Zack Coryellbattle v. City of Maricopa ( 2022 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 24 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ZACK CORYELLBATTLE,                             No. 21-15362
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:19-cv-01386-DLR-JZB
    and
    MEMORANDUM*
    GAYLA CORYELLBATTLE,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    CITY OF MARICOPA; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 16, 2022**
    Before:      SILVERMAN, MILLER, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
    Zack Coryellbattle appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 42
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law violations stemming from his
    arrest. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo.
    Gordon v. County of Orange, 
    888 F.3d 1118
    , 1122 (9th Cir. 2018) (summary
    judgment); Resnick v. Hayes, 
    213 F.3d 443
    , 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under
    28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm.
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Coryellbattle’s
    Fourth Amendment excessive force claim because Coryellbattle failed to raise a
    genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants used excessive force in
    arresting him. See Graham v. Connor, 
    490 U.S. 386
    , 397-98 (1989) (setting forth
    the objective reasonableness standard for excessive force determinations); Mattos
    v. Agarano, 
    661 F.3d 433
    , 443 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[E]stablishing a lack of probable
    cause to make an arrest does not establish an excessive force claim, and vice-
    versa.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Coryellbattle’s
    state law claims for assault and battery and damage to reputation because
    Coryellbattle failed to comply with the requirements of Arizona Revised Statutes
    § 12-821.01(A) for service of a notice of claim. See Simon v. Maricopa Medical
    Ctr., 
    234 P.3d 623
     629 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (requirements for service of the
    notice of claim); Falcon ex rel. Sandovol v. Maricopa County, 
    144 P.2d 1254
    ,
    1256 (Ariz. 2006) (strict compliance with notice of claim provisions is required).
    2                                   21-15362
    The district court properly dismissed Coryellbattle’s Fourth Amendment
    claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution because
    probable cause existed to arrest Coryellbattle under Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-
    2509. See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 
    368 F.3d 1062
    , 1068 (9th Cir. 2004)
    (malicious prosecution claim requires lack of probable cause); Arpin v. Santa
    Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 
    261 F.3d 912
    , 924 (9th Cir. 2001) (warrantless
    misdemeanor arrest “must be supported by probable cause to believe that the
    arrestee has committed a crime”). Likewise, the existence of probable cause
    defeats Coryellbattle’s First Amendment claim. See Nieves v. Bartlett, 
    139 S. Ct. 1715
    , 1727-28 (2019) (probable cause is an absolute defense to a First Amendment
    retaliation claim).
    The district court properly dismissed Coryellbattle’s failure-to-train claim
    under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 
    436 U.S. 658
     (1978), because
    Coryellbattle failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See
    Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 
    485 F.3d 463
    , 484 (9th Cir. 2007) (elements of a
    failure-to-train claim).
    We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
    in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    3                                      21-15362
    All pending motions and requests are denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    4             21-15362