Nesly Carpio-Batres v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 17 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NESLY MARIELA CARPIO-BATRES; No. 17-71235
ANDERSON DAVID RAMIREZ-CARPIO,
Agency Nos. A208-447-788
Petitioners, A208-447-789
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 15, 2022**
San Francisco, California
Before: W. FLETCHER, GOULD, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
Petitioners Nesly Carpio-Batres and Anderson Ramirez-Carpio seek review
of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing Petitioners’ appeal
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
from denial of asylum and withholding of removal by an Immigration Judge (IJ). 1
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing the factual findings in the
BIA’s decision and the parts of the IJ’s decision adopted by the BIA, Cordon-Garcia
v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2000), for substantial evidence, Rayamajhi v.
Whitaker, 912 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 2019), we deny the petition.
1. In denying asylum and withholding of removal, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s
conclusion that Petitioners’ putative particular social groups of Guatemalan single
mothers and single mothers in Guatemala who have family ties in the United States
are not cognizable. The BIA also concluded that Petitioners established no nexus
between these putative particular social groups and past harm or a well-founded fear
of future harm in Guatemala.
Petitioners do not raise in this court any challenge to the IJ’s cognizability
findings. This omission is fatal to Petitioners’ claim because non-citizens seeking
asylum or withholding of removal based on particular social group membership must
set out a cognizable particular social group. See Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d
1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2020). And “[w]e will not manufacture arguments for [a
petitioner].” Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994). We deny the
petition on forfeiture grounds. See Etemadi v. Garland, 12 F.4th 1013, 1026 (9th
1
Anderson Ramirez-Carpio withdrew his separate application for relief,
but he remains a derivative beneficiary on his mother’s application.
2
Cir. 2021) (“[F]orfeiture is the failure to make a timely assertion of a right, whereas
waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a right.” (quoting
Claiborne v. Blauser, 934 F.3d 885, 893 (9th Cir. 2019))).
In any event, even assuming that Petitioners set out a cognizable particular
social group, they did not make the requisite “show[ing] that there is a nexus between
[the purported] mistreatment and a protected ground.” Khudaverdyan v. Holder, 778
F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
also Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2021) (discussing the nexus
requirement for withholding of removal). Petitioners’ bare assertion that such a
nexus exists is insufficient to warrant relief. See Greenwood, 28 F.3d at 977. We
deny the petition for the independent reason that Petitioners abandoned their
arguments with regard to the agency’s nexus finding. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS,
94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised in a brief that are not supported
by argument are deemed abandoned.”).
We further conclude that the agency properly determined that Nesly Carpio-
Batres’s status as a Guatemalan single mother is not a reason, much less one central
reason, why she was extorted there. See Santos-Ponce v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 886,
890 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[W]here ‘there was no nexus at all,’ we draw ‘no distinction
between the “one central reason” phrase in the asylum statute and the “a reason”
phrase in the withholding statute.’” (quoting Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d
3
351, 360 (9th Cir. 2017))). She testified that this exchange took place during her
initial phone call with her extorters: “And I asked them why? Why do you want us
to give you money? And they said we know everything that you have. And we
know that your family send you money.” The BIA validly concluded from this
testimony that the extortion Nesly Carpio-Batres allegedly suffered in Guatemala
was merely the product of “random criminal acts and a desire for money by the
gang,” and not the fact she was a single mother. This conclusion that Petitioners
have not shown any nexus between their purported extortion in Guatemala and any
protected ground is supported by substantial evidence. See Zetino v. Holder, 622
F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by
criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus
to a protected ground.”). And, to the extent that Petitioners claim their extorters’
alleged death threats and armed attack inside their home in Guatemala constitutes
past persecution and necessarily establishes a well-founded fear of future
persecution, this assertion is unavailing for lack of a nexus to a protected ground.
See id. We deny the petition for the separate reason that substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioners did not establish a nexus between
their putative particular social groups and the harm they purportedly suffered or fear
in Guatemala. See id.4
2. Petitioners did not discuss their Convention Against Torture claim in their
opening brief, and as a result they forfeited any challenge to the agency’s decision
with regard to this issue. See Etemadi, 12 F.4th at 1026.
PETITION DENIED.
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