Brian Mecinas v. Katie Hobbs ( 2022 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BRIAN MECINAS; CAROLYN VASKO;                      No. 20-16301
    DNC SERVICES CORPORATION, DBA
    Democratic National Committee;                       D.C. No.
    DSCC; PRIORITIES USA; PATTI                       2:19-cv-05547-
    SERRANO,                                               DJH
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.                              OPINION
    KATIE HOBBS, the Arizona Secretary
    of State,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted January 14, 2022
    Pasadena, California
    Filed April 8, 2022
    Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson and Paul J. Watford, Circuit
    Judges, and Jed S. Rakoff, * District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge Rakoff
    *
    The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the
    Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    2                       MECINAS V. HOBBS
    SUMMARY **
    Civil Rights
    The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of a
    complaint challenging Arizona’s Ballot Order Statute,
    A.R.S. § 16-502, which requires that, in each county,
    candidates affiliated with the political party of the person
    who received the most votes in that county in the last
    gubernatorial race be listed first on the general election
    ballot.
    Plaintiffs, three Arizona voters and three organizations,
    including the Democratic National Committee, brought this
    action against the Arizona Secretary of State alleging that the
    Ballot Order Statute violates the First and Fourteenth
    Amendments because it gives candidates the benefit of
    appearing first on the ballot, not on the basis of some
    politically neutral ordering (such as alphabetically or by lot),
    but on the basis of political affiliation. Plaintiffs allege that,
    for most of the elections that have occurred in Arizona since
    the Ballot Order Statute was enacted, the Republican Party’s
    candidates have appeared in the top position in the great
    majority of Arizona’s general election ballots solely as a
    result of their political affiliation. Plaintiffs allege that the
    candidate whose name appears first on a ballot in a contested
    race receives the benefit resulting from a recognized
    psychological phenomenon known as “position bias” or the
    “primacy effect.”
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    MECINAS V. HOBBS                         3
    The district court dismissed the complaint on the basis
    that plaintiffs lack standing and that the complaint presented
    a nonjusticiable political question. The panel held that the
    district court erred in dismissing the suit on these grounds.
    Specifically, the panel held at least one of the plaintiffs—the
    DNC—had standing to bring this suit. The panel held that:
    (1) the DNC satisfied the injury in fact requirement on the
    basis of its competitive standing; (2) the challenged law was
    traceable to the Secretary; and (3) having shown that an
    injunction against the Secretary would significantly increase
    the likelihood of relief, plaintiffs met their burden as to
    redressability.
    The panel held that plaintiffs’ claims did not present a
    nonjusticiable political question and that the district court
    overlooked the narrow scope of the Supreme Court’s
    decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, 
    139 S. Ct. 2484
    , 2491
    (2019). Adjudicating a challenge to a ballot order statute did
    not present the sort of intractable issues that arise in partisan
    gerrymandering cases.
    The panel rejected the Secretary’s argument that the
    district court’s dismissal could be affirmed on the alternative
    ground that she was not the proper defendant under Article
    III or the Eleventh Amendment. Finally, the panel held that
    plaintiffs had stated a claim sufficient to survive a motion to
    dismiss. The magnitude of the asserted injury was a function
    of the “primacy effect,” presenting factual questions that
    could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss.
    4                     MECINAS V. HOBBS
    COUNSEL
    Abha Khanna (argued), Elias Law Group LLP, Seattle,
    Washington; Marc Elias, Elisabeth C. Frost, and John M.
    Geise, Elias Law Group LLP, Washington, D.C.; for
    Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Kristen Michelle Yost (argued), Coppersmith Brockelman
    LLP, Phoenix, Arizona; Kara M. Karlson, Assistant
    Attorney General; Linley Wilson, Deputy Solicitor General;
    Office of the Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona; for
    Defendant-Appellee.
    OPINION
    RAKOFF, District Judge:
    In Arizona the state’s Ballot Order Statute, A.R.S. § 16-
    502, requires that, in each county, candidates affiliated with
    the political party of the person who received the most votes
    in that county in the last gubernatorial race be listed first on
    the general election ballot. In 2019, three Arizona voters,
    Brian Mecinas, Carolyn Vasko, and Patti Serrano, and three
    organizations, the Democratic National Committee (the
    “DNC”), the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee
    (the “DSCC”), and Priorities USA (“Priorities”), a political
    action committee (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), brought this
    action against Katie Hobbs, in her official capacity as the
    Arizona Secretary of State (the “Secretary”), claiming that
    the Ballot Order Statute violates the First and Fourteenth
    Amendments because it gives candidates the benefit of
    appearing first on the ballot, not on the basis of some
    politically neutral ordering (such as alphabetically or by lot),
    but on the basis of political affiliation. Specifically, Plaintiffs
    MECINAS V. HOBBS                        5
    allege that, for most of the elections that have occurred in
    Arizona since the Ballot Order Statute was enacted, the
    Republican Party’s candidates have appeared in the top
    position in the great majority of Arizona’s general election
    ballots solely as a result of their political affiliation.
    Without addressing the merits of Plaintiffs’ argument,
    the district court dismissed their complaint at the pleading
    stage based on jurisdictional challenges raised by the
    Secretary, viz., that Plaintiffs lack standing and that the
    complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question.
    Plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the district court erred in
    dismissing their suit on these grounds. We agree.
    Specifically, we hold that at least one of the plaintiffs—the
    DNC—has standing to bring this suit and that Plaintiffs’
    claims do not present a nonjusticiable political question. We
    also reject the Secretary’s argument that the district court’s
    dismissal can be affirmed on the alternative ground that she
    is not the proper defendant under Article III or the Eleventh
    Amendment. Finally, we hold that Plaintiffs have stated a
    claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. We therefore
    reverse the dismissal of the complaint and remand for further
    proceedings.
    BACKGROUND
    In 1979, the Arizona legislature enacted A.R.S. § 16-
    502, the Ballot Order Statute. The Ballot Order Statute
    establishes the order in which candidates appear on the ballot
    in general elections in each of Arizona’s fifteen counties.
    The statute mandates a tiered system of organizing the
    names on the ballot. First, names of candidates are listed
    according to their political party, “in descending order
    according to the votes cast for governor for that county in the
    most recent general election for the office of governor.” Id.
    § 16-502(E). Next, candidates affiliated with political parties
    6                    MECINAS V. HOBBS
    that did not have candidates on the ballot in the last general
    election are “listed in alphabetical order below the parties
    that did have candidates on the ballot in the last general
    election.” Id. Third are the names of candidates who were
    nominated but are not registered with a recognized political
    party. Id. A space for write-in candidates is listed last. Id
    § 16-502(G).
    Under this statutory organization scheme, the candidates
    of the political party that received the most votes in the most
    recent gubernatorial election in that county appear first in all
    races and on all ballots in that county. According to
    Plaintiffs’ complaint, the result of these rules has been that
    in all but a handful of general elections since the statute was
    enacted the vast majority of Arizona’s voting population
    received a ballot with the Republican Party’s candidates in
    the top position. The complaint further alleges that a
    candidate whose name appears first on a ballot in a contested
    race receives an unfair electoral advantage based on political
    affiliation—specifically, the benefit resulting from a
    recognized psychological phenomenon known as “position
    bias” or the “primacy effect.”
    Plaintiffs filed this action on November 1, 2019. Shortly
    thereafter, Plaintiffs amended their complaint and moved for
    a preliminary injunction in advance of the November 2020
    election in Arizona. The Secretary opposed the preliminary
    injunction motion and filed a separate motion to dismiss.
    In March 2020, the district court held a two-day
    evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction
    motion—at which Plaintiffs’ two experts, Dr. Jonathan
    Rodden and Dr. Jon Krosnick, and the Secretary’s expert,
    Mr. Sean Trende, testified regarding the statistical modeling
    of the “primacy effect”—and heard oral argument on both
    the motion for preliminary injunction and the motion to
    MECINAS V. HOBBS                               7
    dismiss. While both motions were still pending, the district
    court, on June 2, 2020, ordered the parties to submit a joint
    letter as to whether they would agree to deem the preliminary
    injunction hearing to also constitute a trial on the merits.
    Shortly thereafter, on June 8, 2020, the parties submitted a
    responsive letter stating that they would not so agree.
    On June 25, 2020, the district court granted the motion
    to dismiss with prejudice, holding that Plaintiffs lack
    standing and, independently, that their claims present
    nonjusticiable political questions. The court did not reach the
    merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.
    Plaintiffs timely noticed an appeal and moved for an
    injunction pending appeal, which the district court denied.
    With the 2020 election approaching, Plaintiffs moved this
    Court for an emergency injunction pending appeal. That
    motion was denied by the motions Panel in a brief order.
    Briefing and oral argument on Plaintiffs’ appeal followed.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “We review de novo dismissal for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction and may affirm on any basis supported by the
    record.” Zuress v. Donley, 
    606 F.3d 1249
    , 1252 (9th Cir.
    2010). 1 When “deciding standing at the pleading stage, and
    for purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of
    standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as
    true all material allegations of the complaint, and must
    construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.”
    1
    Unless otherwise specified, all internal quotation marks, citations,
    omissions, emphases, and alterations are omitted from all sources cited
    herein.
    8                    MECINAS V. HOBBS
    Desert Citizens Against Pollution v. Bisson, 
    231 F.3d 1172
    ,
    1178 (9th Cir. 2000).
    It is true that there is an exception to this general rule
    where the defendant brings a motion under Rule 12(b)(1)
    challenging subject matter jurisdiction as a factual—rather
    than facial—matter. See White v. Lee, 
    227 F.3d 1214
    , 1242
    (9th Cir. 2000). “Once the moving party has converted the
    motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting
    affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the
    court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits
    or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of
    establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Savage v. Glendale
    Union High Sch., 
    343 F.3d 1036
    , 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).
    At that point, the court may resolve any factual disputes
    concerning the existence of jurisdiction. See Augustine v.
    United States, 
    704 F.2d 1074
    , 1077 (9th Cir. 1983).
    “However, where the jurisdictional issue and substantive
    issues are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is
    dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the
    merits, the jurisdictional determination should await a
    determination of the relevant facts on either a motion going
    to the merits or at trial.” 
    Id.
