Fredy Valdez-Vasquez v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 17 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FREDY ARMANDO VALDEZ-VASQUEZ, No.                     15-73854
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A072-544-053
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted March 9, 2022**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: IKUTA, LEE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.
    Fredy Valdez-Vasquez (Valdez), a native and citizen of Guatemala, seeks
    review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an
    immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of
    removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In his
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    application, Valdez claimed he was targeted for recruitment and threatened by the
    guerilla forces in Guatemala because of his service in the Guatemalan military. We
    have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    , and we deny the petition. See Shrestha v.
    Holder, 
    590 F.3d 1034
    , 1039 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying substantial evidence review).
    1.     As an initial matter, Valdez did not address the agency’s credibility
    determination or the agency’s determination that he failed to demonstrate
    entitlement to CAT protection. This court reviews “only issues that are argued
    specifically and distinctly in a party’s opening brief.” Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter
    of Univ. of Cal. v. Wu, 
    626 F.3d 483
    , 485 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up); see also Fed.
    R. App. P. 28(a)(6). Valdez’s cursory and conclusory references to the credibility
    findings, and his inaccurate statement that the IJ did not analyze the merits of his
    CAT claim, are not enough to raise the issues “specifically and distinctly” for the
    court’s review. See Greenwood v. FAA, 
    28 F.3d 971
    , 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We will
    not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve
    a claim.”). He has thus forfeited any challenges to those findings. In any event, the
    agency’s conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.
    2.     The agency’s adverse credibility determination was supported by
    substantial evidence.1 The BIA relied on three inconsistencies between Valdez’s
    1
    Because Valdez filed his claim for asylum before May 11, 2005, the Court must
    apply the pre-REAL ID Act standards for adverse credibility findings. See Sinha v.
    Holder, 
    564 F.3d 1015
    , 1021 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009). Under our pre-REAL ID Act
    2
    testimony and his written materials: (i) contradicting his application and
    supplemental declaration, Valdez testified to the IJ that he did not require an
    ambulance or any other medical care after he was attacked by the guerillas; (ii)
    contradicting again his supplemental declaration, Valdez testified that ex-guerilla
    members did not threaten his family; and (iii) contradicting his application and
    supplemental declaration, Valdez testified that he did not capture any guerillas while
    in the military.
    All three inconsistencies, which Valdez could not explain, go to the heart of
    his claim because they either relate to the severity of his past injuries, see Desta v.
    Ashcroft, 
    365 F.3d 741
    , 745 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[M]aterial inconsistencies in
    petitioner’s testimony concerning the extent of his injuries . . . go to the heart of
    petitioner’s claim.”), or to the basis for his fear of future harm, see de Leon-Barrios
    v. INS, 
    116 F.3d 391
    , 393–94 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding an adverse credibility
    determination based on inconsistencies that “relate to the basis for [the petitioner’s]
    alleged fear of persecution”). Substantial evidence in the record thus supports the
    BIA’s bases for affirming the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.
    Because no other evidence in the record besides Valdez’s discredited
    standard, “[m]inor inconsistencies in the record that do not relate to the basis of an
    applicant’s alleged fear of persecution, [do not] go to the heart of the asylum claim,
    or [do not] reveal anything about an asylum applicant’s fear for his safety are
    insufficient to support an adverse credibility finding.” Mendoza Manimbao v.
    Ashcroft, 
    329 F.3d 655
    , 660 (9th Cir. 2003).
    3
    testimony independently established his eligibility, the BIA did not err in concluding
    that Valdez failed to carry his burden of proof for the asylum claim. See Yali Wang
    v. Sessions, 
    861 F.3d 1003
    , 1009 (9th Cir. 2017). And because Valdez failed to
    demonstrate eligibility for asylum, he necessarily failed to meet the more exacting
    requirements for withholding of removal. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 
    348 F.3d 1153
    ,
    1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
    3.     Substantial evidence supports the denial of the CAT claim. While an
    adverse credibility determination is not necessarily a death knell to CAT protection,
    see Kamalthas v. INS, 
    251 F.3d 1279
    , 1284 (9th Cir. 2001), when the petitioner’s
    “testimony [is] found not credible . . . we would have to find that the [country
    condition] reports alone compelled the conclusion that [the petitioner] is more likely
    than not to be tortured,” Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 
    457 F.3d 915
    , 922–23 (9th Cir.
    2006). Valdez does not point to anything in the country condition reports that would
    compel that conclusion. See 
    id. at 923
     (stating that reports that confirm torture takes
    place in a country do not compel the conclusion that the petitioner would be
    tortured).
    Furthermore, the IJ reasonably concluded that Valdez’s fear of torture was
    speculative because the most he could say to justify it was that “perhaps” the
    guerillas would still be interested in him because someone “could” remember him,
    while also conceding that no one may remember him or have any interest in him at
    4
    all. The BIA thus did not err in dismissing the application under CAT. See Xiao Fei
    Zheng v. Holder, 
    644 F.3d 829
    , 835 (9th Cir. 2011) (denying petition for review of
    a CAT claim based on speculative fear of torture).
    PETITION DENIED.
    5