Emily Roe v. Stanford Health Care ( 2022 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 15 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    EMILY ROE, Relator; et al.,                     No.    20-55874
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
    2:17-cv-08726-DSF-AFM
    and
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; STATE                 MEMORANDUM*
    OF CALIFORNIA,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    STANFORD HEALTH CARE, FKA
    Stanford Hospitals and Clinics; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    and
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT
    ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Interested Party,
    Defendant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    Submitted March 9, 2022**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: WARDLAW and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,*** District
    Judge.
    Emily Roe brought this False Claims Act (“FCA”) action, alleging that
    Stanford Health Care and others engaged in fraudulent Medicare billing. The district
    court dismissed Roe’s seconded amended complaint with prejudice, relying on the
    FCA’s public disclosure bar, and also ordered Roe to disclose her identity. After
    Roe failed to do so, the district court held Roe and her counsel in contempt and
    ordered that per diem sanctions would be imposed if they did not purge their
    contempt by a stated date. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
    1.     A FCA suit by a private party will not lie “if substantially the same
    allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed
    . . . unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the
    action is an original source of the information.” 
    31 U.S.C. § 3730
    (e)(4)(A). The
    second amended complaint is almost entirely premised on publicly disclosed
    Medicare data Roe obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests. See
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for
    the District of Montana, sitting by designation.
    2
    Schindler Elevator Corp. v. U.S. ex rel. Kirk, 
    563 U.S. 401
    , 404 (2011). The other
    information Roe identifies in arguing that her action does not rest on the Medicare
    data is either irrelevant or already revealed in the data.
    2.     Roe’s operative complaint is not saved by the FCA’s original source
    exception, which allows private suits by someone with “knowledge that is
    independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or
    transactions.” 
    31 U.S.C. § 3730
    (e)(4)(B). Neither Roe’s specialized expertise, see
    A-1 Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. California, 
    202 F.3d 1238
    , 1245 (9th Cir. 2000), the
    allegedly fraudulent billing to a private insurer she personally observed, see United
    States v. Kitsap Physicians Serv., 
    314 F.3d 995
    , 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2002), nor the
    other information she points to materially adds to the Medicare data.
    3.     On the same day, after it entered its order dismissing Roe’s second
    amended complaint with prejudice, the district court entered a second order requiring
    disclosure of her identity. In determining whether to allow anonymity, a court “must
    balance five factors: (1) the severity of the threatened harm, (2) the reasonableness
    of the anonymous party’s fears, (3) the anonymous party’s vulnerability to such
    retaliation, (4) the prejudice to the opposing party, and (5) the public interest.” Doe
    v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Est., 
    596 F.3d 1036
    , 1042 (9th Cir.
    2010) (cleaned up). Although discounting the severity of the first three factors, the
    district court did not hold that they carried no weight; rather, it found them
    3
    outweighed by the fourth and fifth factors. However, Stanford already knew Roe’s
    identity and the public interest in litigation already dismissed at the Rule 12(b)(6)
    stage is not as strong as that for ongoing litigation. We therefore reverse the
    disclosure order and vacate the corresponding sanctions.
    AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part. The parties shall bear their own
    costs.1
    1
    Roe’s motion to take judicial notice, Dkt. 33, is granted as to the complaint in
    United States ex rel. Gaines v. University Health Care Alliance and otherwise
    denied. All remaining motions by both parties, Dkts. 40, 41, 66, are denied,
    including the requests for sanctions on appeal and the motions to seal previously
    granted subject to reconsideration by this panel, Dkts. 34, 41.
    4