Juan Arreaga Puac v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 14 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JUAN CARLOS ARREAGA PUAC,                       No.    16-71238
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A206-357-326
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted March 7, 2022**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: S.R. THOMAS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges, and ORRICK,*** District
    Judge.
    Juan Carlos Arreaga Puac, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for
    review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable William Horsley Orrick, United States District Judge
    for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of withholding of removal.1 “When the BIA
    conducts its own review of the evidence and law rather than adopting the IJ’s
    decision, our review is limited to the BIA’s decision, except to the extent that the
    IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” Shrestha v. Holder, 
    590 F.3d 1034
    , 1039
    (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We review
    questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo and factual findings
    for substantial evidence. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 
    947 F.3d 1238
    , 1241 (9th Cir.
    2020). We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . We deny the petition.
    Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Arreaga failed to
    show a clear likelihood of economic persecution on account of being indigenous.
    While purely economic harm can rise to the level of persecution in certain
    circumstances, see Baballah v. Ashcroft, 
    367 F.3d 1067
    , 1075 (9th Cir. 2004), the
    only evidence of future economic harm that Arreaga introduced below was country
    conditions evidence documenting racism against indigenous Guatemalans in
    employment generally. He pointed to no past persecution against him and no
    evidence supporting his position that he would face economic harm that amounted
    1
    The BIA and IJ also denied asylum and protection under the Convention
    Against Torture (“CAT”). Arreaga’s brief does not challenge the denial of asylum.
    Though his “question presented” references CAT, the brief contains no substantive
    challenge to or argument about that determination. These issues are, therefore, not
    before us. See Iraheta-Martinez v. Garland, 
    12 F.4th 942
    , 959 (9th Cir. 2021)
    (holding that appellant forfeited argument by failing to develop it in his opening
    brief).
    2
    to persecution in the future.
    We also reject Arreaga’s argument that the BIA erred in finding that he
    failed to show a likelihood of persecution on account of membership in a particular
    social group. As an initial matter, the government is incorrect that this issue is
    unexhausted. Arreaga raised it in his brief to the BIA and the BIA passed on it.
    See Parada v. Sessions, 
    902 F.3d 901
    , 914 (9th Cir. 2018); Figueroa v. Mukasey,
    
    543 F.3d 487
    , 492 (9th Cir. 2008). While Arreaga did not meaningfully develop
    his argument, he need not have done so to exhaust it. Figueroa, 
    543 F.3d at 492
    .
    Both below and here, Arreaga failed to put forward any meaningful evidence
    or argument showing that his proposed particular social group—Guatemalans
    subject to a “virtual kleptocracy” from gangs—is cognizable. See Reyes v. Lynch,
    
    842 F.3d 1125
    , 1132 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the applicant bears the
    burden to prove the existence of a cognizable particular social group). Generally,
    “[a]n alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or
    random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.” Zetino
    v. Holder, 
    622 F.3d 1007
    , 1016 (9th Cir. 2010). Arreaga has not presented here,
    and did not present below, evidence or argument showing that this proposed social
    group shares a common immutable characteristic, is defined with particularity, or
    is perceived as socially distinct in Guatemalan society. See Reyes, 842 F.3d at
    1131. And he has not shown that “individuals in the group . . . share a narrowing
    3
    characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted.” Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 
    968 F.3d 1070
    , 1081 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    PETITION DENIED.
    4