Joaquin Alvarado-Alvarado v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAR 21 2022
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JOAQUIN ALVARADO-ALVARADO,                       Nos. 16-73315
    AKA Joaquin Alvarado,                                 17-71138
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A072-009-938
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted March 16, 2022**
    San Francisco, California
    Before: W. FLETCHER, GOULD, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
    Joaquin Alvarado-Alvarado (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of El
    Salvador, petitions for review of two decisions of the Board of Immigration
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    Appeals (“BIA”). In the first, the BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal of the
    immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of
    removal, and special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan
    Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (“NACARA”). In the second, the
    BIA denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen based on eligibility for adjustment of
    status. We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    . “We review ‘denials of
    asylum [and] withholding of removal . . . for substantial evidence.’” Guo v.
    Sessions, 
    897 F.3d 1208
    , 1212 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Yali Wang v. Sessions, 
    861 F.3d 1003
    , 1007 (9th Cir. 2017)). We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to
    reopen for abuse of discretion. See Tadevosyan v. Holder, 
    743 F.3d 1250
    ,
    1252–53 (9th Cir. 2014). We dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part.
    We have no jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision denying Petitioner’s
    application for special rule cancellation of removal under NACARA. “[The Illegal
    Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)]
    expressly precludes federal courts from reviewing the agency’s factual
    determination that an immigrant is ineligible for ABC benefits or special rule
    cancellation of removal under NACARA § 203.” Ixcot v. Holder, 
    646 F.3d 1202
    ,
    2
    1213 (9th Cir. 2011).1 “We do retain jurisdiction to review colorable constitutional
    claims and questions of law raised in a petition for review of a discretionary denial
    of NACARA cancellation.” Monroy v. Lynch, 
    821 F.3d 1175
    , 1177 (9th Cir.
    2016). Petitioner has not raised any colorable constitutional claims or questions of
    law. Instead, Petitioner challenges the agency’s factual determinations about his
    eligibility for NACARA relief, including whether he entered the United States
    prior to September 19, 1990. We therefore have no jurisdiction over this claim.
    Substantial evidence supports the denial of Petitioner’s application for
    asylum. Petitioner failed to show that he suffered past persecution on account of a
    statutorily protected ground. Petitioner alleged that guerrillas threatened and shot
    at him when he was an active member of the Salvadoran army. However,
    “persecution resulting from membership in the police or military is insufficient, by
    itself, to establish persecution on account of membership in a particular social
    group or political opinion.” Cruz-Navarro v. INS, 
    232 F.3d 1024
    , 1029 (9th Cir.
    2000). Petitioner also failed to show a well-founded fear of future persecution.
    1
    Under NACARA, a national of El Salvador may be eligible for cancellation
    of removal if he or she is a registered member of the class settlement in American
    Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh (ABC), 
    760 F. Supp. 796
     (N.D. Cal. 1991), but
    only if the applicant entered the United States on or before September 19, 1990.
    See IIRIRA § 309(c)(5)(C)(i)(I)(aa), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
     note.
    3
    “Absent evidence of past persecution, [an applicant] must establish a well-founded
    fear of future persecution by showing both a subjective fear of future persecution,
    as well as an objectively reasonable possibility of persecution upon return to the
    country in question.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 
    918 F.3d 1025
    , 1029 (9th Cir.
    2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioner did not present any evidence
    of guerrilla threats to him since his departure from El Salvador over 20 years ago.
    Substantial evidence therefore supports the denial of his asylum application.
    For the same reasons, substantial evidence supports the denial of
    withholding of removal. Davila v. Barr, 
    968 F.3d 1136
    , 1142 (9th Cir. 2020) (“An
    applicant who fails to satisfy the lower standard for asylum necessarily fails to
    satisfy the more demanding standard for withholding of removal.”).
    The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to
    reopen. Petitioner sought to reopen on the ground that his U.S. citizen daughter
    had sought a visa on his behalf, and that if it were granted he would apply for
    adjustment of status. A noncitizen applying for an immigrant visa “has the burden
    of establishing . . . clearly and beyond doubt that he is entitled to be admitted and is
    not inadmissible under [
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    ].” Valadez-Munoz v. Holder, 
    623 F.3d 1304
    , 1308 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    , a noncitizen convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude is inadmissible
    4
    and ineligible for adjustment of status. Safaryan v. Barr, 
    975 F.3d 976
    , 981, 988
    (9th Cir. 2020). In Rohit v. Holder, 
    670 F.3d 1085
    , 1091 (9th Cir. 2012), we held
    that a conviction for soliciting prostitution in violation of 
    Cal. Penal Code § 647
    constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. Petitioner was convicted of
    soliciting prostitution in violation of 
    Cal. Penal Code § 647
    . Petitioner is thus
    inadmissible and ineligible for adjustment of status on the record before the
    agency.2 The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to
    reopen.
    We dismiss the petition to review the BIA’s denial of NACARA relief for
    lack of jurisdiction, and deny the remainder of the petition.
    PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.
    2
    The record does not indicate that Petitioner applied for, or has shown that
    he is eligible for, a waiver of inadmissibility under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (h).
    5