Alvarez Trejo v. Garland ( 2023 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         APR 24 2023
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    VICTORIA ORBELINA ALVAREZ                       No. 21-547
    TREJO; ZAIDA LARISSA BENITEZ                    Agency Nos.
    ALVAREZ; SHEILA AYLEN ALVAREZ                   A209-388-264
    TREJO,                                          A209-388-265
    A209-388-266
    Petitioners,
    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
    General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted April 11, 2023
    Pasadena, California
    Before: BERZON, MILLER, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
    Victoria Orbelina Alvarez Trejo (“Alvarez Trejo”), a native and citizen of
    El Salvador, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
    decision affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying her and her two
    minor daughters’ applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
    precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the
    petition.
    “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both
    decisions.” Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 
    886 F.3d 1291
    , 1293 (9th Cir. 2018).
    “We examine the BIA’s ‘legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for
    substantial evidence.’” Garcia v. Wilkinson, 
    988 F.3d 1136
    , 1142 (9th Cir.
    2021) (quoting Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 
    850 F.3d 1051
    , 1059 (9th Cir.
    2017) (en banc)).
    1. The BIA did not err in determining that Alvarez Trejo failed to
    establish a fear of future persecution on account of her membership in either of
    the two particular social groups Alvarez Trejo proposed.
    First, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Alvarez
    Trejo was not targeted because of her membership in the proposed particular
    social group “nuclear family.” No evidence in the record supports the
    conclusion that Alvarez Trejo or family members were targeted on account of
    their family association. Rather, as the IJ concluded, the evidence, including
    Alvarez Trejo’s own testimony, shows that Alvarez Trejo’s interactions, as well
    as her family’s interactions, with the 18th Street Gang appear to be random or
    economically motivated.
    Second, the BIA did not err in concluding that Alvarez Trejo’s second
    proposed particular social group, “El Salvadoran women who gangs believe
    reported crimes to police” is not cognizable on the instant record. Substantial
    2                                    21-547
    evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the proposed group is not
    cognizable because it is not socially distinct. No evidence in the record shows
    that Salvadoran society perceives women who are perceived by gangs to have
    reported crimes to police as a group. Cf. Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 
    947 F.3d 1238
    , 1243 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that people who privately report crimes to
    police may be socially distinct “if there were evidence that, in a specific
    country, people in the community knew who reported crimes to the police, or if
    there were laws protecting those who did”). Although Alvarez Trejo argues that
    the witness protection law enacted in 2006 serves as evidence that Salvadoran
    society views people who report crimes to police as socially unique, neither the
    witness protection law, as described in the record, nor the country conditions
    reports mention protections for women who are perceived to have reported
    crimes to police. See Matter of H-L-S-A-, 
    28 I. & N. Dec. 228
    , 237-38 (BIA
    2021).
    Moreover, the evidence does not compel a conclusion contrary to the
    BIA’s determination that the gang did not actually perceive Alvarez Trejo to
    have reported a crime. Although some evidence in Alvarez Trejo’s testimony
    supports her contention that the gang believed she had reported a crime, Alvarez
    Trejo also recounted that the gang made statements indicating it threatened her
    in exchange for future silence, rather than because of a belief that she had
    reported crimes.
    3                                     21-547
    In sum, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Alvarez
    Trejo failed to show a nexus between past or future persecution and the
    proposed group “nuclear family.” Her second proposed social group,
    Salvadoran women who gangs believe have reported crimes, is not, on this
    record, cognizable. We therefore affirm the denial of Alvarez Trejo’s asylum
    application as to those grounds.
    2. The BIA also did not err in determining that Alvarez Trejo did not
    establish a nexus between either past or feared future persecution and her
    political opinion. The record does not support a conclusion that Alvarez Trejo
    held or expressed a political opinion by remaining neutral in an environment in
    which political neutrality is fraught with hazard. See Sangha v. I.N.S., 
    103 F.3d 1482
    , 1488 (9th Cir. 1997). Alvarez Trejo’s testimony that she refused to
    shelter a fleeing gang member and initially refused to pay money to gangs from
    the family store, is insufficient to compel the conclusion that she expressed a
    refusal to support gangs. Alvarez Trejo also did not introduce evidence
    compelling the conclusion that the gang imputed a political opinion to her or
    targeted her on account of that opinion. Alvarez Trejo explains the gang’s
    persecution of her family as principally random (fleeing police), money-based,
    or retaliatory. Thus, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that
    Alvarez Trejo did not establish that she held or was imputed to have a political
    opinion for which she was targeted. Her claim for asylum on that ground fails.
    4                                    21-547
    3. Finally, the BIA did not err in rejecting Alvarez Trejo’s Convention
    Against Torture claim on the grounds that Alvarez Trejo did not establish that
    she is more likely than not to be tortured upon return to El Salvador and that the
    government would acquiesce in torture by the 18th Street Gang. See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.18
    (a)(1). Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusions, incorporated
    into the BIA’s review, that the gang did not previously torture Alvarez Trejo
    and that she has not shown that any future treatment would reach the level of
    torture. Additionally, Alvarez Trejo’s testimony that gang members threatened
    her about going to the police and were hiding from the police supports the
    BIA’s conclusion that the police and government are not working together with
    the gang, so the police would not turn a blind eye to the gang’s treatment of
    Alvarez Trejo’s family. Finally, the country conditions reports that Alvarez
    Trejo submitted contain descriptions of the Salvadoran government’s efforts to
    control gang activity, additionally supporting the BIA’s conclusion that
    acquiescence is not shown on the record. In sum, the record does not compel
    the conclusion that Alvarez Trejo would be tortured upon return to El Salvador
    or that the government would acquiesce in such torture, and the BIA did not err
    in denying Alvarez Trejo’s CAT claim.
    The petition for review is DENIED. The motion to stay removal is
    DENIED.
    5                                    21-547
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-547

Filed Date: 4/24/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/24/2023