Hector Monzon-Campos v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 16 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HECTOR ALFONSO MONZON- No. 19-70064
CAMPOS,
Agency No. A087-764-491
Petitioner,
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of an
Immigration Judge
Submitted March 8, 2022**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: PAEZ, CLIFTON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Hector Alfonso Monzon-Campos, a native and citizen of Guatemala,
petitions for review of a decision of an immigration judge (IJ) upholding an asylum
officer’s negative reasonable fear determination. We deny the petition for review.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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1. The proceedings before the IJ did not violate Monzon-Campos’s due
process rights. Although non-citizens in reasonable fear proceedings are entitled to
due process protections, they are not entitled to all of the same protections granted
to persons not previously removed. Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 812 (9th
Cir. 2018). The IJ conducts a de novo review of the asylum officer’s
determination, and non-citizens are not entitled to present new evidence or
testimony in the IJ hearing. Alvarado-Herrera v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1187, 1195
(9th Cir. 2021).
Monzon-Campos contends that the IJ failed to conduct a de novo review and
to elicit sufficient testimony. However, at the outset of the hearing, the IJ stated
that he would review the asylum officer’s decision and reverse it if he disagreed.
Nothing in the record suggests that his review was not de novo. Moreover, the IJ
questioned Monzon-Campos about the details of his prior testimony and allowed
him to provide additional testimony. In these proceedings, Monzon-Campos was
not entitled to more.
2. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that the harm
Monzon-Campos feared was not related to a protected ground. A petitioner in a
reasonable fear proceeding must show a “reasonable possibility” that he will be
persecuted on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
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social group, or political opinion in the country of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3);
8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c).
Monzon-Campos testified that police and criminals repeatedly extorted him
for money, sometimes by violent means. But he also testified that the perpetrators
of that extortion targeted him purely because they “think I have money.” Monzon-
Campos cannot demonstrate the required nexus to a protected ground when
substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that his fear of harm is based
exclusively on a “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by
theft.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010).
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s rejection of Monzon-Campos’s claim
that the harm he feared was related to his political opinion. Although Monzon-
Campos responded “Yes” when the IJ asked whether he would be harmed due to
his political opinion, he only made a conclusory allegation of “mistreatment and
persecution[.]” The asylum officer’s written analysis concluded that Monzon-
Campos “has not established that others would be aware of . . . or that anyone
would be inclined to harm him on account of those opinions[,]” which Monzon-
Campos “could not define” beyond his attendance at “one protest where the entire
village participated” and his expressed opinion on a new president, which have
only resulted in “a verbal argument.” When the IJ asked Monzon-Campos if he
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had faced problems due to his political opinion, he said that these problems were
“[j]ust arguments, words, nothing bigger.”
3. Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that Monzon-
Campos did not qualify for protection under the Convention Against Torture. To
be entitled to CAT protection, a petitioner must establish that, if returned to his
home country, he is more likely than not to face torture by or with the
government’s acquiescence. Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 831, 833
(9th Cir. 2016). Although Monzon-Campos testified that the police repeatedly
stopped him while driving and demanded money, nothing beyond speculation links
the police or other government actors to the more violent extortion he suffered at
the hands of criminals. Nor is there anything in his testimony to suggest that he
would be singled out for torture on his return.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.