    Here, the Secretary’s motion was based solely on the
    allegations in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint. It thus did not
    convert the motion to dismiss into a factual motion. And
    while the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the
    Plaintiff’s preliminary injunction, there is nothing in the
    record to indicate that the court, sua sponte, converted it into
    MECINAS V. HOBBS                                 9
    a hearing on standing. As such, we properly consider this
    motion based solely on the allegations in the complaint. 2
    DISCUSSION
    A. Standing
    Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal court
    jurisdiction to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art.
    III, § 2, cl. 1. As the Supreme Court has explained, “the
    ‘case or controversy’ requirement defines with respect to the
    Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which
    the Federal Government is founded.” Allen v. Wright,
    
    468 U.S. 737
    , 750 (1984). “[S]everal doctrines [] have
    grown up to elaborate that requirement,” including
    “mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like,” but
    “standing . . . is perhaps the most important of these
    doctrines.” 
    Id.
    To have standing, plaintiffs must establish (1) that they
    have suffered an injury in fact, (2) that their injury is fairly
    traceable to a defendant’s conduct, and (3) that their injury
    would likely be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan
    v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 560–61 (1992). Each of
    these elements must be supported “with the manner and
    degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
    2
    In its answering brief, the Secretary asserts that the district court
    properly resolved any necessary factual disputes and that it was
    “Plaintiffs’ burden below ‘to furnish affidavits or other evidence
    necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter
    jurisdiction.’” This misstates the law. To the extent the district court
    purported to resolve factual disputes relating to subject matter
    jurisdiction on the basis of the preliminary injunction hearing, this would
    be error, particularly insofar as those evidentiary issues are intertwined
    with the merits.
    10                   MECINAS V. HOBBS
    litigation.” 
    Id. at 561
    . At the pleading stage, “general factual
    allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct
    may suffice.” 
    Id.
    The district court held that none of Plaintiffs has standing
    to mount a facial attack on the Ballot Order Statute. Plaintiffs
    do not appeal the district court’s holding that the individual
    voters lack standing, arguing only that the organizational
    plaintiffs—that is, the DNC, the DSCC, and Priorities—
    have standing. In a suit with multiple plaintiffs, generally
    only one plaintiff need have standing for the suit to proceed.
    See Leonard v. Clark, 
    12 F.3d 885
    , 888 (9th Cir. 1993). We
    find that the DNC has sufficiently established standing to
    proceed beyond the pleading stage. We do not address the
    standing of the other plaintiffs.
    1. Injury in Fact
    To meet the first element of standing, a plaintiff’s “injury
    in fact” must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or
    imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at 560
    . Of particular relevance here is the requirement that
    the injury be “particularized,” rather than a “generalized
    grievance.” 
    Id. at 560, 575
    . “The fact that a harm is widely
    shared does not necessarily render it a generalized
    grievance.” Sisley v. U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., 
    11 F.4th 1029
    ,
    1034 (9th Cir. 2021). “Rather, a grievance too ‘generalized’
    for standing purposes is one characterized by its abstract and
    indefinite nature—for example, harm to the common
    concern for obedience to law.” 
    Id.
    Plaintiffs argue that the DNC has satisfied injury in fact
    on the basis of its “competitive standing,” explaining that the
    Ballot Order Statute “frustrat[es] its mission and efforts to
    elect Democratic Party candidates” by allegedly diverting
    MECINAS V. HOBBS                        11
    more votes to Republicans than Democrats, thereupon
    giving the Republican Party an unfair advantage.
    We first recognized the doctrine of competitive standing
    in Owen v. Mulligan, 
    640 F.2d 1130
     (9th Cir. 1981). In that
    case, a candidate and “Republic[an] Committee members”
    sued the U.S. Postal Service for giving an opponent a
    cheaper mailing rate, in violation of its own regulations and
    a previous injunction. 
    Id.
     at 1132–33. The Postal Service
    argued that the “potential loss of an election” was “too
    remote, speculative, and unredressable to confer standing.”
    
    Id. at 1132
    . Rejecting that argument, we recognized both the
    candidate’s and the party officials’ standing to sue “to
    prevent their opponent from gaining an unfair advantage in
    the election process through abuses of mail preferences
    which arguably promote his electoral prospects.” 
    Id. at 1133
    .
    We next addressed competitive standing in Drake v.
    Obama, 
    664 F.3d 774
    , 778 (9th Cir. 2011), a case involving
    a challenge to President Obama’s eligibility to serve as
    President brought by a group of plaintiffs that included
    Presidential candidates. There, we reaffirmed Owen’s
    holding that, as relevant to this case, the “potential loss of an
    election [is] an injury-in-fact sufficient to give . . . party
    officials standing” to challenge an offending election
    regulation. Id. at 783. Ultimately, we held that the candidate-
    plaintiffs lacked standing because, by the time they had filed
    their suit, the election had already passed and they were thus
    no longer candidates. Id. at 783–84. However, we
    distinguished the facts of that case from one in which a
    plaintiff—like Plaintiffs here—challenged “an ongoing
    practice that would have produced an unfair advantage in the
    next election.” Id.at 783 n.3.
