does not compel a finding of past persecution. See Sharma v. Garland,
    
    9 F.4th 1052
    , 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that the cumulative effect of
    unfulfilled threats and beatings that resulted in no injury did not compel a finding
    of past persecution); see also Gu v. Gonzales, 
    454 F.3d 1014
    , 1020–21 (9th Cir.
    2006) (holding that a single beating that required no medical treatment did not
    compel a finding of past persecution); Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 
    319 F.3d 1179
    , 1182
    (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that unfulfilled threats constituted “harassment rather than
    persecution”).
    2
    In addition, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Petitioner
    failed to prove that he could not relocate safely within Bangladesh. 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13
    (b)(2)(ii), 1208.16(b)(3)(i). After rival political members came to his
    house and threatened him, Petitioner left home. But Petitioner remained in the
    vicinity for the next ten months, staying within thirty kilometers of his home and
    even returning home “from time-to-time” to live with his father. Petitioner never
    experienced any other attacks or confrontations. Thus, Petitioner’s fear that he will
    be targeted throughout Bangladesh some nine years after he left is not objectively
    reasonable. See Nagoulko v. I.N.S., 
    333 F.3d 1012
    , 1018 (9th Cir. 2003)
    (concluding that speculative fear of future harm cannot support an asylum claim).
    Accordingly, the BIA permissibly concluded that Petitioner did not meet his
    burden of proof for asylum.
    2. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that Petitioner
    failed to show that he will “more likely than not” face torture by, or with the
    consent or acquiescence of, the government if returned to Bangladesh. 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16
    (c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1). No evidence in the record shows that Petitioner
    had been tortured previously. And a petitioner’s generalized fear of the possibility
    of harm in the future, no matter how sincere, cannot compel a conclusion contrary
    to that reached by the agency. See Lopez v. Sessions, 
    901 F.3d 1071
    , 1078 (9th
    3
    Cir. 2018) (holding that a generalized threat of future harm “does not provide a
    sufficient basis to conclude that any harm . . . would rise to the level of torture”).
    Thus, the BIA permissibly denied CAT relief.
    PETITION DENIED.
    4