Eric Robinson v. Kairn Borzakian ( 2022 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 25 2022
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ERIC ROBINSON,                                  No. 21-55599
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00396-TJH-KES
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    KAIRN BORZAKIAN, individual capacity;
    et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Terry J. Hatter, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 16, 2022**
    Before:      SILVERMAN, MILLER, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
    Eric Robinson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
    his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action challenging his criminal conviction. We have
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a dismissal for failure to
    state a claim under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B). Watison v. Carter, 
    668 F.3d 1108
    ,
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    1112 (9th Cir. 2012). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record.
    Thompson v. Paul, 
    547 F.3d 1055
    , 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Robinson’s claims challenging his
    conviction as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
     (1994), because success
    on these claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
    sentence, and Robinson failed to allege facts sufficient to show that his conviction
    had been invalidated. See Heck, 
    512 U.S. at 486-87
     (if “a judgment in favor of the
    plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . .
    . the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
    conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”).
    Dismissal of Robinson’s excessive force claim was proper because Robinson
    failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient
    factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
    face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Smith v. City of Hemet, 
    394 F.3d 689
    , 700-04 (9th Cir. 2005) (standard for § 1983 excessive force claim).
    The district court properly dismissed Robinson’s claims against defendant
    judges and prosecutors as barred by judicial and prosecutorial immunity,
    respectively, and against Robinson’s appointed counsel because court-appointed
    attorneys are not state actors under § 1983. See Polk County v. Dodson, 
    454 U.S. 2
                                          21-55599
    312, 317-19 (1981) (a private attorney or a public defender does not act under
    color of state law within the meaning of § 1983); Garmon v. County of Los
    Angeles, 
    828 F.3d 837
    , 842-43 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining the application of
    absolute prosecutorial immunity); Ashelman v. Pope, 
    793 F.2d 1072
    , 1075 (9th
    Cir. 1986) (en banc) (explaining the application of judicial immunity).
    Robinson’s motion for discovery (Docket Entry No. 8) is denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                     21-55599