    Citing Owen and Drake, Plaintiffs argue that, like the
    party committee members in Owen, the DNC, as the
    12                       MECINAS V. HOBBS
    operational arm of the Democratic Party, see 
    52 U.S.C. § 30101
    (14), has standing to sue based on the ongoing,
    unfair advantage conferred to their rival candidates by the
    Ballot Order Statute. We agree. If an allegedly unlawful
    election regulation makes the competitive landscape worse
    for a candidate or that candidate’s party than it would
    otherwise be if the regulation were declared unlawful, those
    injured parties have the requisite concrete, non-generalized
    harm to confer standing. 3
    This principle is neither novel nor unique to the realm of
    the electoral. Competitive standing recognizes the injury that
    results from being forced to participate in an “illegally
    structure[d] competitive environment,” Shays v. Fed.
    Election Comm’n, 
    414 F.3d 76
    , 87 (D.C. Cir. 2005), a type
    of harm that we have identified in a variety of different
    contexts, see, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Barr, 
    929 F.3d 1163
    , 1173 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[The] inability to compete on
    an even playing field constitutes a concrete and
    particularized injury.”); Preston v. Heckler, 
    734 F.2d 1359
    ,
    1365 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[W]hen challenged agency conduct
    allegedly renders a person unable to fairly compete for some
    benefit, that person has suffered a sufficient ‘injury in fact’
    and has standing . . . .”). Accordingly, a number of our sister
    Circuits have come to the same conclusion as we do here in
    similar cases involving ballot order statutes. See Pavek v.
    Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 
    967 F.3d 905
    , 907 (8th
    Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (political committees, including the
    3
    That both a candidate and a candidate’s political party can assert
    standing based on their shared interest in “fair competition,” see Drake,
    664 F.3d at 782, follows not only from our decision in Owen, which held
    as much, see 
    640 F.2d at 1132
    , but also from the fact that typically, and
    as Plaintiffs alleged here, “after the primary election, a candidate steps
    into the shoes of his party, and their interests are identical,” Texas
    Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 
    459 F.3d 582
    , 588 (5th Cir. 2006).
    MECINAS V. HOBBS                        13
    DSCC, had standing to challenge Minnesota’s ballot order
    statute “insofar as it unequally favors supporters of other
    political parties”); Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett, 
    767 F.3d 533
    , 544 (6th Cir. 2014) (political parties had standing to
    challenge ballot order statute because they were “subject to
    the ballot-ordering rule” and supported candidates “affected
    by” the law); see also Nelson v. Warner, 
    12 F.4th 376
    , 384
    (4th Cir. 2021) (candidate had standing to challenge ballot
    order statute that “allegedly injure[d] his chances of being
    elected”).
    Contrary to these established principles, the district court
    rejected the DNC’s competitive standing theory, relying
    principally on our decision in Townley v. Miller, 
    722 F.3d 1128
     (9th Cir. 2013). In that case, the Nevada Republican
    Party, along with other plaintiffs, challenged a statute
    mandating the appearance of a “none of these candidates”
    (“NOTC”) option on the ballot, which the Party alleged
    would cause its candidates to receive fewer votes and thus
    harm its chances in an election. Id. at 1135. “Assuming
    without deciding” that the Republican Party had satisfied
    “standing’s injury-in-fact requirement” on the basis of its
    alleged competitive harm, we held that standing failed for
    the separate reason that the “causation/traceability and
    redressability requirements” were not met. Id. at 1135–36.
    The reason was simple: The Party did not challenge the
    appearance of the NOTC option on the ballot (which it
    conceded was legal) but only that votes for that option were
    given no legal effect. Id. at 1136. Because the alleged
    siphoning effect would give rise to injury regardless of
    whether the option was given legal effect or not, the
    challenged aspect of the statute was “immaterial to
    plaintiffs’ alleged competitive injury.” Id.
    14                      MECINAS V. HOBBS
    The district court characterized the Townley decision as
    “narrow[ing] the scope of competitive standing,” stating that
    this Court “declined to find competitive standing” on the
    ground that the “inclusion of an ‘NOTC’ was not the
    [impermissible] inclusion of a candidate on the ballot.” This
    was in error. Rather than narrowing competitive standing as
    a basis for injury in fact, Townley reasserted this Court’s
    long-held position that the “potential loss of an election”
    may give rise to standing. 722 F.3d at 1135–36 (quoting
    Drake, 664 F.3d at 783–84). 4
    Further, because the injury is the burden of being forced
    to compete under the weight of a state-imposed
    disadvantage, we reject the Secretary’s argument that
    “Plaintiffs must show”—or rather, allege, given the current
    procedural posture—“that the primacy effect has changed
    (or will imminently change) the actual outcome of a partisan
    election.” The Secretary suggests that, absent the allegation
    of a changed outcome, “Plaintiffs’ purported injury remains
    ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’” citing in support the
    Supreme Court’s decision in Gill v. Whitford, 
    138 S. Ct. 1916
     (2018). But Gill offers no support for that position. In
    that case, the Supreme Court held that, in order to establish
    standing to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional
    gerrymander on the basis of a voter-dilution theory, a voter-
    plaintiff must show that he or she resides in a gerrymandered
    district, explaining that absent such a showing the voter lacks
    a sufficiently “particularized” injury. 
