Filiberto Montiel-Ibarra v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAR 18 2022
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    FILIBERTO MONTIEL-IBARRA,                        No.   17-70300
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A205-412-450
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted March 15, 2022**
    Las Vegas, Nevada
    Before: RAWLINSON and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and COGAN,*** District
    Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable Brian M. Cogan, United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    Petitioner Filiberto Montiel-Ibarra (Petitioner) is a native and citizen of
    Mexico. He seeks review of an order from the Board of Immigration Appeals
    (BIA) dismissing his appeal from the denial of his requests for withholding of
    removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).1 We have
    jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
     and we DENY the petition.
    1. “We review questions of law, such as whether a proposed particular
    social group is cognizable for purposes of withholding of removal, de novo. . . .”
    Macedo Templos v. Wilkinson, 
    987 F.3d 877
    , 879 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation
    omitted). The BIA’s ultimate determination that a petitioner does not qualify for
    withholding of removal or CAT relief is reviewed for substantial evidence. See
    Singh v. Holder, 
    753 F.3d 826
    , 830 (9th Cir. 2014) (withholding of removal);
    Shrestha v. Holder, 
    590 F.3d 1034
    , 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (CAT relief).
    “Substantial evidence review requires us to uphold the BIA’s determination unless
    the evidence compels a contrary conclusion . . . .” Villalobos Sura v. Garland, 
    8 F.4th 1161
    , 1167 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    1
    Petitioner also challenges the adverse credibility finding made by the
    Immigration Judge (IJ). However, “[w]here the BIA assumes that [a noncitizen] is
    a credible witness and thus does not rule on the credibility question, we do not
    review an immigration judge’s credibility determination. . . .” Barraza Rivera v.
    I.N.S., 
    913 F.2d 1443
    , 1450 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
    2
    2. Petitioner alleges membership in two particular social groups: “victims
    of threats from the Zeta Narco Cartel,” and “business owners who are perceived as
    a wealthy family.” To be cognizable under the INA, a particular social group must
    be “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2)
    defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.”
    Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 
    23 F.4th 824
    , 833 (9th Cir. 2022), as amended
    (citation omitted).
    The BIA did not err in concluding that “victims of threats from the Zeta
    Narco Cartel” is not a cognizable particular social group. Even if the group is
    comprised of members sharing a common immutable characteristic, it is neither
    particularly defined nor socially distinct. See Macedo Templos, 987 F.3d at 882.
    Similarly, “business owners who are perceived as a wealthy family” is not a
    cognizable particular social group. See id. at 882-83.2
    3. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that Petitioner
    failed to establish either past or future persecution on account of an enumerated
    ground. Petitioner testified that his family members were threatened by the Zeta
    2
    To the extent that Petitioner’s membership in the group “business owners
    who are perceived as a wealthy family” is now presented as a claim that
    Petitioner’s family is a particular social group, this argument is not properly before
    us, as it was not raised to either the BIA or the IJ. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 
    358 F.3d 674
    , 678 (9th Cir. 2004).
    3
    Narco Cartel (the Zetas) because the Zetas wanted to extort money from them.
    Petitioner’s application stated that the Zetas “have been doing what they can to
    attempt to take the park” from Petitioner’s family. However, these statements
    demonstrate that the harms Petitioner’s family experienced were on account of
    attempts to extort the family rather than on account of a protected ground. See
    Zetino v. Holder, 
    622 F.3d 1007
    , 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended (concluding
    that the petitioner’s testimony implying that family members were murdered in an
    attempt to steal the family’s valuable land was insufficient to establish harm on
    account of a protected ground).
    Petitioner’s statement in his application that the Zetas would target him
    because “they would believe that since [he is] returning from [the] United States
    that [he has] money” does not establish that he is more likely than not to be
    persecuted on account of a protected ground. See Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 
    816 F.3d 1226
    , 1229 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that “imputed wealthy Americans” is not
    a “cognizable particular social group”).
    4. Finally, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Petitioner
    failed to establish eligibility for CAT relief. Petitioner testified that the police and
    government would be unable to protect him from the Zetas because they are
    corrupt, and when his family reported the Zetas’ threats and attack, the police made
    4
    no arrests. But Petitioner offered no evidence establishing a particularized risk of
    torture with government acquiescence. See Rodriguez-Jimenez v. Garland, 
    20 F.4th 434
    , 440 (9th Cir. 2021) (denying CAT relief when the petitioner “failed to
    provide any evidence beyond his own personal speculation” that the government
    would acquiesce to his torture). Petitioner’s testimony that the police did not make
    any arrests, is insufficient to establish government acquiescence without “evidence
    that the police are unable or unwilling to oppose . . . crime.” Garcia-Milian v.
    Holder, 
    755 F.3d 1026
    , 1034 (9th Cir. 2014), as amended. Thus, the record does
    not compel the conclusion that Petitioner is more likely than not to be tortured by
    or with the acquiescence of a government official if he is returned to Mexico.
    PETITION DENIED.
    5