Torey Adamcik v. Al Ramirez ( 2022 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 24 2022
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TOREY MICHAEL ADAMCIK, No. 20-35445
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:18-cv-00015-CWD
v.
MEMORANDUM*
AL RAMIREZ, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Candy W. Dale, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 7, 2022
Seattle, Washington
Before: BYBEE and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and SELNA,** District Judge.
Petitioner Torey Adamcik seeks relief from the district court’s denial of his
federal habeas petition. Adamcik was convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to life without parole. At the time of the crime, he was sixteen years old.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable James V. Selna, United States District Judge for the
Central District of California, sitting by designation.
Adamcik argues that his sentence of life without parole is unconstitutional because
he is not one of the rare juveniles whose crime reflects irreparable corruption. See
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 209 (2016). The district court granted
deference to the last-reasoned state court opinion from the Idaho Supreme Court
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and denied the petition. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we affirm.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
if a petitioner’s constitutional claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court
proceedings, a federal court must defer to the state court decision unless it “(1) was
contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, (2)
involved an unreasonable application of such law, or (3) . . . was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record before the state
court.” Murray v. Schriro, 882 F.3d 778, 801 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fairbank v.
Ayers, 650 F.3d 1243, 1251 (9th Cir. 2011)).
“[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in
prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). While Miller did not place an outright ban, it “did bar
life without parole, however, for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those
whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 209.
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By requiring a sentencing process that accounted for the offender’s youth,
Miller outlined “a procedural requirement necessary to implement a substantive
guarantee.” Id. at 210. However, neither Miller nor Montgomery imposed a
formal factfinding requirement. Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1313
(2021).
The district court correctly determined that the Idaho Supreme Court
adjudicated Adamcik’s substantive Miller claim on the merits. “When a federal
claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it
may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the
absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). The Idaho Supreme Court
acknowledged that Adamcik brought both procedural and substantive claims in his
state postconviction proceedings. After reviewing the sentencing record, it
concluded that Adamcik’s sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment, in part
because “[t]he sentencing judge’s conviction that Adamcik would kill again if
released is the quintessence of finding him irreparably corrupt.” While the Idaho
Supreme Court’s analysis focused on compliance with Miller’s procedural
requirements, in doing so it considered the same evidence that would be relevant to
the merits of Adamcik’s substantive Miller claim.
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The Idaho Supreme Court opinion also did not contradict or unreasonably
apply clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable
determination of fact. “The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court
believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that
determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v.
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). “[S]o long as ‘fairminded jurists could
disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision,” AEDPA precludes
federal habeas relief. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado,
541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed in detail the
sentencing judge’s consideration of Adamcik’s youth, as well as the facts of the
crime. Based on the record before the Idaho Supreme Court, it was reasonable to
conclude that Adamcik’s sentence was not disproportionate in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
The fact that the state courts declined to hold a postconviction evidentiary
hearing on Adamcik’s substantive Miller claim is also not grounds for habeas
relief. Montgomery described evidence of postsentencing behavior as “one kind of
evidence that prisoners might use to demonstrate rehabilitation” at a parole
hearing. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 213. However, Adamcik does not present a
persuasive argument that this requires the state court to hold an evidentiary hearing
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and consider evidence of rehabilitation to adjudicate his habeas claim. Adamcik
received a discretionary sentencing hearing where the sentencing judge considered
evidence of his youth. Procedurally, that is both “constitutionally necessary and
constitutionally sufficient.” Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1313.
PETITION DENIED.
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