    Id. at 1926, 1934
    . It
    4
    In any case, Townley could not have narrowed the doctrine adopted
    in Owen (and reaffirmed in Drake) because it was the decision of a three-
    judge panel. See Hart v. Massanari, 
    266 F.3d 1155
    , 1171 (9th Cir. 2001)
    (“Once a panel resolves an issue in a precedential opinion, the matter is
    deemed resolved, unless overruled by the court itself sitting en banc, or
    by the Supreme Court.”).
    MECINAS V. HOBBS                       15
    thus left undisturbed the distinct and established competitive
    standing doctrine. See 
    id.
     at 1937–38 (Kagan, J., concurring)
    (“Everything said so far relates only to suits alleging that a
    partisan gerrymander dilutes individual votes. That is the
    way the Court sees this litigation.”).
    We thus conclude that the DNC has sufficiently pled an
    injury in fact.
    2. Traceability and Redressability
    The Secretary also argues that even if Plaintiffs could
    demonstrate an injury in fact, they cannot meet the two
    elements of standing not addressed by the district court—
    traceability and redressability. See Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at
    560–
    61. “[T]he ‘fairly traceable’ and ‘redressability’ components
    for standing overlap and are ‘two facets of a single causation
    requirement.’” Washington Env’t Council v. Bellon,
    
    732 F.3d 1131
    , 1146 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Allen, 
    468 U.S. at
    753 n.19). However, they are distinct in that traceability
    “examines the connection between the alleged misconduct
    and injury, whereas redressability analyzes the connection
    between the alleged injury and requested relief.” 
    Id.
    To establish traceability, “there must be a causal
    connection between the injury and the conduct complained
    of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged
    action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent
    action of some third party not before the court.” Lujan,
    
    504 U.S. at 560
    . The Secretary argues that Plaintiffs cannot
    establish traceability because neither the challenged section
    of the Ballot Order Statute, A.R.S. § 16-502(E), nor the
    provision that directs the board of supervisors in Arizona’s
    counties to prepare and print ballots, A.R.S. § 16-503,
    mentions the Secretary. See Jacobson v. Fla. Sec’y of State,
    
    974 F.3d 1236
    , 1253–54 (11th Cir. 2020) (plaintiff failed to
    16                      MECINAS V. HOBBS
    plead an injury traceable to the Florida Secretary of State
    where the challenged ballot order statute “tasks the
    Supervisors, independently of the Secretary, with printing
    the names of candidates on ballots in the order prescribed by
    the ballot statute”). Similarly, the Secretary argues that
    Plaintiffs’ claims and relief sought fail for lack of
    redressability because “[a]n injunction ordering the
    Secretary not to follow the ballot statute’s instructions for
    ordering candidates cannot provide redress, for neither she
    nor her agents control the order in which candidates appear
    on the ballot.” Id. at 1254.
    However, while the county supervisors print the ballots
    under A.R.S. § 16-503, they have no discretion in ordering
    candidate names. Rather they are bound to follow the Statute
    and the Election Procedures Manual, which is promulgated
    by the Secretary as a matter of Arizona law. See A.R.S. § 16-
    452(C) (“A person who violates any rule adopted [by the
    Secretary in the Manual] is guilty of a class 2
    misdemeanor.”). The Manual, which contains detailed
    instruction on ballot design and expressly requires counties
    to order candidates’ names on ballots in accordance with the
    Statute, is promulgated by the Secretary in the context of her
    role as Arizona’s “chief state election officer,” A.R.S. § 16-
    142(A)(1), who is tasked with “prescrib[ing] rules to achieve
    and maintain the maximum degree of correctness,
    impartiality, uniformity and efficiency on the procedures for
    early voting and voting, and of producing, distributing,
    collecting, counting, tabulating and storing ballots,” A.R.S.
    § 16-452(A). 5 Indeed, relying on the Secretary’s role in
    5
    Because the Secretary has a role in overseeing the ballots, in
    contrast to the Florida Secretary of State, who “is responsible only for
    certifying” the nominees, the Eleventh Circuit’s Jacobson decision is
    inapposite. 974 F.3d at 1253.
    MECINAS V. HOBBS                       17
    “promulgat[ing] rules . . . applicable to and mandatory for
    the statewide . . . elections,” we have previously held that a
    challenged Arizona election law was traceable to the
    Secretary. Arizona Libertarian Party, Inc. v. Bayless,
    
    351 F.3d 1277
    , 1281 (9th Cir. 2003). The same holds true
    here.
    Redressability is satisfied so long as the requested
    remedy “would amount to a significant increase in the
    likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that directly
    redresses the injury suffered.” Renee v. Duncan, 
    686 F.3d 1002
    , 1013 (9th Cir. 2012). Because, as noted above, the
    Secretary is statutorily delegated the authority to “prescribe
    rules” for “producing [and] distributing” ballots in
    accordance with the Statute, A.R.S. § 16-452(A), the
    counties would have no choice but to follow a mandate from
    her directing them to order the ballots pursuant to a court’s
    injunction. The Secretary does not dispute this point.
    Instead, she argues that her ability to adhere to a court’s
    injunction may be stymied by the governor or the attorney
    general, both of whom must approve the Manual before it
    can go into effect. See id. § 16-452(B). But this is of no
    moment. “Plaintiffs need not demonstrate that there is a
    ‘guarantee’ that their injuries will be redressed by a
    favorable decision.” Renee, 686 F.3d at 1013. Having shown
    that an injunction against the Secretary would
    “significant[ly] increase” the likelihood of relief, Plaintiffs
    have met their burden as to redressability. Id.
