United States v. Ronald Thrasher ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 31 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 20-30275
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. Nos. 6:17-cr-00274-MC-1
6:17-cr-00274-MC
v.
RONALD WAYNE THRASHER, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 17, 2022
San Francisco, California
Before: GOULD and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and ZIPPS,** District Judge.
A jury convicted Ronald Wayne Thrasher (“Thrasher”) of committing a
series of crimes related to selling methamphetamine, and he was sentenced to 300
months imprisonment. Thrasher appeals the district court’s denial of his pretrial
motions for a Franks hearing and to suppress evidence gained during a search of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Jennifer G. Zipps, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
his residence and vehicle. Because the parties are familiar with the facts and
procedural history of the case, we do not recite them here. We affirm the district
court’s denial of Thrasher’s motions.
We review the denial of a motion to suppress and the denial of a motion for
a Franks hearing de novo. United States v. Norris, 942 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir.
2019). “We review for clear error a finding of probable cause for a search
warrant.” United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2004). “The standard
of review for the specificity of a warrant is de novo.” United States v. Wong, 334
F.3d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 2003).
1. The district court did not err in denying Thrasher’s motion for a
Franks hearing. Thrasher’s evidence does not make a “substantial preliminary
showing” that the warrant affidavit contained a knowingly or recklessly false and
material statement. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978).
Examining the evidence, we are satisfied that the warrant affidavit fairly described
the phone call between Thrasher and the Confidential Informant (“CI”), which was
conducted in code.
Even assuming arguendo that Thrasher could make a substantial preliminary
showing that the warrant affidavit knowingly or recklessly misrepresented the CI’s
criminal history, the CI’s record of cooperation with law enforcement, or
Thrasher’s criminal history, the inaccuracies Thrasher identifies are not material.
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The warrant affidavit made clear the CI’s significant criminal record, including a
conviction for a crime of dishonesty. Many of the alleged inaccuracies regarding
the CI’s record are minor or unproven allegations. Thrasher’s criminal history was
not central to the warrant affidavit’s probable cause showing, and the warrant
affidavit’s description does not materially alter the overall picture that Thrasher
himself had a significant criminal history.
2. The district court did not err in denying Thrasher’s motion to suppress
evidence found in a search of Thrasher’s vehicle. The warrant affidavit established
probable cause to search Thrasher’s vehicle because there was significant evidence
that he used it to traffic methamphetamine, and the warrant affidavit explained that
vehicles are commonly used to purchase and deliver illicit drugs. The search
warrant also identified Thrasher’s vehicle with specificity because it encompassed
all vehicles registered to or under his direct control.
3. We also hold that there was no error in the district court’s denial of
Thrasher’s motion to suppress evidence gained through warrants to his cell phone
providers. Thrasher’s reliance on an out-of-circuit case is unpersuasive: the
warrants here complied with the Fourth Amendment and were valid ab initio. See
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008); United States v. Artis, 919 F.3d
1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 2019). The evidence obtained through these warrants was
admissible in Thrasher’s federal trial.
3
AFFIRMED.
4