Brock Peters v. Kilolo Kijakazi ( 2022 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 24 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BROCK A. PETERS,                                   No.   21-35277
    Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05620-BAT
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
    of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Brian Tsuchida, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 11, 2022**
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: GRABER, BEA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Brock Peters (“Peters”) appeals the district court’s affirmance of the final
    decision   of   the    Commissioner     of   the    Social   Security   Administration
    (“Commissioner”), which denied Peters’s application for supplemental security
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    income (“SSI”). For the following reasons, we affirm.
    1. Peters first argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical opinions of
    his examining psychologist and a certified physician assistant. Concerning the
    opinion of the examining psychologist, the ALJ gave “some weight” to this opinion
    “as far as the limits to simple, routine tasks” but concluded that the opinion was
    “otherwise vague, and extends little beyond [Peters’] self-reporting.” These are
    specific and legitimate reasons to discount an examining physician’s opinion. See
    Thomas v. Barnhart, 
    278 F.3d 947
    , 957 (9th Cir. 2002); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc.
    Sec. Admin., 
    169 F.3d 595
    , 602 (9th Cir. 2002). Concerning the opinion of the
    certified physician assistant, under the pre-March 2017 version of 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1513
     that applied to Peters’s application, a certified physician assistant was not
    an “acceptable medical source.” Therefore, the ALJ need only give germane reasons
    for discounting this testimony. Molina v. Astrue, 
    674 F.3d 1104
    , 1111 (9th Cir.
    2012). The ALJ discounted the certified physician assistant’s testimony, because it
    was a check-off report that lacked explanation, was inconsistent with Peters’s self-
    reporting to the certified physician assistant, and was inconsistent with Peters’s other
    testimony of work. These are permissible “germane reasons” to discount the
    opinion. 
    Id.
     at 1111–12; Britton v. Colvin, 
    787 F.3d 1011
    , 1013 (9th Cir. 2015) (per
    curiam).
    2.   Peters next argues that the ALJ erred in discounting his subjective
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    complaints in light of his activity level and medical records. An ALJ is permitted to
    rely on daily activities that contradict a claimant’s testimony in discounting
    testimony by a claimant of his subjective complaints. Smith v. Kijakazi, 
    14 F.4th 1108
    , 1114 (9th Cir. 2021). The ALJ permissibly relied on evidence in the record
    that Peters reported doing “odd jobs” in January 2017 and performing work on the
    property where he lived in exchange for rent in September 2017. Moreover, the ALJ
    properly cited medical records demonstrating that, when Peters sought medical
    treatment for his claimed ailments, he responded well to treatment. “[E]vidence of
    medical treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a claim of
    disability.” Wellington v. Berryhill, 
    878 F.3d 867
    , 876 (9th Cir. 2017).
    3. Peters also argues that the ALJ erred in discounting the lay testimony of
    his partner of ten years, and in failing to discuss the lay testimony of three social
    workers. To discount lay testimony, an ALJ must cite germane reasons for doing
    so. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 
    427 F.3d 1211
    , 1218 (9th Cir. 2005). Concerning Peters’s
    partner’s testimony, the ALJ noted that “the severity of the symptoms alleged is not
    entirely consistent with the medical evidence of record.” This is an acceptable
    reason to discount lay testimony, Lewis v. Apfel, 
    236 F.3d 503
    , 511–12 (9th Cir.
    2001), and this reason is supported by substantial evidence. Concerning the lay
    testimony of the three social workers that the ALJ did not discuss, each social worker
    interacted with Peters on only a single occasion in helping Peters complete his
    3
    disability applications.   Any error in failing to discuss the social workers’
    observations is harmless because their very limited observations are consistent with
    the ALJ’s finding as to Peters’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). See Molina,
    
    674 F.3d at 1122
     (concluding that the ALJ’s error in rejecting lay testimony was
    harmless).
    4. Finally, Peters argues that because the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical
    evidence, discrediting Peters’s testimony, and discrediting lay testimony, the ALJ
    necessarily committed error in determining Peters’s RFC. However, for all the
    reasons noted above, because the ALJ permissibly evaluated all of the evidence in
    the record in determining Peters’s RFC, Peters’s derivative challenge fails.
    AFFIRMED
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