    Thus, at least with regard to the DNC, Plaintiffs have
    satisfied all three elements of standing.
    B. Political Question
    In addition to dismissing for lack of standing, the district
    court held that Plaintiffs’ suit was nonjusticiable under the
    18                   MECINAS V. HOBBS
    political question doctrine. In general, a federal court “has a
    responsibility to decide cases properly before it, even those
    it ‘would gladly avoid.’” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v.
    Clinton, 
    566 U.S. 189
    , 194 (2012) (quoting Cohens v.
    Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)). To this rule,
    the political question doctrine operates as only a “narrow
    exception.” 
    Id.
     Accordingly, the Supreme Court has limited
    its application to those few cases where there is either “a
    textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
    issue to a coordinate political department” or “a lack of
    judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
    resolving it.” Nixon v. United States, 
    506 U.S. 224
    , 228,
    (1993) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 
    369 U.S. 186
    , 217 (1962)).
    As we have explained, “courts should undertake a
    discriminating case-by-case analysis to determine whether
    [a] question posed lies beyond judicial cognizance” under
    this doctrine. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 
    410 F.3d 532
    , 545
    (9th Cir. 2005).
    In finding Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Ballot Order
    Statute nonjusticiable for lack of manageable standards, the
    district court—adopting the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in
    Jacobson, 974 F.3d at 1260–63—invoked the Supreme
    Court’s recent decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, 
    139 S. Ct. 2484
    , 2491 (2019), a case involving challenges to two
    states’ congressional districting maps as unconstitutional
    partisan gerrymanders. There, the Court concluded that,
    given its precedent allowing legislatures “to take partisan
    interests into account when drawing district lines,”
    adjudicating just “how much” partisan gerrymandering “is
    too much” presents questions of “fairness” not suitable for
    judicial resolution. 
    Id. at 2497
    , 2500–01. Relying on this
    language, the district court held that the present case was
    similarly nonjusticiable, characterizing Plaintiffs’ complaint
    MECINAS V. HOBBS                               19
    as calling on the court to decide what constitutes a “fair”
    ballot ordering system.
    But, in so holding, the district court overlooked the
    narrow scope of the Rucho decision, which the Supreme
    Court explicitly linked to its “struggle[] without success over
    the past several decades to discern judicially manageable
    standards for deciding” partisan gerrymandering claims. 
    Id. at 2491
    . The Court explicitly distinguished partisan
    gerrymandering claims as “more difficult to adjudicate” than
    other election-related challenges, namely districting
    challenges grounded in “one-person, one-vote” violations
    and racial discrimination. 
    Id. at 2497
    . As such, “[n]othing
    about the Court’s language . . . suggests that the holding in
    Rucho is applicable outside the context of partisan
    gerrymandering claims.” Nelson, 12 F.4th at 387. 6
    Indeed, adjudicating a challenge to a ballot order statute
    does not present the sort of intractable issues that arise in
    partisan gerrymandering cases. While cases like Rucho
    require “reallocating power and influence between political
    parties” through complicated exercises in (literal) line-
    6
    Contrary to the suggestion of the district court, our decision in
    Juliana v. United States, 
    947 F.3d 1159
     (9th Cir. 2020), did not extend
    Rucho’s reasoning to find claims related to climate change nonjusticiable
    under the political question doctrine. See 
    id.
     at 1174 n.9 (“we do not find
    this to be a political question”). Rather, in that case, we found that the
    plaintiffs could not satisfy the redressability element of standing because
    the relief sought—“a comprehensive scheme to decrease fossil fuel
    emissions and combat climate change”—was inconsistent with the
    limited remedial authority of federal courts siting in equity. 
    Id.
     at 1171–
    73; see also Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 
    326 U.S. 99
    , 105 (1945)
    (“Equitable relief in a federal court is of course subject to restrictions,”
    including that “the suit must be within the traditional scope of equity as
    historically evolved in the English Court of Chancery[.]”). That issue is
    not present here.
    20                      MECINAS V. HOBBS
    drawing, 
    139 S. Ct. at 2502
    , there is no comparable difficulty
    in constructing a ballot ordering scheme that lists candidates
    on a basis other than political party affiliation. Whether it be
    at random, through the sort of rotation system required in
    Arizona’s primary election, see A.R.S. § 16-502(H), or by
    some other method, “[a]ny system that orders candidates on
    a basis other than party affiliation remedies the constitutional
    concern,” Jacobson, 974 F.3d at 1301 (Pryor, Jill, J.,
    dissenting). It is thus no surprise that, in contrast to the
    Court’s persistent struggle to address partisan
    gerrymandering claims, federal courts—as well as state
    courts 7—have adjudicated the merits of ballot order disputes
    for decades. See Nelson, 12 F.4th at 387 (collecting cases).
    Notably, this includes the U.S. Supreme Court, which, in a
    summary affirmance over an objection premised on the
    political question doctrine, upheld a district court’s finding
    that an incumbent-favoring ballot order policy was a
    “purposeful and unlawful invasion of [the] plaintiffs’
    Fourteenth Amendment right to fair and evenhanded
    treatment.” Mann v. Powell, 
    314 F. Supp. 677
    , 679 (N.D. Ill.
