Ruben Vera-Perez v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 24 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    RUBEN VERA-PEREZ,                               No.    20-73247
    Petitioner,                     Agency No. A216-051-641
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted March 17, 2022**
    Las Vegas, Nevada
    Before: D.M. FISHER,*** BENNETT, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
    Ruben Vera-Perez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions this Court for
    review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA’s) dismissal of his appeal of an
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
    Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) denial of his application for adjustment of status. We
    lack jurisdiction and therefore dismiss the petition.1
    Vera-Perez is potentially eligible for a statutory exception that allows
    adjustment of status if an alien, among other criteria, is the subject of a properly
    filed I-130 Petition for Alien Relative dated on or before April 30, 2001. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1255
    (i). Discretion to grant or deny a § 1255(i) petition rests with the Attorney
    General. Id. § 1255(i)(2) (“[T]he Attorney General may adjust the status of the
    alien. . . .”). We are deprived of jurisdiction to review this determination. Id.
    § 1252(a)(2)(B) (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment
    regarding the granting of relief under section . . . 1255.”). However, we are not
    precluded from “review of constitutional claims or questions of law.” Id.
    § 1252(a)(2)(D).
    Vera-Perez argues that the IJ and BIA committed legal error because they
    violated BIA precedent by erroneously weighing the significance of two police
    reports: the reports of his December 21, 2000 arrest for corporal injury of a spouse
    and related charges, and his May 17, 2019 arrest for driving under the influence
    and related charges. Neither of these arrests have resulted in a conviction. The
    charges stemming from the 2000 arrest were dropped. Some of the charges
    stemming from the 2019 arrest resulted in fines, and some remain pending.
    1
    The motion for temporary stay of removal is denied as moot.
    2
    Contrary to Vera-Perez’s arguments, the IJ and BIA were permitted to
    consider the arrest reports. “In determining whether an application for relief is
    merited as a matter of discretion, evidence of unfavorable conduct, including
    criminal conduct which has not culminated in a final conviction . . . , may be
    considered.” Matter of Thomas, 
    21 I. & N. Dec. 20
    , 20 (B.I.A. 1995). The evidence
    is weighed according to its strength and the facts and circumstances of the case. 
    Id. at 20, 24
    . The IJ and BIA considered that the arrests bookended two DUI
    convictions and noted the alcohol-related pattern shown by the arrests and
    convictions. In addition, the IJ found that Vera-Perez had been offered treatment
    but had not “demonstrated genuine rehabilitation.” Given the totality of the
    circumstances, the IJ concluded—after a lengthy and thoughtful analysis—that
    Vera-Perez’s convictions and “repeated failure to conform his conduct to the
    requirements of the law” outweighed the factors that favored him. The BIA
    adopted and affirmed the IJ’s opinion, holding that the record supported the IJ’s
    findings. Thus, the agency weighed the evidence of the arrests “according to the
    facts and circumstances,” as it was required to do. 
    Id. at 20, 24
    .
    Vera-Perez cites a case where the BIA was “hesitant to give substantial
    weight” to an arrest report. In Re Arreguin de Rodriguez, 
    21 I. & N. Dec. 38
    , 42
    (B.I.A. 1995). The facts of Arreguin de Rodriguez are distinguishable. The
    petitioner had denied wrongdoing, and the conduct for which she was arrested
    3
    (giving a ride to a family near the border) was susceptible of an innocent
    explanation. 
    Id.
     Here, by contrast, Vera-Perez has not denied wrongdoing or
    contested the facts in the arrest records. Nor is there an innocent explanation for
    battering one’s spouse or causing an accident while driving drunk.
    Similarly, two out-of-circuit cases that follow Arreguin de Rodriguez are
    distinguishable because the petitioners credibly denied wrongdoing. Avila-Ramirez
    v. Holder, 
    764 F.3d 717
    , 719 (7th Cir. 2014) (IJ found the petitioner “‘credible’
    and gave ‘full weight to his testimony’”); Billeke-Tolosa v. Ashcroft, 
    385 F.3d 708
    ,
    709-10 (6th Cir. 2004) (court-appointed social worker evaluated the petitioner and
    agreed he did not commit the acts described in the criminal complaints).
    Because the IJ and BIA did not commit legal error, Vera-Perez’s argument
    amounts to a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence. We lack jurisdiction to
    do so. Torres-Valdivias v. Lynch, 
    786 F.3d 1147
    , 1152-53 (9th Cir. 2015)
    (“Although framed in an attempt to present a question of law, . . . this argument
    challenges the BIA’s discretionary decision . . . . We therefore lack jurisdiction to
    decide the merits of this argument.”).2
    2
    Panels of this Court have considered arguments similar to Vera-Perez’s and have
    framed the result differently. Rather than concluding that the failure to make out a
    legal error results in a lack of jurisdiction, they have denied the petition on the
    merits after holding that there is “jurisdiction to consider whether the BIA acted
    ‘contrary to law’ by violating” its own precedents, i.e., Thomas, 21 I. & N. Dec. at
    20, and Arreguin, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 38. See, e.g., Martinez-Corona v. Garland,
    No. 19-72569, 
    2021 WL 4868357
    , at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 19, 2021) (denying the
    4
    DISMISSED.
    petition because “nothing indicates that [Arreguin’s] case-specific holding was
    intended to overrule or modify the more general Thomas standard or prevent IJs
    from considering arrest reports altogether”). Viewing Vera-Perez’s argument this
    way, we would deny the petition on the merits for the reasons stated above.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-73247

Filed Date: 3/24/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/24/2022