    1969), aff’d, 
    398 U.S. 955
     (1970).
    More particularly, there is no reason to conclude that the
    Supreme Court’s Rucho opinion “call[s] into question the
    use of the Anderson[-]Burdick framework,” the
    constitutional test that “[c]ourts regularly [use to] evaluate
    and adjudicate disputes regarding the lawfulness of state
    7
    For example, in Kautenberger v. Jackson, 
    85 Ariz. 128
    , 129
    (1958), the Arizona Supreme Court considered a challenge under the
    state constitution to a law that required rotating candidates’ names on
    paper ballots in primary elections but maintained a fixed ballot order on
    machine ballots. The court held that Arizona’s constitution required
    name rotation due to the “well-known fact” that “where there are a
    number of candidates for the same office, the names appearing at the
    head of the list have a distinct advantage.” 
    Id. at 131
    .
    MECINAS V. HOBBS                               21
    [election] statutes, including ballot-order statutes.” Nelson,
    12 F.4th at 387; Soltysik v. Padilla, 
    910 F.3d 438
    , 444 (9th
    Cir. 2018) (“Our court has applied [the Anderson-Burdick]
    test to a wide variety of challenges to ballot regulations and
    other state-enacted election procedures.”). Under the
    Anderson-Burdick test, a court identifies the “character and
    magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by
    the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks
    to vindicate” and then weighs the injury “against the precise
    interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
    burden imposed by its rule.” Burdick v. Takushi, 
    504 U.S. 428
    , 434 (1992); see Anderson v. Celebrezze, 
    460 U.S. 780
    ,
    789 (1983).
    As reflected in the Supreme Court’s use of Anderson-
    Burdick to adjudicate claims that state election laws
    unconstitutionally burden political parties’ rights, the test
    provides precisely the sort of judicially manageable standard
    that renders a case such as the instant one amenable to
    adjudication. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
    Party, 
    520 U.S. 351
    , 357–64 (1997) (applying test to
    Minnesota law prohibiting candidates from appearing on
    ballot as candidate of more than one political party). Because
    the Anderson-Burdick test is available to review Plaintiffs’
    constitutional challenges, we conclude that we can
    “comfortably employ[] judicially manageable standards” in
    adjudicating the merits of the claims at issue here. Pavek,
    967 F.3d at 907.
    We therefore hold that the political question doctrine
    does not render the merits of this case nonjusticiable. 8
    8
    The district court further erred insofar as it based its finding of
    nonjusticiability on its determination that, as a factual matter, Plaintiffs
    22                       MECINAS V. HOBBS
    C. Eleventh Amendment
    The Secretary further argues that even if we disagree
    with both of the district court’s jurisdictional holdings, we
    can nevertheless affirm the dismissal on the ground that
    Plaintiffs’ suit is barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
    The Eleventh Amendment has been “construed to prohibit
    federal courts from entertaining suits brought by a state
    citizen against the state or its instrumentality in the absence
    of consent.” Culinary Workers Union, Loc. 226 v. Del Papa,
    
    200 F.3d 614
    , 619 (9th Cir. 1999). However, under Ex parte
    Young, 
    209 U.S. 123
     (1908), this immunity is subject to an
    exception for “actions for prospective declaratory or
    injunctive relief against state officers in their official
    capacities for their alleged violations of federal law” so long
    as the state officer has “some connection with enforcement
    of the act.” Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action v. Brown,
    
    674 F.3d 1128
    , 1134 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ex parte
    Young, 
    209 U.S. at 157
    ).
    The question of whether there is the requisite
    “connection” between the sued official and the challenged
    law implicates an analysis that is “closely related—indeed
    overlapping”—with the traceability and redressability
    inquiry already discussed. Culinary Workers, 
    200 F.3d at 619
     (quoting Okpalobi v. Foster, 
    190 F.3d 337
    , 347 (5th
    Cir.1999)); see also Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v.
    Wasden, 
    376 F.3d 908
    , 919 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the
    two inquiries share a “common denominator”). Accordingly,
    “did not meet their burden” of establishing “the existence of any ballot
    order effect in Arizona.” Because the existence of such an effect is
    unquestionably an issue intertwined with the merits, the district court
    was not permitted to resolve this question of fact on a motion to dismiss.
    See Augustine, 
    704 F.2d at 1077
    .
    MECINAS V. HOBBS                        23
    the Secretary argues, as she did in connection to standing,
    that she lacks sufficient connection to the Ballot Order
    Statute because she is merely the chief state election officer,
    not the one who prints the ballots. In support of this position,
    the Secretary cites the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Mi Familia
    Vota v. Abbott, 
    977 F.3d 461
    , 468–69 (5th Cir. 2020), in
    which the court held that a claim challenging a prohibition
    against the use of paper ballots did not fall within the Ex
    parte Young exception as applied to the Texas Secretary of
    State because county officials, and not the Secretary of State,
    were statutorily responsible for printing ballots.
    The decision in Mi Familia Vota, however, was premised
    on a finding that an injunction against the Texas Secretary of
    State would still leave local officials with enough discretion
    to prevent meaningful relief, see 
    id.
     at 467–68, whereas in
    Arizona, in contrast, the Secretary has clear duties to oversee
    ballot production, including, as already discussed, through
    the promulgation of the Manual, which the county officials
    have no discretion to disregard, A.R.S. §§ 16-452(A), (C).
    The “connection” required under Ex parte Young demands
    merely that the implicated state official have a relevant role
    that goes beyond “a generalized duty to enforce state law or
    general supervisory power over the persons responsible for
    enforcing the challenged provision.” Planned Parenthood,
    
    376 F.3d at 919
    . Here, given the Secretary’s role in
    promulgating the Election Procedures Manual, that modest
    requirement is far exceeded. The Secretary is thus properly
    named as a defendant under Ex parte Young.
    Having decided that Plaintiffs’ suit against the Secretary
    presents a justiciable case or controversy, we now turn to the
    merits.
    24                   MECINAS V. HOBBS
    D. The Merits
    The right to vote is “preservative of all rights.” Yick Wo
    v. Hopkins, 
    118 U.S. 356
    , 370 (1886). As such, voting is
    accorded “the most fundamental significance under our
    constitutional structure.” Burdick, 
    504 U.S. at 433
    . But,
    “[o]n the other hand, the Constitution assigns to the States
    the duty to regulate elections, and election laws ‘invariably
    impose some burden upon individual voters.’” Arizona
    Democratic Party v. Hobbs, 
    18 F.4th 1179
    , 1186 (9th Cir.
    2021) (quoting Burdick, 
    504 U.S. at 433
    ). Moreover, “as a
    practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of
    elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of
    order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic
    processes.” 
    Id.
     at 1186–87 (quoting Storer v. Brown,
    
    415 U.S. 724
    , 730 (1974)).
    To balance these competing concerns, the Supreme
    Court “devised [the Anderson-Burdick test as] a ‘flexible
    standard’ for assessing laws that regulate elections.” Id.
    at 1187 (quoting Burdick, 
    504 U.S. at 434
    ). “This is a sliding
    scale test, where the more severe the burden, the more
    compelling the state’s interest must be.” Soltysik, 910 F.3d
    at 444. “A law that imposes a ‘severe’ burden on voting
    rights must meet strict scrutiny.” Hobbs, 18 F.4th at 1187
    (quoting Burdick, 
    504 U.S. at 434
    ). “Lesser burdens,
    however, trigger less exacting review, and a State’s
    ‘important regulatory interests’ will usually be enough to
    justify ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.’”
    Timmons, 
    520 U.S. at 358
     (quoting Burdick, 
    504 U.S. at 434
    ).
    In assessing Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Ballot Order
    Statute, the first step, as already noted, is to consider “the
    character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights
    protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the
    MECINAS V. HOBBS                        25
    plaintiff seeks to vindicate.” Anderson, 
    460 U.S. at 789
    .
    Here, Plaintiffs assert a cognizable injury resulting from the
    “primacy effect,” which Plaintiffs allege is so substantial so
    as to give “Republican candidates . . . a significant, state-
    mandated advantage, up and down the slate of partisan
    races,” violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments by
    diluting votes for candidates whose party the Statute
    disfavors and conferring an unfair political advantage on
    certain candidates solely because of their partisan affiliation.
    See, e.g., McLain v. Meier, 
    637 F.2d 1159
    , 1165–67 (8th Cir.
    1980) (incumbent-first statute “burden[ed] the fundamental
    right to vote possessed by supporters of the last-listed
    candidates” and violated equal protection); Sangmeister v.
    Woodard, 
    565 F.2d 460
    , 467 (7th Cir. 1977) (policy of
    awarding first position on the ballot to the incumbent party
    violated equal protection); Mann, 314 F. Supp. at 679
    (favoring incumbents when breaking ballot order ties
    violated “Fourteenth Amendment right to fair and
    evenhanded treatment”), aff’d, 
    398 U.S. 955
    .
    The Secretary urges us to deem “any burden” imposed
    by the Statute as “negligible” and thus justified by the state’s
    interest in “establish[ing] a manageable ballot layout.” But
    the magnitude of the asserted injury is a function of the
    “primacy effect,” presenting factual questions that cannot be
    resolved on a motion to dismiss. See Soltysik, 910 F.3d
    at 449. For example, the complaint alleged that in the 2020
    election cycle, more than “80% of Arizona’s voters [would]
    be presented with ballots in which the names of Republican
    candidates [were] listed first for every single partisan race.”
    And, as noted, the Arizona Supreme Court has characterized
    the “distinct advantage” arising from a candidate’s name
    appearing at the head of a ballot as a “well-known fact.”
    Kautenberger, 
    85 Ariz. at 131
    . Moreover, even if the burden
    imposed is, as the Secretary contends, “not severe,” that is
    26                  MECINAS V. HOBBS
    not the end of our inquiry. Soltysik, 910 F.3d at 445. Even a
    ballot measure “not severe enough to warrant strict scrutiny”
    may well be “serious enough to require an assessment of
    whether alternative methods would advance the proffered
    governmental interests.” Id. at 450. And given that Arizona’s
    asserted interest in a manageable ballot could seemingly be
    effectuated through a nondiscriminatory ordering system,
    “judgment in the Secretary’s favor is premature” at this
    juncture. Id.
    Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order and
    judgment dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice and
    remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.